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Abstract 
The EU enlargement policy aims to transform applicant countries into fully-fledged member 
states, committed to abiding by the EU acquis and able to take part in the EU decision-
making and policy implementation processes. However, the contestation of the state, or 
contested statehood, has been identified as the key variable hindering Europeanisation in the 
Western Balkans. This has led the European Union (EU) to fall into cycles of mismanaged 
conditionality, such as in the police reform process and the constitutional reform process in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, the EU has learned to adapt, enacting practices of state 
building to cope with contested statehood. 
By bridging the literature on European integration, state building, and Europeanisation, this 
study traces the transformations of sovereignty and of the state throughout European 
integration, and identifies the polity ideas that underpin EU practices of ‘member state 
building’ in the notion of sovereignty as participation. Member state building is interested in 
reinforcing administrative capacities with the aim of participation in EU processes, while 
also enhancing the legitimacy of institutions via the export of consensus-generating 
mechanisms. 
Two case studies, exemplifying the two statehood dimensions of legitimacy and capacity, 
allow examining how the EU interacts with Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the framework of the 
Structured Dialogue on Justice and of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, the EU 
introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina consensus-generating mechanisms, aimed at restoring 
both administrative capacities and domestic legitimacy of institutions. 
The role of the EU as an interested mediator and the emancipatory potential of the accession 
perspective set member state building apart from ‘liberal peace’ international state building. 
Member state building thus emerges as an enlargement-specific form of EU-led state 
building, allowing the EU to cope with contested statehood in its candidate countries and 
potential candidates and to build member states while integrating them. 
 
.  
1 
 
Introduction and methods 
 
 
 
 
The dissertation identifies the practices adopted by the European Union (EU) when 
confronted with issues of state contestation in the framework of its enlargement policy, 
looking specifically at the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).  While in previous 
enlargement rounds the EU could limit itself to accompanying the process of double transition 
to democracy and market economy, in the case of the Western Balkans the EU has to confront 
the additional issue of state contestation, or contested statehood, that hinders the causal 
mechanisms of Europeanisation, i.e. conditionality and socialisation. This has led the EU to 
perform ineffectively and to fall into cycles of mismanaged conditionality, such as the police 
reform process (2005-2008) and the Sejdić–Finci constitutional reform process (2008-2014) 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In this dissertation I argue that, in order to cope with contested statehood, the EU has 
adapted its enlargement policy over time and developed a ‘member state building’ strategy, 
different from the usual ‘liberal peace’ international state building that is aimed at 
strengthening state structures per se. Member state building, rather, aims at establishing or 
reinforcing those specific structures which are required in order to take part in the EU 
decision-making and policy-implementation processes, while at the same time preserving and 
enhancing their domestic legitimacy via the export of consensus-building mechanisms and 
procedures. Member state building thus emerges as an enlargement-specific form of EU-led 
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state building, set apart from ‘liberal peace’ international state building by its specific aim to 
build future EU member states, the ensuing need to preserve and restore internal democratic 
legitimacy, and the policy tools chosen to achieve this – softer tools of capacity-building and 
consensus-building aimed at restoring both administrative capacities and domestic legitimacy.  
 
1. EU enlargement and state building in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The rules of entry into a club are usually the first element in the definition of identity and 
otherness. This is also valid for international organisations, especially for those that do not 
aspire at universal membership but rather posit themselves as regional and functional 
organisations. The European Union here represents a crucial case, since it is the international 
organisation with the most developed and demanding policy of membership, reflecting both 
the degree and the differentiation of its internal integration.  
Over the decades of EU deepening and widening, from a six-country area of free 
circulation of goods and workers to the current 28-country political union based on a unified 
internal market, the EU has developed and specified its enlargement policy in relation to the 
applicant countries it was faced with. Over the last thirty years, EU enlargement has reshaped 
the international system of the old continent. Following the end of the bipolar structure in 
Europe, and accompanying processes of democratisation and economic liberalisation, the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe introduced deep reforms in their state structures to 
achieve EU membership between 2004 and 2007. Six more countries from the Western 
Balkans
1
 as well as Turkey are currently engaging in the same accession-driven 
                                                 
1
 Well aware of the profound connotations of the term “Balkans” (see Todorova, Maria N. Imagining the 
Balkans. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), I use the “Western Balkans”  label—defined as all post-
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transformative effort, while other applicants have expressed their desire to embark on the 
same integration process, which appears to promise peace and prosperity.  
It is against this backdrop that the enlargement policy has been dubbed the EU’s most—
and arguably the only—successful foreign policy2. Starting from the basic “rules of entry in 
the club” set by the Treaties since 1957, the EU has developed over time an enlargement 
policy acting as a framework of its relations with Europe at large.
3
 The EU enlargement 
policy may be interpreted as an ever more demanding pre-accession strategy that aims at 
transforming applicant countries into fully-fledged member states, committed to abiding by 
EU acquis commitments and able to take part in the EU decision-making and policy 
implementation processes. 
If the first enlargement in 1973 proceeded without particular conditions besides free 
market access, the perspective of accession of post-authoritarian Mediterranean countries 
since the 1960s fostered the development of an understanding of the EU as a community of 
liberal democracies, leading to the inclusion of democratic conditionality in its pre-accession 
policy.
4
 While the inclusion of neutral countries in 1995 helped the EU differentiate its own 
                                                                                                                                                        
Yugoslav countries, minus Slovenia, plus Albania—as more accurate and appropriate than alternative terms 
such as Southeastern Europe to refer to the countries of the current EU enlargement agenda. As remarked by 
Elbasani “the Western Balkans grouping is distinguished as a separate region in terms of European 
enlargement, as all countries share a common perspective and framework of European integration”. Elbasani, 
Arolda. “Europeanization Travels to the Western Balkans: Enlargement Strategy, Domestic Obstacles and 
Diverging Reforms.” In European Integration and Transformation in the Western Balkans: Europeanization 
or Business as Usual? London: Routledge 2013. 
2
 Bertoncini, Yves, and Chopin, Thierry.  oliti ue europ enne. Etats, pouvoirs et citoyens de l’Union 
europ enne. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po 2010, p. 54. 
3
 Sedelmeier, Ulrich. “Enlargement: from rules for accession to a policy towards Europe?” In H. Wallace, A. R. 
Young, & M. A. Pollack, Policy-making in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 401–
430.  
4
 Thomas, Daniel C. “Constitutionalization through enlargement: the contested origins of the EU’s democratic 
identity.” Journal of European Public Policy, 13(8), 2006, p. 1190–1210.  
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identity from the transatlantic integration projects based on US leadership and centred upon 
NATO, it has been in particular the fifth eastward enlargement of the EU in 2004/2007 that 
fostered the development of a comprehensive pre-accession strategy within the EU 
enlargement policy. Faced with applicant countries undergoing a double transition to 
democracy and market economy, the EU enlargement policy developed into a complex 
process of conditionality and compliance, led by the European Commission and based upon 
contractual agreements and the “Copenhagen criteria” (democracy, functioning market 
economy, capacity to abide by the commitments of the EU acquis). This process crucially 
contributed to the transformation and consolidation of liberal market democracies in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
The EU enlargement process is still ongoing, and seven more countries from the Western 
Balkans to Turkey are engaging in the same accession-driven transformative effort, relatively 
unhindered by the crisis that has shaken the economic and political governance of the EU in 
the last period. The countries of the current enlargement agenda, though, bring along a 
different challenge for the EU. With the exception of the case of Turkey, they are recent 
countries, less consolidated in their statehood, born out of either the violent dissolution of 
Yugoslavia or the collapse of state institutions in post-Cold War Albania. Both their will and 
capacity to introduce reforms and respond to EU incentives are hindered by open issues of 
statehood, related equally to the (lack of) administrative capacities and popular legitimacy of 
state structures.
5
  
                                                 
5
 Paris, Roland. “Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism”. International Security 22(2), 1997, p. 
54–89. 
Chandler, David. International statebuilding. London: Routledge 2010. 
Richmond, Oliver P. “Failed Statebuilding versus Peace Formation.” In Routledge handbook of international 
statebuilding. Abingdon ; Oxon: Routledge 2013, p. 130–140. 
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The EU has responded to such challenges by strengthening its pre-accession strategy in 
several ways. First, compliance conditionality is no longer limited to legal compliance (“box-
ticking”) but extends to the track record of implementation. Moreover, the Copenhagen 
criteria have been complemented with region-specific conditions for each applicant (regional 
cooperation, ICTY cooperation, normalisation of relations with neighbours): the ‘Copenhagen 
plus’ acquis. Finally, the EU is getting increasingly involved in issues of state building, linked 
to its own involvement (from military to police missions and international civil administration 
powers) in international efforts to stabilise and reconstruct post-conflict countries. 
Since the 1990s, statehood issues have been addressed by international state-building 
efforts, led by the UN and other international institutions (WB, IMF, NATO), and aimed at 
strengthening state capacities to achieve sustainable peace. Yet, early state-building 
approaches, based on military stabilisation and a guided democratic transition, have been 
criticised for not taking into account local agency and for ending up reinforcing dependency 
from abroad.
6
 
The state-building conducted by the EU, in particular when accession-driven – member 
state building, i.e. “building functional member states while integrating them into the EU” 7 – 
is different, I argue, from the kind of state building conducted by international organisations. 
This is so, among other things, because of the different identity of the European Union as a 
supranational organisation, and the different experience of its member states with sovereignty. 
The latter is seen more as a source of the troubles that haunted Europe in the 20th century 
rather than as a solution to them, and at least partly overcome by regional integration. As the 
EU-led accession-driven form of state building, member state building is a distinct process, 
                                                 
6
 International Commission for the Balkans (ICB). The Balkans in Europe’s future. Sofia: Centre for Liberal 
Strategies 2005, p. 29. 
7
 Ibid. 
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resulting in a different outcome: the construction of state structures which are able to 
participate in the EU framework of regional integration, rather than the strengthening of state 
structures per se.  
As such, member state building employs a wider set of tools than international state-
building. Over time, it has grown into a project that does not only seek to strengthen the 
administrative efficiency through capacity-building projects (“capacities”), but it also takes 
into consideration the relationships between state and society (“legitimacy”), which it tries to 
address through political dialogue instruments and through the inclusion in the process of 
local authorities, non-state actors and civil society organisations. The double emphasis on 
both capacities and legitimacy of state institutions in candidate countries gives a broad 
transformative potential to the EU member state building process, and highlights how the 
identity features of the EU emerge in its enlargement policy – the reproductive moment of the 
regional integration process. 
The dissertation highlights this process with case studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
As the country with the most layers of complexity in governance, among those of the region, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the product of multiple, overlapping and unfinished transitions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shares with the whole Central-Eastern Europe the heritage of 
socialism, with its related two transitions to democracy and to market economy (two of the 
three Copenhagen criteria for EU membership). In addition to this, it shares with the other 
post-Yugoslav and post-Soviet states the heritage of recent independence, with its transition 
to sovereignty and statehood. Finally, it shares with other post-Yugoslav states the heritage of 
conflict, with its transition to peace. Due to the way peace was achieved in Bosnia, though, 
through external intervention and imposed federal compromise backed by international 
supervision, it also faces additional transitions to functional governance and to self-rule. 
When analysed under the lens of contested statehood, Bosnia and Herzegovina appears to be 
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fully in control of its territory and enjoying universal recognition, yet being severely 
constrained in its domestic ability to take and implement policy decisions. An asymmetric and 
highly decentralised federal system, with most competences in the remit of sub-state levels, 
and the embeddedness of international organisations with executive powers such as the Office 
of the High Representative (OHR), are all testimony to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
“problematic sovereignty”.8 
With the exception of executive and sanctioning powers, which remain vested in the 
OHR, the EU retains full instrumentality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its toolbox straddles 
enlargement policy, with policy dialogue and financial assistance; Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, with the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUSR, since 
2011 double-hatted as Head of EU Delegation) conducting activities of political dialogue and 
mediation, including the Structured Dialogue on Justice; and Common Security and Defence 
Policy, including the EUFOR Althea military mission. With such a wide policy arsenal at its 
disposal, it is puzzling that the EU has chosen to use softer tools, such as financial assistance 
and political dialogue, to conduct state building activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This, I 
argue, can be understood if the latter are considered as part of a member state building 
strategy that aims at overcoming state contestation by strengthening domestic legitimacy and 
supporting the consolidation of the institutions needed by a future EU member state, 
remaining strictly within the perimeter of the EU acquis. 
Overall, this makes of Bosnia a crucial case to study the approach of the EU to non-
typical (i.e. long established, unitary, nation-state) enlargement countries, and the strategies 
put in place by the EU to cope with the contestation of statehood as an intervening variable of 
the Europeanisation process. If the EU has been able to find and enact strategies to cope with 
                                                 
8
 Krasner, Stephen D. Problematic Sovereignty: contested rules and political possibilities. New York: Columbia 
University Press 2001, p. 2. 
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contested statehood in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then we may assume that similar 
or more limited adaptations may be successful in other cases too. 
 
2. Analytical aims 
The proposed research aims to contribute to the literature on European integration by offering 
a social constructivist reading of the EU through its actions towards its candidate countries 
(“member state building”). The identity of the EU as a supranational union of states 
influences its concept of sovereignty, apparent from the notion of member state, and its state-
building actions in the framework of the enlargement policy. The EU reproduces itself by 
fostering the development of compatible state structures across its borders and then 
integrating them. Moreover, I also highlight how the EU may learn from its failures and adapt  
its policy tools to react to different environments.  
Moreover, this thesis adds to the debate on the external action of the EU by establishing a 
dialogue between the literature on the Europeanisation of candidate countries and the 
literature on state building. I propose to reconceptualise them through the notion of member 
state building, focusing on the accession-driven strategies of EU state building as a way to 
overcome the limitations of traditional state-building approaches, and reframing the debate on 
the limits of Europeanisation and of the transformative power of Europe. Finally, on a policy 
level, this thesis also shows which features are necessary for the EU to achieve an impact in 
an unfavourable context such as the one of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
More broadly, the study offers a contribution to international studies by proposing an 
analysis of the transformations of the state, highlighting the factors and mechanisms that may 
allow international actors to foster the consolidation and transformation of state structures 
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abroad, while at the same time underpin state legitimacy and democratic politics. Member 
state building points to an unprecedented process of state transformation by interaction and 
integration, which contributes to the current academic debate on the transformations of states 
and democracy.  
I investigate member state building along two dimensions of statehood, defined as 
follows. The first, capacity, measures the effectiveness of administration, which may enable 
the country to take part in the definition and implementation of EU policies after accession 
(e.g., the build-up of a decentralised implementation system in order to access pre-accession 
funds).
9
 The second, legitimacy, highlights the interrelation between state and society and 
refers to the absence of state contestation and competitive nation-building projects.
10
 I single 
out legitimacy and capacity as the two significant dimensions of statehood in order to ensure 
that they are theoretically independent from each other.
11
 
 
3. Research questions  
The dissertation addresses member state building in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim to 
develop an analysis of the transformation of the state within the context of EU enlargement 
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from the vantage point of social constructivism. Secondly, it offers an interpretation of the EU 
as a state-building agent starting from its actions in the framework of its enlargement policy 
in the context of the Western Balkans, highlighting the features that set it apart from other 
international state building actors. The final aim of the study is to provide an interpretation of 
the EU as a political system with a peculiar identity that reproduces itself by fostering the 
development of compatible state structures in the countries across its borders before 
integrating them. 
The first set of research questions of this study include which notions of statehood and 
sovereignty underpin EU practices of state-building, and to what extent the EU’s practices of 
state building differ from those of other international agencies. With the notion of member 
state as a reference point, I trace the transformations of the state as seen through different 
theories of European integration, highlighting how this may be best understood under a social 
constructivist ontology able to show the mutual constitutiveness between the Union and its 
member states. I then inquire the transformation of sovereignty within the context of theories 
of International Relations, showing how the relations between the EU and its member states 
are best understood through a notion of sovereignty as capacity and participation, rather than 
of sovereignty as control or as responsibility. As a next step, I look into the framework 
provided by the literature on Europeanisation, as a prism to explain the transformative power 
of ‘Europe’, both towards EU member states and towards candidate countries and potential 
candidates. Here I highlight the issue of contested statehood as a crucial intervening variable 
in the literature to explain the apparent failure of Europeanisation in the Western Balkans. In 
order to move forward, I then propose to reconceptualise the issue under the notion of 
“member state building”, looking at how ‘Europe’ affects statehood in the Western Balkans – 
not anymore as an intervening but as a dependent variable. My emphasis is not on the 
11 
 
outcomes of this process, i.e. on the effectiveness of the EU’s actions, but rather on the 
practices that it enacts, and on the notions underpinning them.  
The second set of research questions of this study include whether and how the EU has 
adapted over time to take into account the contestation of statehood within its enlargement 
policy and which specific practices have been enacted by the EU to respond to the 
contestation of statehood. In order to answer these questions, I analyse the actions of the EU 
as a state builder in its enlargement policy in the concrete case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
showing how they emerge from a trial-and-error process in which the EU slowly came out at 
the helm of the international community in the country and had to calibrate and adapt its 
instruments to the domestic situation and to its own elements of relative advantage. In 
particular, I look at the actions and practices of the EU in two different processes: the 
Structured Dialogue on Justice, as a policy dialogue instrument aimed at fostering consensus 
around institutions and reforms in the justice sector, and thus at restoring legitimacy; and the 
funds for pre-accession assistance (IPA), as a financial instrument aimed at strengthening 
state structures to create the necessary capacities for the management of EU funds, including 
by fostering consensus around the overall policy aims of the country (debate on the 
countrywide strategies). 
I argue that the EU, as a post-national supranational union, has a different understanding 
of domestic sovereignty than other international organisations, closer to a concept of 
sovereignty as participation, and that this leads the EU to enact practices of accession-driven 
state-building which address both legitimacy and capacities issues of state contestation, and 
which remain distinct from the international state-building model which is based mainly on 
capacity-building alone. In particular, among my findings I note that, in order to strengthen 
both capacities and legitimacy in the target country, the EU tends to export its own consensus-
12 
 
building mechanisms and to resort to instruments of network governance, rather than making 
use of more coercive measures that would undermine the legitimacy side of state-building.  
 
4. Methods and instruments 
In order to advance a solution for any given research problem, one has to clarify one’s own 
assumptions regarding epistemology and ontology, the range of data which needs to be 
collected and the rationale for choosing any methodology to link theory to data. The choice of 
methods is instrumentally linked to the research question which awaits explanation. “It is the 
research question that drives the selection of a research design”, as stated by McNabb.12 Also, 
in the words of Gee, “there can be no sensible method to study a domain, unless one also has 
a theory of what the domain is”.13  
The research questions of this study deal with the dynamic relation between the European 
Union and its enlargement countries in a context of state contestation. The chosen approach 
thus needs to accommodate both agency (actors’ behaviour) and structure (systemic 
influences), and take into account ideational factors (the EU notion of member state, domestic 
legitimacy) together with material ones (administrative capacities, EU incentives and funds). 
To do so, I adopt a qualitative methodology based on social constructivism. Qualitative 
research is deemed the most appropriate for “small-sample studies, often analyzing a single 
case or a few cases”.14 Obviously, this involves a trade-off: the in-depth knowledge of a 
phenomenon involving a small number of cases will come at the price of the generalisability 
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and applicability of findings to different contexts. Nevertheless, this seems to be a necessary 
choice to make given the small number of cases available, hindering the use of statistical 
tools, and given the difficulty in comparing across widely different regions. Moreover, 
qualitative methods have the advantage of not limiting themselves to the establishment of 
correlation among variables, but rather on being able to investigate, through methodologies 
such as process tracing, the mechanisms of causality.
15
  
In fields such as political science and international relations, where the number of 
possible cases is usually limited, the small-n comparative method appears as “often the only 
scientific method available for the study of macrodimensional, interdimensional and 
institutional processes”.16  This study thus combines within-case analysis based on process 
tracing
17
 with cross-case comparison. My aim is to produce a structured, focused comparison, 
embedding the thick description of a few cases within a comparative framework.  
Process tracing aims at refining broader theories by providing them with more fine-
grained explanations, at an analytical level which is closer to the data. This method is well-
suited to take into account the role of both agents and structures, and to accommodate both 
positivist and post-positivist elements, since it is deemed epistemologically “compatible with 
a positivist or, to be more precise, scientific realist understanding of causation in linear 
terms”. 18   Faring strongly on issues of interaction whilst showing limitations on establishing 
context, process tracing is conveniently complementary to discourse analysis methodologies, 
                                                 
15
 Panke, D. “Process Tracing: Testing Multiple Hypotheses with a Small Number of Cases.” In T. Exadaktylos 
& C. M. Radaelli, Research Design in European Studies: Establishing Causality in Europeanization. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2012, p. 125–140, p. 136. 
16
 Della Porta, Donatella. “Comparative analysis: case-oriented versus variable-oriented  research”. In D. Della 
Porta & M. Keating, Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences: a pluralist perspective. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 198–222, p. 202. 
17
 Checkel, Jeffrey T. “Process Tracing.” In A. Klotz & D. Prakash, Qualitative methods in international 
relations: a pluralist guide. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2008, p. 114–127. 
18
 Checkel, Process Tracing, 2008, p. 116. 
14 
 
to which it adds a dynamic perspective. Process tracing will be particularly useful to identify 
the scope conditions and mechanisms that explain the presence or absence of a certain 
outcome.  
Throughout the study, I analyse the conceptual notions that underpin EU practices of 
state building. Discourse analysis, interested in how words allow action, seems appropriate to 
define and analyse notions such as “member state” as a product of the discursive power of the 
European Union.
19
 According to discourse analysis, perception is mediated by meanings that 
are socially reproduced—representations. The reiteration of such representations normalises 
and institutionalises them, producing reality.
20
 Discourse analysis is predicated on the 
assumption that ideas matter, which fits well with the importance of an ideational notion such 
as member state building. The notion of EU member state is a case of “polity ideas”,21 i.e., 
“normative ideas about a legitimate political order”.22 Applying a discourse analysis approach 
to the state building practices of the EU in its enlargement policy falls within Wæver’s  
suggestion that “discourse analysis could handle the more interesting question of how (and 
why) supposedly ‘objective’ and ‘apolitical’ interpretations are produced politically”.23  
The research is based upon the in-depth analysis of two case studies from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the 2007-2016 period. Case selection is driven by the puzzle of the perceived 
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failure of Europeanisation when facing contested statehood; as Elbasani and Börzel note, 
statehood levels are highly correlated with the levels of European integration of Western 
Balkan countries.
24
 In particular, the specific features of state contestation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina already led the EU to remain embroiled at least twice in cycles of mismanaged 
conditionality, as described in Chapter II. At the same time, and differently from Kosovo, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina enjoys universal recognition among the EU member states, and it 
does not therefore raise issues within EU institutions that may hinder the credibility of the 
magnetic pull of EU enlargement. Bosnia and Herzegovina emerges as a crucial case, thus, to 
explore how the EU learns to react to environmental conditions that hinder the functioning of 
its usual instruments and policies, and which state building practices it is able to enact within 
its enlargement policy.  
Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the study focuses on two policy areas, in relation to the 
two dimensions of statehood identified in the literature. On the one hand, I inquire the 
practices of the EU in the context of the Structured Dialogue of Justice, as a policy dialogue 
instrument which between 2011 and 2016 was used to reinforce the legitimacy of domestic 
institutions in the justice sector by fostering domestic consensus around their reform via a 
deliberative and transgovernmental method of work. On the other hand, I consider the 
functioning of EU financial assistance for pre-accession countries, and look into how its 
procedures are aimed at fostering the development of EU-compatible institutions, and lately 
also the agreement on broad policy aims at country level, thus once again restoring capacity 
via consensus-building. The two case studies are chosen under a “most different” approach: 
they exemplify very different policy areas, in which, yet, a striking similarity emerges on the 
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independent variable , i.e. the practices of EU state building.: in order to cope with the issues 
deriving from state contestation, the EU resorts to the export of consensus-building 
mechanisms, already established in its own internal framework, through which the EU may 
support both the strengthening of state capacities and legitimacy at the same time. Although 
selected as the most different, the cases all pertain to the same context of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. A within-country comparison among them thus also “reduces the number of 
‘disturbing’ variables to be kept under control”. 25 Finally, an in-depth analysis of the 
development of specific policy process serves the specific purpose of uncovering the 
ideational factors (strategies, interests and ideas) of the actors involved; process tracing may 
then allow to identify the mechanisms linking dependent and independent variables.  
Time-wise, the study takes into account the period between 2011 and 2016. This takes 
into account the consolidation of a reinforced EU presence in the country in 2011, and the 
launch of the Structured Dialogue on Justice in the same year. At the same time, I analyse the 
framework of financial assistance from 2007 onwards (first IPA financial period 2007-2014 
and second IPA financial period 2014-2016). 
Aware of the trade-off between cultural competence and “home blindness”,26 I combine 
three types of inquiry to reconstruct the EU practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, I 
conduct document analysis of primary sources of both an institutional (EU treaties, EU 
Council decisions) and policy nature (Commission communications, speeches, press releases). 
These are coupled with insight from secondary sources: academic literature and policy 
analyses by independent experts. Finally, this corpus of sources is complemented by a set of 
semi-structured interviews with policy makers and observers well acquainted with the subject 
matter, in Brussels and Sarajevo (European Commission and EU Delegation / EUSR officials; 
                                                 
25
 Della Porta, Comparative analysis, 2008, p. 214. 
26
 Neumann, Discourse Analysis, 2008, p. 64. 
17 
 
members of the European Parliament; representatives of EU member states’ embassies in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; as well as academic and policy analysts) 
Since the project includes interviews as source material, it is necessary to discuss their 
advantages and limitations. Interviewing, though tempting as an “easy” research method, 
might ensnare the researcher in daunting and time-consuming tasks if not properly targeted 
and managed. To begin with, in this project interviewing will not consist in a method to 
access the truth by collecting behavioural data susceptible to quantitative analysis. Rather, I 
consider interviews as an appropriate avenue to gain access to the subjective understanding of 
the people involved in the social facts which are the subject of the study, since “social 
abstractions... are best understood through the experiences of the individuals whose work and 
lives are the stuff upon which the abstractions are built”.27 Interviewing can thus be a useful 
tool to evaluate the presence and importance of agency and ideational factors, especially when 
triangulated with other primary and secondary sources. I conduct semi-structured open-ended 
interviews (a method that allows minimising problems of reactivity) with participants who are 
closely associated with the subject matter, according to a purposeful sampling methodology 
and chain referral (snowball method). Sampling aimed at a maximum variation to ensure that 
the subjective understandings collected include a wide range of views and thus can be deemed 
representative.
28
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5. Thesis structure 
The thesis is composed of four main chapters. Chapter I is devoted to the notion of EU 
member state and its transformations throughout European integration. It thus introduces a 
thicker notion of EU member state, and presents different theoretical approaches to 
EU/member state relations, starting from theories positing their separation and the primacy of 
one level over the other, to theories that assume instead their interaction and interdependence. 
Positing the mutual constitutiveness between the Union and its member states, social 
constructivism emerges as the ontological perspective best suited to explore the research 
questions. The following section problematizes sovereignty, following the theoretical debate 
which has led from a Westphalian notion of sovereignty as control to its opposite notion of 
sovereignty as responsibility. Here a notion of sovereignty as participation emerges as an 
alternative to both, underlining the functional autonomy of different state institutions in their 
transboundary relations, and pointing to a transformation of the form of the state, from the 
unitary to the “disaggregated” state, that is explored in the rest of the chapter. The next 
section introduces the widely-used framework of Europeanisation, its theoretical 
underpinning, mechanisms of action, and scope conditions. Europeanisation helps to explain 
the domestic effects of Europe and the transformation from nation states into member states 
via a double (domestic and international) relation of accountability. Yet, the explanatory 
power of the Europeanisation framework comes to a standstill when facing the issue of 
contested statehood. The chapter puts forward, as a complementary alternative, the concept of 
member state building as the enlargement-specific form of state building. 
Chapter II introduces the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the setting of the case 
studies considered. After a short introduction to the Dayton political order, the chapter 
discusses the multiple transitions (to democracy, market economy, statehood, and peace) that 
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make it the country in the region with the most layers of complexity in governance. It then 
analyses Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state whose contestation stems from the simultaneous 
presence of a complex federal and consociational structure, and of sub-state centrifugal 
tendencies coupled with direct intervention by international actors with executive powers. The 
chapter also takes a look at the Dayton institutional framework under the lenses of the 
consociational and integrative models of power-sharing. The second part of the chapter looks 
at the interactions between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina over time, 
highlighting in particular how the EU struggled to adapt its approach to the specific Bosnian 
post-conflict context and to get to the helm of the international presence in the country. The 
EU twice remained stuck in cycles of mismanaged conditionality, in the case of the police 
reform process (2005-2008) and of the Sejdić-Finci constitutional reform process (2008-
2014). The shift towards a streamlined EU presence and the rescheduling of conditionality 
with the “new approach” to Bosnia and Herzegovina in late 2014 led to a rebalanced 
conditionality and a different standing of the EU in the country, which enabled the re-opening 
of the EU path and the achievement of relative successes in the 2014-2016 period, also 
highlighting the consolidation of a strategy of member state building as stateness-aware 
enlargement or “limited state-building”. 
Given the context presented in the previous chapters, Chapter III delves into the first case 
study, looking at the Structured Dialogue on Justice as an exercise in domestic legitimacy-
building in JHA matters that ran from 2011 to 2016. The EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
enacted a strategy of governance by dialogue and deliberation, exporting in the context of EU 
enlargement the deliberative settings typical of, for example, comitology and governance 
networks. In the dialogue the EU, as an interested mediator, facilitated discussion between 
domestic authorities and stakeholders, contributing to restoring domestic legitimacy in the 
justice sector. As a consensus-building mechanism, the Structured Dialogue allowed the EU 
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to react to the contestation of statehood in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus standing out as one 
example of the EU’s strategy of member state building. 
Finally, Chapter IV focuses on the other dimension of statehood, capacity. By looking at 
the instrument for pre-accession assistance, it highlights how EU-led capacity building 
focuses specifically on those bodies that are directly responsible or necessary for the 
implementation of the EU acquis, and requires target countries to develop their own 
institutional solutions to adapt their structures to the requirements of the EU acquis. EU 
practices of capacity building started from standard incentives of institution building, as in the 
thrust towards decentralised management, to then undergo a learning process leading the EU 
to shift its focus from structure to function, away from a pre-determined top-down blueprint 
and towards local adaptation to the domestic context. Finally, consensus-building mechanisms 
emerge in this area too, such as in the debate on the “coordination mechanism” for all 
competent institutions to agree on countrywide strategies. This evolution also shows a 
learning process of the EU on how best to support capacity-building in context of state 
contestation within its enlargement region. 
The theoretical understanding provided in Chapters I and II and the empirical insights 
developed in Chapters III and IV allow conclusions to be drawn on the specific practices of 
member state building enacted by the EU to cope with state contestation in its enlargement 
policy. Based on a notion of sovereignty as participation, such practices aim to restore  both 
legitimacy and capacity facets of statehood, via the export of consensus-building mechanisms 
that are typical of the EU’s internal governance. The result is a specific form of state building, 
in line with the EU’s identity and policy aims, which may prove able to bridge the gap 
inherent in the requirement of “building functional member states while integrating them”.29  
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I. Towards a theoretical understanding of member 
state building 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Differently from international ‘liberal peace’ state building approaches, the EU is not 
interested in expanding state features per se, but rather in transforming them in order to make 
them compatible with its own system of multi-level governance.
30
 I refer to this as member 
state building— “building functional member states while integrating them into the EU”.31 
Based on a notion of the EU member state as a “polity idea” 32  –  i.e., of what features are 
functionally necessary for a state to be able to participate in the life of the EU from decision 
making to implementation – member state building has the potential to be more open-ended 
and able to accommodate concerns about input legitimacy. Nevertheless, its success is by no 
means certain, as the EU faces two main challenges. First, the contradiction between the logic 
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of sovereignty diffusion that is proper to integration and the logic of sovereignty 
concentration that is prevalent in contested states
33
 and is impairing the working of 
Europeanisation by conditionality. Second, the development of modalities of interaction with 
candidate countries which do not impinge on their democratic legitimacy, but rather foster a 
domestic debate which underpins local ownership. The European integration process has 
proven able, in Western Europe, to make war unthinkable among its members and turn them 
from Westphalian states into a new kind of interdependent states, on the lines of Deutsch’s34 
concept of “security community”. Through the work of enlargement policy, this process has 
been extended to most of Central Europe, and is now tackling the issue of contemporary state 
building and sovereignty pooling in the Western Balkans region. This process represents an 
important example of state transformation by interaction and integration—a topical issue for 
international studies.   
This chapter highlights how the relations between the European Union and its member 
states have been conceptualised over time and from different theoretical traditions by 
reviewing the academic literature on European integration, state building, and 
Europeanisation. The first section introduces a thicker notion of EU member state, going 
beyond the legal dichotomy to add substantial requisites of stateness, Europeanness, and 
behaviour, and taking into account the increasing differentiation of membership, blurring the 
in/out divide. The second section reviews different theoretical approaches to EU/member state 
relations in European studies. Departing from earlier theories that posited their separation and 
the primacy of one level over the other (neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism), 
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later theories assume instead the interaction and interdependence between the two levels as 
the main feature of European integration (neo-institutionalisms, multi-level governance, neo-
medievalist “empire Europe” approaches). I finally adopt social constructivism as an 
ontological perspective positing the mutual constitutiveness between the Union and its 
member states. The third section goes to the roots of the debate, by problematising the notion 
of sovereignty and following the theoretical debate which has led from a Westphalian notion 
of sovereignty as control (internal supremacy and external non-interference) to its opposite 
notion of sovereignty as responsibility, as an inherently social concept, based on the 
recognition of a privilege conditioned upon the fulfilment of certain behavioural 
requirements. It finally settles with a notion of sovereignty as participation, laying half-way 
between the two, that underlines the functional autonomy of different state institutions in their 
transboundary relations, and points to a transformation of the form of the state, from the 
unitary to the “disaggregated” state35 – a phenomenon that is inquired in the rest of the 
chapter. 
The fourth section introduces the framework of Europeanisation as the most widely 
used concept to frame the effects of European integration on the member states, their 
differential reactions, and the ensuing feedback at supranational level. I provide with a review 
of the definitions of Europeanisation, its theoretical underpinning in the different strands of 
neo-institutionalism, and finally its mechanisms of action, scope conditions, and outcome 
patterns. The fifth section then delves into how European integration has changed its 
participating countries, turning them from nation states into member states. Different strands 
of literature agree that delegation to supranational institutions has added a layer of 
international accountability to the previously only domestic non-majoritarian checks and 
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balances. Scholars then disagree on whether the ensuing relativisation of state-society relation 
may enhance or rather pose problems for domestic democracy.  The sixth section undertakes a 
critical review of the concept of Europeanisation, in particular when applied beyond the 
borders of the EU, to candidate countries, identifying its weak points in the lack of clear 
conceptual boundaries, the shadow of hierarchy, the dangers of degreeism, and the dead-end 
issue of contested statehood. Then, the seventh section put forward, as a complementary 
alternative, the concept of member state building, as better able to frame the EU’s task of 
“building functional member states while integrating them”36 than Europeanisation and 
international state building.  
 
1. The notion of EU member state beyond the legal dichotomy 
What does it mean to be a member state of the European Union, and what kind of statehood is 
fostered by EU integration and enlargement? The relations between the EU and its member 
states are complex, and have been approached under different lights. This section argues that 
being a member state goes beyond a simple legal title to be added to that of sovereignty, and 
it involves substantial requirements and an ongoing transformation of state structures.  
1.1 Beyond the legal title of member state: stateness, Europeanness, and 
behaviour 
As an international organisation with specific supranational characters, the European Union is 
founded upon a series of legal instruments (international treaties and national constitutions). 
In purely legal terms, being a member state is the legal title that a state acquires by being or 
becoming a contracting party of such international treaties. “Obtaining the status of member 
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state enables all such states to benefit from the same rights and be subject to the same 
obligations as stated in the European treaties”.37 Being a member state is thus “a legal title to 
be added onto that of nation state... associated with an EU-specific set of rights and duties”.38  
In this sense, being an EU member state is not dissimilar from being a member of the United 
Nations, of NATO, or of the WTO. 
Is this all that it is in the notion of EU member state? It would not seem so, for a series of 
reasons. The EU has introduced over time the most comprehensive and wide-ranging 
programme of pre-accession, through it enlargement policy, aiming at achieving deep 
transformation of state structures in candidate countries before their accession, thus shaping 
the contours of the would-be member states. This presupposes a thicker concept of member 
state than a simple legal title.  Differently from other international organisations, recognised 
sovereignty and consensus are not enough to ensure a successful membership application. 
Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union, dealing with the application procedure, 
provides some interesting elements about it.
39
  
First, to become a member state of the European Union, a political entity needs to be a 
state and, as for all other conditions, to be recognised as such by the other members. This 
rules out the possibility for other non-state subjects with international legal personality (as 
                                                 
37
 Bertoncini and Chopin,  oliti ue europ enne, 2010, p. 154. 
38
 Bickerton, Christopher J. European Integration: From Nation-States to Member States. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2012, p. 53. 
39
 “(§1) Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting 
them may apply to become a member of the Union. The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall 
be notified of this application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act 
unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament, 
which shall act by a majority of its component members. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the 
European Council shall be taken into account. (§2) The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the 
Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement 
between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all 
the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.” 
26 
 
e.g. the Holy See) or international organisations (as the Benelux Union) to apply for EU 
membership.  
Second, a state needs to be recognised as “European”, as the EU sees itself as a regional 
organisation for Europe. Nevertheless, since Europe’s borders and status as a continent (or 
rather a peninsula of Asia) are contested and socially constructed, the EU has not taken its 
“European” character in a simplistically geographical or cultural-historical way. 
Europeanness, and the lack thereof, has been straightforwardly the reason for the rejection of 
the Moroccan candidacy for (then EC) membership in 1987.
40
 On the other hand, other states 
whose territory lie totally or mainly on other geographical continents, such as Cyprus and 
Turkey, have been deemed “European” under the terms of art.49, so much that Cyprus is now 
a member state and Turkey is a negotiating candidate. The distinction between the European 
post-Soviet states, thus potentially eligible for membership, and the non-European North 
African states, deprived of such a potential, remains today a visible dividing line also within 
the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  
Third, beyond stateness and Europeanness, further conditions for a successful 
membership application are the political/behavioural criteria of being considered as respecting 
the EU values, listed in art. 2 TUE, and as being “committed to promoting them”. In this case, 
a normative element related to the construction of the identity of the EU comes into the 
picture. Moreover, the quote in the treaty article of “the conditions of eligibility agreed upon 
by the European Council” serves to refer to the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, which set the 
conditions for admissibility of membership application to liberal democratic states with 
functioning market economies, as well as taking into consideration the EU’s 
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integration/absorption capacity. In this sense, being a EU member state is “a legal title 
conferred upon an applicant state after that state has demonstrated beyond doubt that it has 
met the publicly-given criteria for membership of the EU”.41 
2.2 Beyond the in/out dichotomy: the growing differentiation of 
membership  
Even if conditional upon stateness, Europeanness, and appropriate behaviour, being a EU 
member state would still seem a dichotomous variable, the critical juncture of which lies in 
the moment of EU accession. In fact, things are more complex. The EU, as a political entity, 
is displaying a low level of overlapping of its functional borders in different policy areas, so 
much that it is being likened more to the pre- (or post-)modern empire rather than to the 
modern state form
42. EU enlargement may thus be defined as “a gradual process of territorial 
extension of the EU and its integrated policy regimes”.43 It is thus more difficult to define in a 
binary way the notion of being a EU member state, as several steps emerge in between full 
membership and lack of relations. The degrees of this graded membership include full 
membership, differentiated membership (with opt-out and transitional periods), quasi-
membership (integration without membership, as in the EEA), and different degrees of 
association, both with and without a future membership perspective. 
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2. From a Community of states to a Union of member states. EU 
integration as a tool for the state or an instrument for its 
transformation. 
The criteria mentioned above to define what it means and what it takes to be a member state 
are merely static: they don’t consider the dynamics which are at play between the European 
Union and its member states. The literature on European integration has long debated the 
ontology of the EU: what is the relation between the European Union and its member states, 
and how does it relate to the nature of the European integration process?  
2.1 Together but separate: member states and the Community in earlier 
theories of integration 
Different theories of EU integration should be considered, when trying to analyse this 
dynamic. On the one hand, a first set of theories, including neo-functionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism, keep the two levels separate: European integration is but a tool for the 
member states (liberal intergovernmentalism), or aims at establishing a new centre and divert 
the loyalties of national actors of politics and society towards it (neo-functionalism). In both 
cases, the two levels interact, in cooperation or competition, but do not influence each other’s 
preferences and functions. On the other hand, another set of later theories (neo-
institutionalism, multi-level governance, social constructivism), posits the reciprocal 
influence and transformation of the national and European levels. The linkage between the 
two levels is stronger, and interaction at EU level results in the transformation of the member 
states and their structures.  
The earlier theories of European integration aim to explain European integration by 
reference to the action and preferences of agents, at both national and supranational level. On 
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the one hand neo-functionalism, focused on the role of non-state agents in the mobilisation 
process at supranational level, and in the inner drive of integration provided by the logic of 
functional spill-over, tends to privilege the supranational level over the national one. On the 
other hand liberal intergovernmentalism, looking at states as unitary actors in their 
negotiations at European level, and at international institutions only as their agents, puts the 
emphasis on the primacy of the national level over the supranational one.  
Neo-functionalism, dubbed as “a harnessing of functionalist methods to federalist goals”,44 
endeavours in describing, explaining, and predicting, regional integration as the process of 
“creation of political communities defined in institutional and attitudinal terms”.45 The final 
outcome, although differently described in the literature, may be equated with Haas’ concept 
of shift in the “loyalties, expectations and political activities” of the distinct national political 
actors “toward a new centre”, thus resulting in a “new political community, superimposed 
over the pre-existing ones”.46 In so doing, and based on a pluralist and systemic vision of 
politics, neo-functionalism gives primacy to non-state actors (interest groups, supranational 
institutions) and portrays a  process of integration which finds an automatic and compelling 
drive in the presence of functional spill-overs.
47
 Once few sectors have been integrated to 
solve issues of interdependence, these will create new contradictions which will need to be 
solved through further pooling of sovereignty, thus providing an inner drive of integration.
48
 
The logic of spill-over derives from the rationalist assumptions of functionalism and foresees 
an increasing integration fostered by the necessity to solve dilemmas of interdependence, 
                                                 
44
 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe. “Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate Or Obsolete? : A Reappraisal in the Light of the 
New Dynamism of the EC.” Millennium : Journal of International Studies 20 (1), 1991, p. 3. 
45
 Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. Library of World 
Affairs. Stanford University Press 1958, p. 611. 
46
 Ibid., p. 16. 
47
 Niemann, A., and Schmitter, P. “Neo-Functionalism.” In Theories of European Integration, by Antje Wiener 
and Thomas Diez, 45–66. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, p. 45. 
48
 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate Or Obsolete?, 1991, p. 4. 
30 
 
independently from the actors’ ideological preferences. Given its focus on non-state agents 
and on the supranational outcome of functional spill-over, neo-functionalism tended to assert 
the primacy of the Community over its member states, slowly marginalised in the daily 
conduct of politics by the new centre. 
Contrary to the neo-functionalist reading, liberal intergovernmentalism posits the member 
states as “masters of the Treaties”, fully in control over the pace, speed, and consequences of 
integration.
49
 Liberal intergovernmentalism is a composite theory that combines a liberal 
theory of formation of state preferences with an intergovernmental theory of bargaining 
among (big) member states, thus focusing on high politics and “celebrated intergovernmental 
bargains”.50 It thus rejects the sui generis claim for European integration and purports to 
explain it according to standard International Relation theories. States, as unitary actors, 
cooperate and establish institutions in order to face externalities and reap benefits, though 
mainly on a lower common denominator level. The main rationale for institutions is to secure 
credible commitments and to reduce the costs of incomplete contracting, thus limiting 
transaction costs and providing information to shape the choice of the actors. Institutions 
work as a constraint for states in the attempt to fulfil their exogenous preferences through 
strategic behaviour and utility maximisation, fostering cooperation.
51
 Liberal 
intergovernmentalism thus tends to see the EU as “a successful intergovernmental regime 
designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy-coordination”,52 
concluding that European integration was helping to “rescue” member states from the 
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irrelevance towards which globalisation was pushing them.
53
  Reducing the Community-level 
actors to the role of agents of the member states, the principals, liberal intergovernmentalism 
thus asserts the primacy of the national level over the supranational one.  
While neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism offer different understanding 
and prediction about the prevalence of one level over the other, they both consider them as 
separate layersco of political life. In both theories, national and supranational actors and 
institutions are different, separate, and act alone according to own preferences and interests. 
This separation between the two level, common in earlier theories of European integration, 
comes under strain in later accounts, in which the interdependence and the interpenetration 
between the two levels is put in the focus of analysis.  
2.2 From nation states to member states: blurring the distinction 
between national and supranational levels 
Earlier literature and discourse on EU integration tended to keep a clear distinction between 
the Community and the nation-states. “The relationship between the two, whether it was 
adversarial or cooperative, was nonetheless distant. The tone was one of non-engagement. 
The nation-state and the community were waltzing together perhaps but in a very correct and 
formal manner”.54 Such an assumption of detachment between levels started nevertheless to 
come under strain. Sbragia herself remarked rather the gradual knitting, embrace, or 
integration of the national and supranational level in Europe: “what strikes me – she noticed – 
is the gradual blurring of the distinction being made between the ‘Community’ and the 
‘nation-states’”, thus pointing to the transformation of any Community member “from 
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‘nation-state’ to ‘member state’.” Sbragia mentioned three factors as responsible for the 
gradual and incremental embrace between the two: the integration of nation-based elites 
(governmental, business, and judicial) through socialisation fora, the broadening in scope of 
the Communities’s activities from merely regulatory to redistributive, as in regional 
development policy and social regulation (policy), and the politicisation of the Community, as 
apparent in the public debate over the Maastricht Treaty (politics).  
The integration between the national and supranational level became the assumption of 
later theories of European integration, including neo-institutionalism, governance, and 
“empire Europe” approaches, concerned with the interlinkages and mutual consequences of 
the European level as a structure on its member states and institutions.  
Starting with Schepsle’s55 rational choice institutionalist account of “structure-induced 
equilibrium”, and with Scharpf’s56 historical institutionalist understanding of the conditions 
for policy paralysis and “joint decision traps”, a literature strand on neo-institutionalism 
developed, which has put emphasis on how integration develops over time, and in how 
particular institutional features may constrain or channel its evolution. “Institutions and 
policies generate incentives for actors to stick with and not abandon existing institutions, 
adapting them only incrementally”.57 Member states are thus not seen anymore as free agents 
only, as in liberal intergovernmentalism, but their actions and preferences are constrained by 
the shape of institutions and by the deadweight of previous agreements, which under 
conditions of unanimity, intergovernmentalism, and default status-quo condition, get locked-
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in in a pre-determined path of institutional inertia. According to Pierson,
58
 the short-termism 
of political decisions, unintended consequences, and changes in governmental preferences due 
to electoral turnover, create gaps in the member states’ control over supranational policies and 
institutions, which do not allow nevertheless for institutional reform until they reach a 
threshold. The path dependence of integration is thus punctuated by critical junctures, in 
which the accumulation of drift leads to a rupture point and to institutional reform. With 
historical institutionalism, the national and supranational levels start to be analysed in their 
linkages and mutual lock-in features. 
A second theoretical path to the integration between the national and the supranational 
level is the one followed by governance approaches. Multi-level governance, notwithstanding 
having been vulgarised almost as a descriptive formula for the current system of European 
integration, is based upon a theoretical attention to underline the simultaneous blurring of 
three analytical distinctions: between centre and periphery (political mobilisation), between 
state and society (policy-making), and between domestic and international (polity 
restructuring). Focusing, as neo-functionalism, on the mobilisation of non-state agents, early 
governance studies depict how they have become engaged in overarching policy network that 
directly link the supranational, national, and sub-national (both functional and territorial) 
levels, in the process of policy-making. In contrast, later governance approaches point to how 
European integration has been “redefining the state”59, going back to an ontological agenda 
concerned with “polity restructuring”.60 Multi-level governance thus came to theorise the 
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“unravelling of the state”61 due to pressures from above, from below, and from within, and the 
creation of non-hierarchical relations between different overlapping territorial and functional 
jurisdictions (“polycentric governance”)62, which may produce efficient outcomes thanks to 
their deliberative features, able to cope with the recursive redefinition of goals and means
63
 
but might also suffer from a weak “democratic anchorage”,64 allowing for accountability, in 
the absence of higher authority, only in terms of discretion without arbitrariness.
65
  
The insights of multi-level governance about polity restructuring were brought even 
further by the neo-medievalist strand of literature, which purported to resurrect the notion of 
empire as an empirical counterpart for the EU in order to abandon the methodological 
nationalism of earlier studies.
66
 Scholars such as Zielonka identified a neo-imperial Union in 
the making, spurred by the increased diversity and asymmetry brought about by enlargement, 
which would definitively impede the EU to achieve the centre formation and boundary-
building processes analysed by Bartolini as conducive to state-building.
67
  According to 
Zielonka, “enlargement has dramatically and irreversibly transformed the nature of the 
Union”, and  “will prevent the Union from overcoming the already existing discrepancy 
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between its functional and territorial boundaries”.68 The Westphalian form of the international 
system in Europe, according to these accounts, is being gradually overcome and is either 
turning into a post-modern, neo-medieval arrangement in which states lose their characteristic 
features into “overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, diversified institutional 
arrangements, and multiple identities”,69 while different peripheries are variously 
subordinated to the centre, or is being reshaped into a neo-modern form, featuring asymmetry 
and differentiation of integration, by an imperial Union whose members remain, nevertheless, 
states
70
. 
2.3 The Union and its member states as mutually constitutive: a social 
constructivist ontology 
Neo-functionalist and liberal-intergovernmentalist approaches both tend to reduce the EU to 
only one of its parts, either the national or the supranational one.
71
 As an alternative, and 
following the line of interdependence between levels set by the neo-institutionalist, 
governance, and neo-medievalist approaches, this study adopts an understanding of the 
ontology of the European Union based on the social constructivist tradition inaugurated by 
Checkel,
72
 which posits the mutual constitutiveness between the Union and its member states.  
Social constructivism is a relatively recent approach in European studies.
73
 Its two core 
assumptions assert that the structure in which agents act is both material and social, and that it 
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stands in a relation of mutual constitutiveness with the identities, interests, and preferences of 
the agents.
74
 Social constructivism, therefore, leaves behind methodological individualism 
and agent-centred rational choice, to add an interpretative and structure-centred perspective 
based on a social ontology.  
The proposed study adopts a constructivist perspective relying on conventional 
methodologies of knowledge, as opposed to the radical constructivist views alleging the 
impossibility of “intersubjectively valid knowledge claims”.75 As such, it remains compatible 
in its meta-theoretical underpinnings with those approaches belonging to the “soft rationalist 
family tree”,76 which takes into account the role of ideational factors in shaping political 
action. 
The added value of social constructivism for European integration theory lies in 
complementing agency-centred theories by recalling that actors’ interests and preferences are 
not exogenous, given, and constant; rather, they spring from “the social construction of 
reality”, as in the definition of Berger and Luckmann.77 Ideas define the universe of options 
and legitimise action, and are codified in institutions, defined as “a relatively stable structure 
of identities and interests”78 which the individuals face as social facts with a power of 
coercion derived from the collectively shared knowledge of the social group. Norms, as 
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“shared intersubjective understandings that make behavioural claims”,79 provide guidance to 
actors trying to “do the right thing” according to a logic of appropriateness80. Identities, rather 
stable and born from reciprocal typification, give rise to the actors’ interests. “Identity is part 
of a historical process of interaction which consolidates practices and beliefs creating norms, 
which in turn determine action”.81  
Preferences are endogenous to the process of interaction: “actors, through interaction 
with broader institutional contexts (norms or discursive structures), acquire new interests and 
preferences – in the absence of obvious material incentives”.82 Immersed in a social 
environment, actors first adopt and then internalise social prescriptions. The social structure 
starts to provide actors with new interests and preferences, thus constitutively affecting their 
most basic properties, including preferences and identity, which are increasingly defined by 
their membership of a social community. 
Social constructivism differs from previous rationalist perspectives in its ontological 
assumptions and epistemological methods, though its conventional strand remains compatible 
with them. The claim of social constructivism is smaller than that of the grand theories of 
integration, as it does not put forward any substantive claim concerning European integration. 
Rather, it purports to go further in the structure/agency debate, saying not only that structure 
and agents are codetermined, but that they are mutually constituted. It thus stands in between 
individualism and structuralism, “claiming that there are properties of structures and of agents 
that cannot be collapsed into each other”.83  
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An ontologically social approach such as constructivism has the potential to complement 
theories that assume the primacy of either structure or agency. While the Union is more than 
the mere sum of its members, it also remains dependent on them in several respects and 
neither element can be said to have primacy over the other; consequently, the distinction 
between principals and agents is blurred.  
According to social constructivists, “the EU has achieved identity hegemony in Europe” 
by working as an “active identity builder” and “fill[ing] the meaning space of Europe with a 
specific context”, so that now Europe and the EU have become synonymous.84 This opens up 
the question of the feedback effect of membership of the Union on the features and identity of 
its member states (Europeanisation research agenda). On the one hand, starting from the 
common features of its members, the EU has come to define itself as a community of 
democracies.
85
 On the other hand, EU membership increasingly defines how states see 
themselves and are seen by others, finally affecting the very meaning of statehood and 
sovereignty. Rather than nation-states, they are increasingly becoming defined as member 
states,
86
 to the extent that their democratic legitimacy “cannot be established independently of 
the EU” anymore.87 The EU appears thus as “a cooperative venture of conflict resolution and 
problem-solving coordination within an obligatory frame of reference” having a 
transformative (but not homogenising) effect on its members: 
We thus witness in Europe the development of a supranational political 
order that recognizes the difference of its constituent parties. The EU is not 
based on a culturally homogenized people, nor is it brought about by 
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coercion and brute force. The EU’s ‘contract’ aims at changing the identity 
of the contracting partners – from nation-states to member states.88 
Therefore, social constructivism crucially refocuses on two aspects overlooked in 
previous theoretical perspectives: the “mutual constitutiveness of agency and structure” and 
the impact of integration on the “social identities and interests of actors”.89 
 
3. The transformation of sovereignty: sovereignty as control, as 
responsibility, as participation 
The transformations of the state and of its relations with societies and with the international 
level, discussed above, go along with a reconceptualisation of the notion of sovereignty. The 
classical notion of sovereignty as control, grounded in a Westphalian/Vettelian concept of 
stateness, of non-interference, and of sovereign equality, has come to be theoretically 
countered by a notion of sovereignty as an internationally shared responsibility, underpinning 
international intervention and post-conflict state building by international administration. A 
middle way between the two, I argue, is offered by the concept of sovereignty as 
participation. Sovereignty as participation includes the involvement in international social life 
as constitutive of a state’s identity, but does not allow for the suspension of the state’s 
sovereignty in order to restore it. As such, it seems particularly well suited to analyse the 
efforts of state building led by the European Union, aimed at building member states and in 
need to take care of local legitimacy, without the option to suspend sovereignty in its target 
countries.   
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3.1 Sovereignty as control 
Sovereignty, although criticised as “organised hypocrisy”,90 has been the ultimate source 
of order for the international system in the last five hundred years. The traditional reading of 
the history of international relations posits its birth with the end of the wars of religion in 
Europe and the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. These instruments had as a fundamental tenet 
the autonomy from external powers of each territory and government, in particular the non-
interference of the Catholic Church in the religious affairs of the German princes. 
Notwithstanding the ongoing debate on the issue,
91
 the episode has remained an icon in the 
literature on international relations. In particular, “Westphalia” came to embody the two sides 
of sovereignty: internal supremacy of the ruler over a territory, and external non-interference 
in other rulers’ affairs. As such, “the sovereign power cannot be challenged from the inside 
and it can respond to outside challenges by resorting to the use of force”:92 this is the content 
of the definition of sovereignty, synthetically put forward by Philpott as “supreme authority 
within a territory”.93 Sovereignty thus entails a combination of authority, supremacy, and 
territoriality.  
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As a central tenet of international relations, the concept of sovereignty has gone through 
different reconceptualisations: as noted by Biersteker,
94
 “state and sovereignty are mutually 
constitutive concepts”. Classical realism, starting with Morgenthau,95 saw it as a fixed and 
exogenous attribute of states, providing moral and legal justification to the political facts at 
the base of the decentralised relations among nations. Nevertheless, classical realism was 
challenged by those scholars of the liberal school of international relations who put emphasis 
instead on the growing interdependence in world politics and the diminishing role of the state 
towards non-state actors, including business corporations.
96
 Economic interdependence, new 
global technologies, and the spread of democracy, were seen as eroding the absolute 
sovereignty of the state. The reply to the liberal critique came in terms of Waltz’s approach of 
structural realism; while he recognised that states are not the only international actors, he also 
introduced a concept of hierarchy within international anarchy and remarked that “so long as 
the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in terms 
of them”.97 The positions of realists and liberals tended then to converge around a vision of 
international politics centred around the concept of anarchy, and the centrality of self-
interested states within it, though remaining distinct on the reasons and factors of cooperation 
under anarchy. 
In fact, both realists and liberals have been criticised for confining their debate within a 
narrow reading of sovereignty as control: in this way, the ones were too focused on the states’ 
continuing monopoly over legitimate violence, while the others put too much emphasis on the 
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last wave of globalisation, whose erosion of state sovereignty has not been stronger than the 
previous ones’.  As underlined by Krasner, issues of control are distinct from issues of 
authority, and “interdependence sovereignty, or the lack thereof, is not practically or logically 
related to international legal or Westphalian sovereignty”.98  
Krasner underlines the inner tension, within the international realm, between the logic of 
consequences, fostering actors to rationally balance presumed costs and benefits of action, 
and the logic of appropriateness, pushing them to behave as prescribed by rules, norms, and 
identities. The supremacy of the first over the second constitutes sovereignty as an “organised 
hypocrisy”, since in the words of Krasner “states say one thing but do another; they 
rhetorically endorse the normative principles or rules associated with sovereignty but their 
policies and actions violate these rules”.99 
A second, more radical critique to the concept of sovereignty as control came from the 
perspective of neo-marxist and world-system theory. According to the vision of Immanuel 
Wallerstein, sovereignty is but a fiction, a manipulation of the capitalist class. Sovereignty, 
the state, and international relations are deeply embedded, in his vision, in the relations 
between public authorities and the capitalist world as the “political system of sovereign 
states... suits perfectly the needs of capitalist entrepreneurs”,100 as it allows them to protect 
their private property from both theft, through public authority, confiscation, through the 
extension of the rule of law and property rights, and uncontrolled market forces, through legal 
regulation, in exchange for a fair amount of taxation.  
3.2 Sovereignty as responsibility 
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In contrast to the traditional meaning of sovereignty, couched in terms of absolute 
independence and autonomy, sovereignty as responsibility underlines its role in the 
socialisation of states, and provides the justification for an international state building agenda 
based on a liberal peace theory view of international relations.  
Biersteker and Weber recognise the hypocrisy of sovereignty as control, as denounced by 
Krasner, but go forward by presenting sovereignty as an inherently social concept: “State’s 
claim to sovereignty construct a social environment in which they can interact as an 
international society of states, while at the same time the mutual recognition of claims to 
sovereignty is an important element in the construction of states themselves”.101 Focusing on 
the social construction of sovereignty, these authors conclude that, rather than on a “timeless 
principle of sovereignty”, the international system is based on the normative production of the 
state as a peculiar way of linking government, territory, population and recognition.
102
 
The constructivist approach to sovereignty is taken a step forward by Philpott,
103
 who 
focuses on how ideas can generate authority. Reflecting on the role of the Peace of 
Westphalia in producing the normative foundation for a new international society, and of the 
process of decolonisation in expanding it on a global scale, Philpott refutes Krasner’s 
emphasis on power and material interests as constitutive of international reality, and on 
concepts such as sovereignty as a rationalisation and manipulation by dominant actors of 
political realities into legal justifications. Rather, Philpott sees ideas as powerful tools to 
subvert one or more of the three faces of authority in the international society (the legitimacy 
of polities, the rules of membership, the prerogatives of members): “ideas convert hearers; 
these converts amass their ranks; they then demands new international orders; they protest 
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and lobby and rebel to bring about these orders; there emerges a social dissonance between 
the iconoclasm and the existing order; a new order results”.104   
From these understandings of sovereignty as a social construction, the debate on 
sovereignty took a new direction towards an understanding of sovereignty as responsibility 
from a policy-oriented debate, as the one taking place at the United Nations in the 1990s. In 
fact, the UN as a collective security system was set up as a way to supersede the Westphalian 
system of individual absolute sovereignty, deemed responsible for the two world conflicts of 
the early 20
th
 century.
105
 Nevertheless, its realisation was impeded by the emergence of the 
bipolar conflict and by the lack of implementation of the security-related provisions of the UN 
Charter (art. 43, 45). What came into being was thus “another multilateral experiment that 
was not properly equipped to fully replace the pillars, practices, and dynamics typical of the 
Westphalian order”.106 After 40 years of freezing, from the Korean War to the first Gulf War, 
the debate on the role of the UN and state sovereignty re-emerged at the end of the bipolar 
conflict in the 1990s. The reserved jurisdiction in internal affairs (domaine reservé), corollary 
of Westphalian-type sovereignty and of the UN principle of sovereign equality, came 
increasingly under scrutiny and was challenged by the emerging concept of humanitarian 
intervention,
107
 which found one of its first formulations in the pan-European context in the 
final document of third conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Moscow, 1991), 
stating that “the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE 
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are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong 
exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned”.108  
The concept of sovereignty as shared responsibility was first put forward by Deng in his 
work on conflict management in Africa: 
The locus of responsibility for promoting citizens’ welfare and liberty, for 
organizing cooperation and managing conflict, when not exercised by the 
society itself, remains within the state. Until a replacement is found, the 
notion of sovereignty must be put to work and reaffirmed to meet challenges 
of the times in accordance with accepted standards of human dignity.
109
 
Sovereignty as responsibility remained a topic of discussion among scholars interested in 
finding a way to reconcile an international system based on sovereign equality and non-
interference with a growing concern for the respect of human rights worldwide. The debate of 
the 1990s was not only academic, but had to confront real-world issues such as the 
international interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The results of this debate 
coalesced in the report on the responsibility to protect by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), an international conference convened at the 
initiative of the Government of Canada. According to the ICISS, 
Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being increasingly 
recognized in state practice, has threefold significance. First, it implies that 
the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety 
and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests 
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that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens 
internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, 
it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to 
say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission.
110
 
As can be noted, the ICISS included in its concept of sovereignty as responsibility a 
double accountability of governments, both downwards towards their citizens, and upwards 
towards the international society embodied by the UN, which I argue is a central tenet of any 
notion of sovereignty beyond the mere concept of control. Nevertheless, the notion put 
forward by the ICISS of a responsibility to protect (R2P), accompanied by a commitment to 
prevent and a duty to rebuild, proved nonetheless of difficult and contentious 
operationalisation, in particular in the post-9/11 world.   
In political terms, a debate ensued between a libertarian and neoconservative strand,
111
 
emphasising that sovereignty as capacity and responsibility would justify cases of foreign 
intervention by a duty to prevent spill-overs of international insecurity, and a communitarian 
and idealistic strand, limiting the possibility of external intervention in failing states only to 
extreme cases of humanitarian emergencies: “when a state acts irresponsibly, some 
international body will rule that the state has defaulted on its responsibilities and thus call for 
corrective international intervention by an international or regional body”.112 In legal terms, 
the concept was discussed by several UN sessions, and in the 2009 UNSG Report it was 
reiterated that the responsibility to protect could not constitute a way to circumvent the 
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primacy of the UN system and the traditional Westphalian characteristics of the international 
society. Somehow, the responsibility to protect was tamed and normalised by asking for the 
UN Security Council to authorise any action in its pursuit.   
Sovereignty “no longer appears to be an on-or-off condition”;113 rather than a natural 
right of states, sovereignty is constructed as a concession, a privilege dependent on the 
fulfilment of certain responsibilities.
114
 It is not anymore a screen behind which governments 
can hide from the scrutiny of their peers about whether they behave appropriately and fulfil 
their domestic responsibilities towards the population under their jurisdiction. In this way, 
sovereign governments are subject to both domestic and international accountability; they are 
less “free agents” and more “members of one community”.115 If they do not act appropriately 
or fulfil their fundamental tasks, they lose the privilege of sovereignty and justify external 
intervention.  
Taking a Foucauldian perspective, Aalberts and Werner remark how “state sovereignty is 
used as a governmental technology that aims to create proactive, responsible subjects”.116 
Starting with the Islands of Palmas arbitration, and up to the 2001 ICISS report, sovereignty 
is being increasingly understood as an obligation to respect the rights of other states, shaping 
and fostering autonomous and responsible members of the international society, “constituting 
states as capable actors that bear responsibility for their policy choices”.117 
It may be seen from the debate quoted above how the practice of “liberal peace” 
international state building derives from an understanding of sovereignty as responsibility. 
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Under the assumption that state weakness or failure is at the root of conflict, and premised on 
the incapacity of domestic state consolidation, international state building aims at 
reconstructing state structures through external intervention:  
the international community compromises one important norm associated 
with sovereignty – self-governance – to create the conditions for full 
empirical statehood and sovereign authority in the country it intervenes in, 
by establishing the capacity of the state to fulfil its international and 
domestic obligations.
118
 
Practices of state building such as international administrations and governance 
assistance have not yet found an appropriate formalisation in terms of sovereignty. Krasner 
thus proposed the formalisation of such practices into new relations of trusteeships and 
partnerships, according to which the core institutions of fragile or failed states are reorganised 
under formulas of shared sovereignty.
119
 
The notion of sovereignty as responsibility has not been without critiques. In particular, 
critics have noted that it seem to blur even further the accountability of international actors 
and to neglect the role of agency. Cunliffe has noted that “subordinating the supremacy of 
state sovereignty to the higher authority of the international community undermines the 
project of making power more accountable, and restrains the exercise of political agency in 
international politics”.120 Chandler has remarked how state building perfectly fits the 
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governmentality of an “Empire in denial”, willing to escape responsibility for its actions 
abroad, and how sovereignty as responsibility aptly justifies intervention in non-Western 
countries.
121
 Moreover, state building results in the creation of states “as administrative 
centres, directed from Brussels or Washington”, thus deprived of the vital relation between 
state and society.
122
  International state building is thus in line with those processes, such as 
regional integration, that produce a relativisation of the links between the state as an 
administrative machine and the society as a community. “The result is a proliferation of 
‘phantom states’ composed of technical administrative shells, sustained mainly through 
external policy-making and resources, and dangerously detached from their constituent 
population, over which they are expected to exercise their political power”.123 
Analysts of the Western involvement in the Balkans have drafted different conclusions 
about it: while Zaum concluded that this concept was already providing a blueprint for action 
and a justification for post-conflict international administrations,
124
 Venneri remarked rather a 
risk-averse, hands-off attitude of European institutions when faced with issues of sovereignty 
and intervention in the countries of the EU enlargement agenda, in particular Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
125
 
3.3 Sovereignty as capacity and participation 
As seen above, the concept of sovereignty as control is most apt to describe the 
Westphalian notion of state, self-contained and taking part only in the most limited 
international institutions (diplomacy, treaties, intergovernmental organisations). To the 
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opposite, the concept of sovereignty as responsibility see states’ sovereignty as conditional 
upon the fulfilment of certain tasks, and granted by a superior order, providing a justification 
for cases of external intervention and international state building in post-conflict societies. 
Neither of the two concepts, though, seems apt to describe the sovereignty of the member 
states of the EU, nor the way that the EU interacts with sovereign candidate countries. 
Starting from a thick notion of EU member state, this study argues that being a member state 
goes beyond the Copenhagen criteria of liberal democracy and functioning market economy, 
and that through the criterion related to the capacity to implement the acquis it extends to the 
way state functions are organised. Such an understanding of sovereignty as capacity and 
participation spans in the middle way between sovereignty as control and sovereignty as 
responsibility. As seen in the critiques to the concept of sovereignty as control, sovereignty 
rather “represents a construction simultaneously encompassing authority, control, and 
legitimacy”.126  
Sovereignty as capacity and participation is not seen as in contrast with the delegation of 
powers to supranational authorities and multilateral institutions. States willingly allow for 
interdependence, in the belief that it reflects their own interests. Delegation of power can be 
interpreted more as “an expression of the value of sovereignty than a threat to its continuing 
importance”, as its objective is to “enhance the capacity of states (and the international 
system) to cope with complex problems requiring transnational or private-sector management 
or expertise”.127 As reported by Krasner, rulers  that are “free to choose the institutions and 
policies regarded as optimal” can decide to violate legal sovereignty, by inviting external 
intervention or by taking part in regional integration processes, without violating Westphalian 
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sovereignty, which happens instead “when external actors influence or determine domestic 
authority structures”.128 
Sovereignty may be deconstructed along different dimensions, as in Thomson’s view.129  
Along with the metapolitics of sovereignty as constitutive of the state system, there appears 
then a functional dimension, variable over time and issue. For instance, the retreat of the state 
from the field of the economy has gone along with the expansion of its intrusiveness in the 
private lives of the citizens. Starting from the work of Wolfgang Reineke, Anne-Marie 
Slaughter has argued that in today’s globalised world “national governments have already lost 
their sovereignty, but they should compensate for that loss by delegating their responsibilities 
to a host of non-state actors – international organizations, corporations and NGOs”.130  States 
are not disappearing, and remain the most important international actor, but they are 
transforming from unitary into “disaggregated” states in which “different government 
institutions … engage in activities beyond their borders”.131  The disaggregation of the state 
functions is accompanied by the disaggregation of sovereignty, whose meaning shifts “from 
autonomy from external interference to the capacity to participate in transgovernmental 
networks”, i.e. “sovereignty as participation”.132 
The reflection of Slaughter starts from the recognition that the notion of the unitary state 
is a fiction that is not even useful nowadays, turning itself into an analytical blinder. Instead, 
recognising the shift from the unitary state to the disaggregated state allows recognising the 
necessity and ability of governmental bodies to reach across the state border, cooperating with 
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their foreign counterparts in order to fulfil their domestic tasks. In fact, as pointed out by 
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “the only way most states can realize and 
express their sovereignty is through participation in the regimes that make up the substance of 
international life”.133 
It is regulators pursuing the subjects of their regulations across borders; 
judges negotiating minitreaties with their foreign brethren to resolve 
complex transnational cases; and legislators consulting on the best ways to 
frame and pass legislation affecting human rights or the environment.
134
   
Thus, the standard form of cooperation is not any longer limited to the multilateral treaty 
and the international organisation, as in an international system premised on unitary states and 
on sovereignty as control. Rather, as “a pattern of regular and purposive relations among like 
government units working cross the borders”,135 government networks become the most 
relevant aspect of the international landscape, involving and engaging with civil society 
organisations both horizontally (among national officials of different countries) and vertically 
(among national and supranational officials). In this, government networks take part in what 
Keohane and Nye define as “transgovernmental” activity, i.e., “direct interactions among sub-
units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the 
cabinets”.136    
Governmental networks, constituting a new world order, allow a way out of the trilemma 
of global governance: “we need global rules without centralised power but with government 
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actors who can be held to account”.137 Government networks thus appear as the only feasible 
alternative to a global government, if states are to retain their formal sovereignty and if 
accountable actors are to be included within governance bodies. In particular, government 
networks  
have become the signature form of governance for the European Union, 
which is itself pioneering a new form of regional collective governance that 
is likely to prove far more relevant to global governance than the experience 
of traditional federal states.
138
  
Understanding global governance through government networks, according to Slaughter, 
requires an updated concept of sovereignty, away from the autonomy from external 
interference typical of the notion of unitary state, and focused instead on the “new 
sovereignty”, identified by Abram and Antonia Chayes as the capacity to participate and 
interact with transgovernmental networks and international institutions, “connection to the 
rest of the world and the political ability to be an actor within it”.139 
Instead of a unitary state endowed with a single sovereignty as autonomy (insularity), as 
capacity of keeping other actors outside its own sphere of jurisdiction (right to resist), the 
notion of disaggregated state focuses on the relational capacity to engage and on the single 
governmental institution, each one endowed with a share of sovereignty according to its own 
functions and capabilities, interacting and participating transnationally. Moreover, rather than 
weakening the state, it ends up reinforcing it by strengthening the capacity of its institutions to 
interact with their foreign counterparts.
140
 This notion of sovereignty comes close to the 
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sovereignty as responsibility, as it “would accord status and recognition to states in the 
international system to the extent that they are willing and able to engage with other states, 
and thus necessarily accept mutual obligations”.141 Nevertheless, it does not arrive to justify 
external intervention and substitution in case its requirements and obligations are not fulfilled. 
The sanctions, it seems, is rather in the lack of ability to participate in global governance and 
to affect the world order.  
 
4. Europeanisation: the domestic impact of Europe   
Adopting an understanding of sovereignty as capacity and participation, as described above, 
allows opening up the research agenda on the effects of European integration on its member 
states and on its candidate countries, and the feedback effects of this interaction on integration 
itself. This would not be possible under the competing notion of sovereignty as control, which 
sees states as unitary actors and rules out any transgovernmental interaction, nor under a 
notion of sovereignty as responsibility, that subjugate states to a higher authority able to 
suspend their sovereign prerogatives. The inquiry in the domestic impact of European 
integration and its feedback effect has been undertaken in the framework of the concept of 
Europeanisation. This section introduces its definitions, theoretical linkages, mechanisms, 
scope conditions and outcome patterns, arriving at sketching a conceptual framework of 
Europeanisation.  
4.1 Defining Europeanisation: exploring the domestic effects of Europe 
The concept of Europeanisation has given birth to a large amount of literature in European 
studies, signalling the shift from an ontological to a post-ontological research agenda. 
                                                 
141
 Ibid., p. 267. 
55 
 
Europeanisation research is interested in explaining not what the EU is, but what the EU does, 
as in its effects on the member states, and their responses to adjustment pressures.
142
 The 
definition of Europeanisation has been gradually broadened from an outcome to a process, up 
to including the recursive relation between the national and the supranational level.   
The first result-oriented understanding of Europeanisation as an outcome sees it as an 
end-state corresponding to “a situation where distinct modes of European governance have 
transformed aspects of domestic politics”.143 This definition is static rather than dynamic, 
answering the question of “how much” a specific issue or country is “Europeanised”, with 
reference to a specific and predetermined end result—the transformation and convergence of 
domestic structures (policies, institutions, or even identities) to a predetermined “European” 
norm. Nevertheless, it is problematic in referring to an end point which is often difficult to 
pinpoint (the average level of integration? an ideal or personal understanding of the finalité of 
the Union?), and it loses sight of other possible national responses other than convergence.
144
 
Second, rather than an outcome, Europeanisation has been defined as a process 
integrating the supranational and national political levels by “reorienting the direction and 
shape of politics”.145 In this way, “domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to 
European policy-making”,146 while the EU level exerts an influence “impacting member 
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states’ policies and political and administrative structures”.147 All these first generation 
definitions stress a one-way, top-down relationship; following an organisational logic, 
domestic institutions adapt to the altered context of EU membership, resulting in patterns of 
expected transformation and convergence.
148
  When defining Europeanisation as “the 
‘domestic impact of Europe’ – the various ways in which institutions, processes and policies 
emanating from the European level influence policies, politics and polities at the domestic 
level” Börzel and Risse treat European-level developments as the explanatory factor 
(independent variable) of changes at the domestic level (dependent variable).
149
 Nevertheless, 
risks lie in reifying Europeanisation as something which is out there, able to explain what we 
see,
150
 or in giving it uncontested primacy as an independent rather than an intervenient 
variable in already ongoing processes of modernisation or globalisation.
151
 
Finally, a two-ways, process-oriented definition of Europeanisation sees it as a relation of 
influence between the national and the supranational level which is both top-down and 
bottom-up, circular rather than unidirectional, and cyclical rather than one-off. One of the 
most accurate definitions put forward, which avoids denotativeness and the orchestration of 
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lists of established concepts, is the one by Dyson and Goetz,
152
 defining Europeanisation as “a 
complex interactive ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ process in which domestic polities, politics, 
and public policies are shaped by European integration and in which domestic actors use 
European integration to shape the domestic arena. It may produce either continuity or change 
and potentially variable and contingent outcomes”. The pressure from above (structure) 
interacts with the “creative use” (agency) of European integration by domestic actors,153 
including their attempts at “uploading”154 and “projecting”155 their own national standards at 
EU level, and with phenomena of horizontal socialisation and learning. Convergence is not 
prioritised as the expected outcome, but uneven results stem from differences among 
countries and issue areas, refracting, mitigating and filtering the impact of integration. 
Europeanisation appears both as a cause and an effect of change, blurring the boundaries 
between independent and dependent variables.
156
 Though useful to remind of the inter-
relatedness of Europeanisation and European integration, this type of definition risks to 
directly encroach upon the field of the latter and to end up into conceptual overstretch. The 
three understandings of Europeanisation, captured by the three definitions above, are 
summarised in the table 1.1 below. 
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Table 1.1 – Definitions of Europeanisation  
 
Dimensions of Europeanisation 
Static: outcome Dynamic: process 
Direction of 
change 
One-way, linear, one-
off 
(top-down) 
Europeanisation as 
transition towards a 
‘Europeanised’ 
endstate 
Europeanisation as 
domestic change 
coming from ‘Europe’ 
Two-way, circular, 
cyclical 
(bottom-up-down) 
 
Europeanisation as a 
circular/cyclical 
relation between 
national and 
supranational 
 
4.2 The three strands of neoinstitutionalism and the mechanisms of 
Europeanisation  
Europeanisation has been mainly understood in the framework of neo-institutionalist 
theories of European integration, based on the assumption that “institutions are the foundation 
of all political behaviour, without which there could be no organised politics”.157 Neo-
institutionalism argues that institutions structure politics by determining who is able to act and 
by shaping their strategies and (eventually) their interests, identities, and horizons of action; it 
remains thus compatible with social constructivist approaches. Neo-institutionalism, 
nevertheless, has also been criticised for its top-down bias and its reliance on the “shadow of 
hierarchy” or “of conditionality”,158 resulting in a geographic gradient, with Europeanisation 
declining in power the farther one gets from the EU. Three variants of neo-institutionalism 
have helped theoretically framing Europeanisation: on the one hand rational choice 
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institutionalism and historical institutionalism, both linked to a rationalist approach, and on 
the other hand sociological institutionalism, referring instead to social constructivism.
159
  
First, rational choice institutionalism is an agency-centred approach based on 
methodological individualism; it takes the individual person as the basic unit of social life. Its 
ontology relies on a hard version of rational choice, depicting the actors as dedicated to 
maximise their utility function according to a logic of consequentiality. Preferences are fixed 
and exogenous to interaction. Institutions work as a constraint, as opportunity structures, 
limiting states’ strategic behaviour and solving collective action problems.160  A rational 
choice reading of Europeanisation sees the EU as yet another resource for domestic actors, 
leading to their differential empowerment and to a strategy of reinforcement by reward: “a 
state adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs”.161 
Moreover, functional emulation can also indirectly lead to policy competition and lesson 
drawing: “a state adopts EU rules, if it expects these rules to solve domestic policy problem 
effectively”.162 The EU acquis and accession negotiations make up the context where 
“reinforcement by reward” works best; technicality allows depoliticisation, while sectoral 
veto players are kept at bay by the aggregate benefit of membership.
163
 
A more interpretive understanding has been offered by sociological institutionalism, from 
the vantage point of post-positivist social science (Verstehen), interested more in 
                                                 
159
 Hall, P. and Taylor, C.R. “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism.” Politica 44, 1996, p. 936–
957. 
160
 Moravcsik, Andrew, and Schimmelfennig, Frank. “Liberal Intergovernmentalism.” In European Integration 
Theory, edited by Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009., p. 72. 
Chatzigiagkou, Enlargement Goes Western Balkans, 2010, p. 58-60. 
161
 Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Sedelmeier, Ulrich. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the 
Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 11 (4), 2004, p. 
661–679, p. 664. 
162
 Ibid., p. 668. 
163
 Ibid., p. 671-673. 
60 
 
understanding the meaning of the actors’ behaviour rather than in explaining or predicting it 
through the mechanistic reasoning based on if-then causality chains typical of positivist 
natural science (Erklären). It is in fact doubtful whether agency and subjectivity can be 
externally objectivised and analysed as if they were natural forces acting in causally linear 
ways, while both the agents and the researcher are involved in a complex web of human 
interactions. This competing approach thus draws from the constructivist tradition which 
posits a social ontology where agents and structure are mutually constituted, “claiming that 
there are properties of structures and of agents that cannot be collapsed into each other”.164 
Immersed in a normative environment, actors first adopt and then internalise social 
prescriptions in the form of norms, i.e., “set[s] of shared intersubjective understandings that 
make behavioural claims” upon them.165 Preferences and identities are thus endogenous to the 
process of interaction. Individuals behave trying to “do the right thing” through a logic of 
appropriateness, i.e., “rule-guided behaviour”.166 The EU is considered by sociological 
intitutionalists as “the formal organization of a European international community defined by 
a specific collective identity and a specific set of common values and norms”.167 Indirectly, 
even in absence of EU impulse, normative emulation may result in the mimicry of models 
with higher perceived legitimacy.
168
  Even Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier acknowledge the 
relevance of sociological mechanisms of Europeanisation, though they limit them to the phase 
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of association negotiations and to democratic conditionality beyond the acquis, concerning 
the basic principles of liberal democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms.
169
 
Finally, historical institutionalism is an eclectic approach relying on the sequencing of the 
previous two.
170
 In the short-term, institutions are only behavioural constraints for actors’ 
strategies of utility maximisation, but “in the long-run, actors’ very identities may be 
powerfully shaped by institutional arrangements”.171 Stemming from economic 
conceptualisation of increasing returns and path dependency, historical institutionalism sees 
institutions as sticky structures that lock in actors into persistent patterns. Change is explained 
by institutional misfit and external shocks, punctuating the equilibrium and resettling it on a 
new course. Policy inertia and path dependency limit EU influence, and only marginal change 
can be expected by layering or patching up EU policies into national repertoires.
172
 Though 
combining the previous two approaches, historical institutionalism remains somehow biased 
towards structure, leaving to agency a very limited role. The three strands of neo-
institutionalism are summarised in the table 1 below.  
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Table 1.2: Europeanisation according to the three strands of neo-institutionalism 
 Rational choice 
institutionalism 
Sociological  
institutionalism 
Historical  
institutionalism 
Logic of action Consequentiality  
(cost-benefit analysis) 
Appropriateness  
(rule-guided 
behaviour) 
Path dependency 
(stickiness of 
institutions) 
Interests of the 
actors 
Exogenous to interaction  
(new means for old 
goals) 
Endogenous to 
interaction 
(new means for new 
goals) 
Evolving over time  
(malleable in the long-
term) 
Main element of 
change 
Thin learning  
(strategic bargaining) 
Thick learning 
(socialisation) 
Timing and practices 
(punctuated 
equilibrium) 
Strategy of 
Europeanisation 
Conditionality  
(reinforcement by 
reward) 
Persuasion and 
legitimacy 
Incremental change 
and critical junctures 
- Direct 
influence 
Cost/benefit 
manipulation 
(incentives/disincentives, 
capacity-building) 
Normative pressure 
(authoritative models) 
 
- Indirect 
influence 
Functional emulation: 
- regulatory competition 
- lesson-drawing 
Normative emulation 
(mimicry) 
 
Scope 
conditions 
1. Credibility  
2. Determinacy  
3. Adjustment costs 
4. Size/speed of reward 
5. Number of veto 
players 
1. Norms legitimacy  
2. Identification with 
EU 
3. Norm resonance 
1. Policy 
dissatisfaction 
2. EU-centred 
epistemic 
communities 
3. Rule transferability 
4. Number of veto 
players 
Contexts of 
main relevance 
Acquis conditionality 
- Accession negotiations 
Democratic 
conditionality 
- Association 
negotiations 
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4.3 Scope conditions and outcome patterns of Europeanisation 
Domestic actors are not simply passive recipients of Europeanisation. Instead, it is their 
active engaging, interpreting, incorporating or resisting to external influence that shapes the 
outcomes of Europeanisation, resulting in convergence or divergence. 
Börzel and Risse define four scopes conditions for institutional change. First, a domestic 
demand for change is needed, which leads to the differential empowerment of domestic 
actors. Second, statehood and the institutional and administrative capacities of the country are 
crucial for its ability to adopt, implement, and enforce decisions and reforms. Third, the 
regime type of the target country matters, since market democracies resonate with EU 
institutions and policies, while autocracies face higher costs of compliance and lower 
domestic pressure. Finally, power asymmetries, both in terms of material and ideational 
resources, constrain or foster norms diffusion; the EU’s leverage is higher, the stronger its 
power asymmetry with the receiving actors.
173
 
The relation between pressure for adaptation and change in domestic structures is 
curvilinear, as sketched by Radaelli in his “misfit” model. A moderate pressure induces 
change at national level, whether by adaptation (thin learning) or transformation (thick 
learning). Instead, a good fit makes change unnecessary, while a bad fit raises the adjustments 
costs, discouraging change. The outcome of Europeanisation is thus not necessarily 
convergence, in terms of superficial adaptation (“absorption”) or behavioural change 
(“transformation”), but it could also be inertia or defensive responses (“retrenchment”). This 
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could be an issue of timing, as EU pressure could face a stable, post-reform domestic context, 
which already paid the sunk costs of adjustments.
174
 
The final resulting framework of Europeanisation can be depicted as in table 2.  
Table 1.3: Europeanisation framework: logics of action, scope conditions, outcomes 
 
European Union 
/ ‘Europe’ 
Influence modes Logics of action Scope conditions Outcomes 
Direct 
Coercion, 
authority 
Domestic 
demand 
Inertia 
Consequentiality Statehood Absorption 
Indirect 
Appropriateness Regime type Transformation 
Path dependency  
Power 
asymmetries 
Retrenchment 
 
5. Turning nation states into member states: the internal 
transformative power of Europe 
The rise of international cooperation and multilateral institutions has been a striking feature of 
the post-war period. But global and regional institutions do not signal only a thicker 
international society than in the inter-war period or in the Belle Epoque. Rather, it points to a 
profound transformation and redefinition of the state form itself, and of its internal features. 
Different interpretations have been put forwards concerning the domestic consequences of 
such a transformation, which can still be referred back to the Europeanisation paradigm. 
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On the one hand, for scholars in the liberal tradition of international relations such as 
Majone, as well as Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik, delegation to international bodies is yet 
another way to secure domestic non-majoritarian democracy, as constitutionalism and 
federalism. International accountability is deemed to reinforce and preserve domestic 
democratic procedures
 175
 On the other hands, scholars such as Bickerton see this additional 
layer of accountability as alternative to the state/society linkages which were fundamental for 
the previous forms of nation states and national corporatist (welfare / developmental) states. 
International cooperation thus connects and reinforces national executives, insulating them 
from the societies they are deemed to democratically govern.
176
   
5.1 The anchoring power of international institutions on democracy 
One way in which the form of the state is changed in the process of European integration is by 
the relativisation of the linkage between state and society, which is supplemented by a 
stronger linkage among different executives at European level. To the domestic accountability 
of Constitutional forms of checks and balances, a new layer of international accountability is 
juxtaposed. European institutions can thus be seen as yet another non-majoritarian institution 
typical of a “regulatory state”177 and their introduction can be “democracy-enhancing” rather 
than a factor of democratic deficit.
178
 
In fact, majoritarianism is a fallacious notion of democracy. The idea of control by the 
majority of all politics – legislative, executive, and eventually also judiciary – derives from a 
                                                 
175
 Majone, Giandomenico. “Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards.” European Law Journal 
4 (1), 1998, p. 5–28.  
Keohane, Robert O., Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik. “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism.” 
International Organization 63 (1), 2009, p. 1. 
176
 Bickerton, From Nation-States to Member States, 2012 
177
 Majone, Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’, 1998. 
178
 Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik, Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism., 2009 
66 
 
radical view of the parliamentary assembly as “the only democratic representative 
institution”179 and finds very few practical applications today. Westminster-type 
Parliamentary supremacy is tempered, in the continental tradition, by both constitutionalism 
and federalism.  
On the one hand, “contemporary democracies are constitutional democracies”180 
several policy fields and decisions are insulated from the political game, in order to avoid the 
tyranny of the majority. Written constitutional rules, bicameralism, independent courts, and 
specialised agencies, all are tasked with holding in check the power of the democratically-
legitimated MPs. “Well-designed constitutional constraints enhance democracy, understood 
as the ability of the people as a whole to govern itself, on due reflection, over the long run”,181 
as it allows to combat special interests, protect individual and  minority rights, and foster 
collective deliberation and participation to policy choices.   
The core claim of the constitutional conception of democracy is that rule by 
the people can be enhanced, on balance, by complex procedural 
requirements such as checks and balances, and by institutions that are 
relatively remote and only indirectly accountable.
182
 
On the other hand, federalism as an organising principle of the state also trumps 
majoritarian democracy. “True federalism is fundamentally a non-majoritarian, or even anti-
majoritarian, form of government”.183 Besides a written and rigid Constitution, federalism 
prescribes a vertical and horizontal separation of powers and the over-representation of small 
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jurisdictions in some settings (as in the European Council). Federalism has been interpreted as 
a tool of cleavage management in plural and divides settings, where different sub-societies 
coexist, in order to avoid deadlock or disintegration of the system.
184
 As such, federalism 
allows for the non-domination of one group over the other.  
Both federalism and constitutionalism are domestic system of checks and balances, 
aimed at tying the hands of majoritary-based legislatures and executives and ensure that their 
action does not trump upon individual or minority rights. The same logic of delegation to non-
majoritarian institutions at home helps explaining delegation to international institutions. 
Delegation is usually justified by either cognitive factors (efficiency and effectiveness of 
specialised agencies), the reduction of transaction costs (saving time and efforts to reach 
agreements), or the politicians’ wish to escape responsibilities and shift blame over other 
actors. To these, Majone adds the need to achieve credibility of commitments in technical 
decisions, in order to explain the spread of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions in 
today’s Europe. Time-constrained legislators, subject to periodical renewal through elections, 
are faced with perverse incentives and a short-term bias, when looking for long-term solutions 
for policy problems. To achieve credible political commitments, not subject to the vagaries of 
democratic elections’ results, policy-makers may thus restrain themselves and delegate 
authority to experts and agencies that are less directly accountable, and thus freer to take 
decisions with a long-term perspective. In cases such as these, “reliance upon qualities like 
independence and credibility has more importance than reliance upon majority rule,” thus 
calling for a rethinking of a purely majoritarian concept of democracy.
185
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According to Majone, the European institutions may be though of as “the regulatory 
branch– the ‘fourth branch of government’ to use the America phrase – of the Member 
States”.186 The delegation to them of specific (“precisely and narrowly defined”) tasks would 
thus be sufficiently justified under the same non-majoritarian legitimacy sources: “expertise, 
procedural rationality, transparency, accountability by results”.187 
Delegation to multilateral international institutions can be justified in the same way as 
domestic delegation to non-majoritarian institutions: “multilateral institutions can, and often 
do, bolster democracy by enhancing such domestic constitutional mechanisms”.188 This is so 
since international institutions help empower diffuse interests against special interests (as in 
the case of trade policy and liberalisation), protect vulnerable minorities’ and individual rights 
(as in the ECtHR
189
 and the Kadi saga
190
), and foster collective informed deliberation (as in 
climate policy and in the EU’s regulatory and network governance). Surely, international 
organisations as well “may attenuate direct electoral control and may themselves be captured 
by special interests, or operate in a nontransparent and unaccountable fashion”.191 At the same 
time multilateral institutions, the authors find, will more likely be democracy-enhancing 
where their member states are democratic, and where they foster the participation of civil 
society networks and organisations. The costs of participating in international institutions, for 
domestic democracies, will be higher for small and homogeneous societies, in terms of loss of 
citizens’ participation, than for large and heterogeneous ones, though the first may be more 
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able to monitor, influence and make accountable both their government and the 
organisation.
192
 Participation to international organisations thus, according to the liberal 
theoretical strand, adds a layer of international accountability to the domestic accountability 
between state and society, strengthening and “anchoring” domestic democracy.  
5.2 The relativisation of the state/society linkage  
A second interpretation of the domestic change fostered by multilateral cooperation, put 
forward especially by scholars such as Bickerton, see this additional layer of accountability as 
alternative to the state/society linkages which were fundamental for the previous forms of 
nation states and national corporatist (welfare / developmental) states. International 
cooperation thus connects and reinforces national executives, insulating them from the 
societies they are deemed to govern.   
Bickerton argued that “European integration corresponds to the shift from one form of 
state – the nation state – to another, the member state”.193  This passage goes along with the 
relativisation of the linkage between state and society which had been foundational for the 
nation state form: “the state-society relationship has been relativised, becoming only one 
relationship amongst others constitutive of statehood”.194 
European integration is best understood as a process of cooperation 
undertaken not by nation states jealous of their sovereignty and their 
national prerogatives, but by member states, entities whose self-
understanding is inseparable from pan-European-level cooperation and 
policymaking. These member states are characterized by national executives 
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and administrations whose main orientation is towards the cooperative 
decision-making process itself.
195
 
This shift from nation- to member-states explains, according to Bickerton, the paradox 
of behaviour of EU countries, compromising rather than bargaining even when sheltered from 
the public eye within different EU bodies (e.g. the Political and Security Committee, PSC, 
and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, Civcom, in CFSP; and the 
Economic and Financial Committee, EFC, in the eurozone management, all of which 
Bickerton dubs as “consensus-generating mechanisms”).196 
A second paradox identified by Bickerton is the one of the European Union appearing 
as external to its member states, in the popular imagination, while it is in fact much more 
based on the centrality of national executives and composed mainly of national 
representatives and officials more than of a European civil service.
197
 This is due, according 
to Bickerton, to the “internal shift in the nature of statehood”198 within the process of 
European integration, turning nation states into member states by introducing as an external 
constraint upon national sovereignty what was before (as Constitutional constraints) only an 
internal expression of sovereignty. This is in line with a reconceptualisation of the state from 
a Weberian coercive actor holding the legitimate monopoly of violence into a distinctive 
“community of association” binding citizens together and limiting state powers by an act of 
internal sovereignty
199
, thus making up a peculiar combination of coercion and consent.  
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The focus is thus, following Milward,
200
 on regional integration as a process of state 
transformation. In contrast with earlier polities, displaying only tenuous links between rules 
and subjects (“society existed independently of rulers… [it] survived not because of its lords 
but despite them”),201 the point of departure is the modern nation state, whose main feature 
was the use of nationhood and nationalism in order to mobilise the masses and fuse coercion 
and community. This created strong and firm vertical social bonds between state and society, 
and fostered an anarchical international society whose role was to express the independence 
of its members, rather than being a check on their sovereignty.
202
 
The change from state to member states, according to Bickerton,
203
 comes with the 
idea that “membership is constitutive of statehood and is not just a post hoc recognition of the 
status quo”. Besides the traditional elements of statehood (territory, government, population, 
monopoly on legitimate violence), this new form of state witnesses a relativisation of the 
relationship between state and society, being supplemented by the state’s participation into 
external activities working as an internal constraint. In contrast with modern constitutional 
democracy since Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Madison, which depoliticises certain 
regulatory elements as a way of avoiding majoritarian despotism and as an internal expression 
of popular sovereignty, member states find constraints on their powers from without, from 
their participation to external activities and bodies. “Limiting power through the imposition of 
external constraints upon national governments is the guiding idea of member statehood”; 
“instead of the people expressing themselves qua constituent power through this 
constitutional architecture, national governments seek to limit popular power by binding 
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themselves through an external set of rules, procedures, and norms”.204 This results in an 
exercise of self-limitation which is not conceptually different from the one of constitutional 
democracy – so much that it may be referred back to Weiler’s concept of “constitutional 
tolerance”205 – but which situates the sources of constraints beyond the borders of the state. 
“The member state realizes itself qua member state in the creation of multiple limits to and 
constraints upon the exercise of national power”.206 
Externalising the constraints also detaches and separates the popular will from the 
policy-making process. First, society is assumed as separate from the state, as opposed to 
integrated. Second, constraints over power are based on institutional and bureaucratic 
mechanisms rather than on legal-political principles; the state is thus seen as “an 
administrative machine rather than a political community”.207 As expressed by Della Sala, the 
member state form is hard but hollow.
208
 On the one hand (hardness), government is more 
effectively insulated from societal pressures and executives are reinforced; whole policy 
areas, previously object of political contestation (e.g. monetary policy), are now depoliticised 
and dealt with technocratically as technical exercises. On the other hand (hollowness), the 
state is emptied of authority in favour of international (IOs), transnational (corporations) and 
subnational (local autorities) actors, and representation gives way to efficiency as a criteria to 
assess the quality of democracy. This results overall, in Bickerton’s analysis, in an inherently 
unstable state form, resting upon the presumption of division and diverging interests between 
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national governments and societies. Rather than seeing a vertical division between nation 
states, or an horizontal separation between nation states and the supranational Union, 
Bickerton identifies a “horizontal separation of national executives – in close cooperation 
with EU institutional settings – from domestic populations”.209 As remarked by Cooper, 
sovereignty is thus reconceptualised from expressing independence and separation, to 
expressing participation. Sovereignty as participation is not anymore a right inherent to the 
nature of any sovereign, but rather a privilege belonging to those “with a seat at the table”.210 
How did the transformation process of European states from nation states into member 
states develop? Bickerton identifies a critical juncture in the crisis of national Keynesianism 
in the 1970s and 1980s. The national corporatist state, which had isolated policymaking but 
within a strong national context, allowing for the rise of the welfare state, gave way to a 
“weak form of state”, “less bound by domestic constituents and more dependent upon 
international rules and norms for their own identity and sense of purpose”211. In fact, the 
response to the post-war devastation of Europe was couched in national Keynesian terms:  
liberal democracies managed to deradicalise organised labour via generous national welfare 
systems, as well as the judicialisation and individualisation of political conflict. National 
corporatism as a “transitional state form”212 featured an emphasis on consensus and 
compromise, made possible by political pragmatism
213
 and the primacy of administrative 
actors over political representatives, along with the technicalisation and technocratisation of 
politics. This resulted in broader depoliticisation of public life, and according to Bickerton 
can be seen as the uncoupling of representation from democracy, with the emergence of a 
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functional notion of societal representation. Yet, political life remained bound within the 
state; the social contract remained “national in form and content”.214 
The economic crisis of the 1970s questioned the national socialdemocratic corporatist 
consensus. Resolution came through a radical transformation of the role of the state in social 
and economic life, including public expectations about it. The “new laissez faire”215 implied a 
shift away of responsibilities from the state towards individuals and the market, thus 
“reneging on the basic premise of the post-war nation state: that governments could act as 
forces for social improvement and could guarantee individual access to goods such as 
employment, healthcare, education, and housing”.216 Such an unpopular claim could only be 
supported via both public fatalism (Thatcher’s famous TINA formula) and external 
constraints. “Convinced of the impossibility of national solutions, governments embarked on 
various strategies to change public expectations and to demobilize those societal actors for 
whom national Keynesianism had become the natural policy choice”.217 At the same time, the 
time inconsistency thesis led to a new consensus on the independence of central banks and the 
preference for policy rules rather than political discretion, while the inflationary bias 
perceived as inherent in national democratic procedures was corrected by reducing the state’s 
role in the economy. Overall, the notion of national social contract was criticised and put 
aside, weakening the link between states and societies and replacing them with stronger links 
between different national executives in need to find non-political, non-partisan sets of rules 
to bind their action. “The liberation of national governments from their corporatist 
commitments thus coincided with a weakening in many of the institutions that had mediated 
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state-society relations in the post-war period”218. National corporatist frameworks were 
formally preserved but their raison d’etre changed: “from being a way of guaranteeing rising 
incomes for the working class… these arrangements became the means by which businesses 
were able to keep down labour costs”.219 
The rise of the “regulatory state”, in Majone’s terms, with the shift of authority 
towards non-majoritarian bodies and the transformation of state structure from economic 
actors to market regulators, coincided with the relinquishment by the state of “many other 
goals, including economic development, technical innovation, employment, regional income 
redistribution, and national security”.220 This shift in the nature of the administrative power of 
the state, together with the dismantling of the post-war Keynesian institutional mechanisms, 
signals for Bickerton the rise of the “member state” as a new state model: “political power 
needs to be circumscribed in order that special interests do not dominate its decision-
making”.221 National executives are thus endowed with greater autonomy, but they lack an 
overarching set of political values and, unable to achieve substantial legitimacy via a social 
contract, they end up identifying with the procedural rules and norms.  
 
6. Europeanisation beyond the member states and its pitfalls 
Europeanisation within the borders of the European Union may refer to the 
transformation of the nation states into member states, by the introduction of an additional 
layer of international accountability, with different evaluations of its consequences, as 
highlighted in the previous section. On the one hand, domestic democracy may be reinforced 
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by a new non-majoritarian, albeit external, constraint; on the other hand, the linkages between 
state and society may get under strain and lead instead to collusion among member states’ 
executives, insulated from their own societies.  
In any case, the research agenda of Europeanisation did not stop at the borders of the 
European Union. During the 1990s, the growing influence of the EU on Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEE) in the frame of its enlargement policy led scholars to widen their 
field of research
222
. This section zooms in on Europeanisation beyond the member states, 
resuming the main features of “Europeanisation East”, as well as its main open issues 
resulting from the literature on the Europeanisation of candidate countries: unclear conceptual 
boundaries, a return to first generation top-down definitions, the risks of degreeism and 
adjectivised Europeanisation, and the seemingly intractable issue of stateness for contested 
candidate states. 
6.1 Europeanisation vs. EU-isation: lack of clear conceptual boundaries 
The concept of Europeanisation, first, is subject to a terminological ambiguity. The term, 
referring to ‘Europe’ in general, does not include a clear specification of the source of change 
expected at domestic level. We need to know “which Europe we are talking about”.223  
In a minimalist sense, Europeanisation is understood as “the process of downloading EU 
directives, regulations and institutional structures” to the national level.224 “Minimally, 
‘Europeanization’ involves a response to the policies of the European Union”.225 This narrow, 
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EU-centric sense, which could be better termed “EU-isation”,226 is the one that scholars, 
especially those employing rationalist approaches, usually refer to. It is a meaning that is 
easier to operationalise and put to test in empirical studies. 
In a maximalist sense, on the other hand, one can “speak of Europeanisation when 
something in the domestic political system is affected by something European”,227 i.e., it is “a 
phenomenon exhibiting similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely 
identified with, ‘Europe’”.228 Such an approach, on the one hand, opens up to the possibility 
of voluntary, indirect mechanisms resulting in institutional isomorphism or mimicry, such as 
social learning, adaptation and lesson-drawing. On the other hand, it includes the possibility 
of a broader understanding of “Europe” to be considered as the origin of the impulse affecting 
the domestic level. By sidelining an EU-centric approach, it takes into consideration the role 
of other European international organisations (Council of Europe, OSCE, NATO, but also 
OECD and global institutions such as WB, IMF, WTO) in fostering rule transfer and norm 
diffusion, going even beyond formal institutions (political Europe) to consider the role of 
cultural Europe, in the broad circulation of norms, practices and behaviours in the continent, 
as in the framing of the Eastern Enlargement as a part of the historical process of “return to 
Europe” of countries which felt having been violently separated from it.229 
In fact, while the second, maximalist meaning seems the most linguistically appropriate 
for the concept of Europeanisation, for the sake of familiarity and operationalisation most 
scholars use the first, minimalist sense. This is an even more contentious issue when 
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Europeanisation of candidate states is at stake, since the EU may not be only one source of 
change, in a process which sees parallel and often reinforcing pressures from several 
international instances and organisations (EU, Council of Europe, NATO, in addition to the 
broader globalisation and modernisation trends).  
6.2  Europeanisation East in the shadow of hierarchy: back to a top-
down definition? 
The research agenda on the Europeanisation of candidate and applicant countries developed 
from the studies on conditionality in the shadow of the EU’s eastern enlargement of 2004/07, 
mainly in the frame of rationalist and constructivist institutionalist theories. It was possible to 
speak of Europeanisation of candidate countries, thus striking a parallel with internal EU 
dynamics, due to the broad scope of the process, covering the whole of the acquis, and to the 
extent with which EU institutions steered it. At the same time, differences included the tools 
at EU disposal towards non-member countries (positive incentives, normative pressure, and 
persuasion), softer than treaty-based obligations and sanctions, coupled with deeper and more 
comprehensive monitoring, as well as the power asymmetry of the EU towards candidate 
countries, deprived of any “voice” or “upload” possibility and simply object of top-down rule 
transfer.
230
 
According to Héritier,
231
 the main differences between “Europeanisation West” 
(Europeanisation within the EU) and “Europeanisation East” (Europeanisation of candidate 
countries) lay in the starting situation of CEE countries, featuring both a triple simultaneous 
transition (to democracy, market economy, and sometimes also statehood) and a strong 
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linkage with EU accession negotiations. In such a setting, the “overpowering external 
incentives associated with EU membership conditionality” exert an “enormous pressure” on 
candidate states.
232
 When coupled with the wide scope of accession negotiations, including all 
the issues areas covered by the acquis and even beyond in cases of democratic conditionality, 
the frequent demands for wholesale institutional reform, and the extensive monitoring role of 
the European Commission on implementation, membership conditionality leads 
Europeanisation East to conform more with first-generation definitions of Europeanisation as 
a one-way, top-down process. Candidate countries are denied agency in the process, as they 
have no outlet to express their voice or to shape the policies of which they are at the receiving 
end. 
The Europeanisation of candidate countries shares with the Europeanisation of member 
states the key empirical finding of a differential impact of “Europe” across countries and issue 
areas. Nevertheless, given the peculiarities introduced above, it is understandable how it has 
highlighted a more clear-cut explanatory value of rationalist institutionalist hypotheses for the 
domestic impact of the EU, when compared with sociological and historical institutionalist 
alternatives. Clear and credible incentives underpinning conditionality, in terms of both 
rewards and punishments, and the political costs incurred by domestic elites, seem able to 
explain the variance in the outcome levels of Europeanisation.
233
 As such, the 
Europeanisation of candidate countries looks very much alike a hierarchical process of 
conditional compliance. 
6.3 Adjectivised Europeanisation: the dangers of degreeism  
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As underlined by Sartori,
234
 a concept is defined in its field of application by two properties in 
a trade-off relation, intention and extension. The properties covered by the concept define its 
intention, while the range of items to which the concept applies defines its extension. The 
more the properties a concept includes, the less the empirical realities to which it will apply. 
Radaelli noticed earlier on that Europeanisation studies seemed to privilege extension and 
cover a broad range of phenomena, also when with few common features, and considered that 
to be due to the early stage in which the research field found itself.
235
 Similarly, the definition 
that he put forward back then was also highly denotative,
 
intending to seize the research 
object by putting forward a collection, a catalogue of elements that may fall within its field of 
application, even if they do not appear at first sight to have too many properties in 
common.
236
 In Sartori’s language,237 Radaelli’s definition could be classified as a “precising 
denotative” definition.238 
The assumption was that, after a first exploratory approach to the field, more intension-
focused definitions and approaches would result in a more in-depth understanding of the 
object of Europeanisation research
239
. In fact, more than one decade later, Europeanisation 
studies keep using the same, denotative and extensive definitions. The end result is conceptual 
stretching in terms of degreeism, i.e. differences in kind replaced by differences in degree: by 
not being able to define what Europeanisation is and what is not, students tend to see it 
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everywhere, but only partially.
240
 As Radaelli contended, “if everything is Europeanized to a 
certain degree, what is not Europeanized?”.241 The result can be seen in the plethora of studies 
arguing that Europeanisation is there, but only to a certain extent. The ‘adjectivised 
Europeanisation’ trend seems to be on the rise in the field. We hear about “limited”,242 
“slow”,243 “shallow”,244 “sluggish”,245 “negotiated”246 Europeanisation, up to “Potemkin” 
Europeanisation.
247
 While they are often used in a descriptive way, sometimes these labels are 
held up as new concepts. In fact, they risk mistaking a difference in the outcome (differential, 
limited convergence and compliance) with a difference in the process. Instead of defining the 
scope conditions of the process of Europeanisation in the context of candidate countries, in 
order to explain its differential outcome, they tweak the process itself.  
6.4 The issue of stateness: a cul-de-sac for weak states in the 
enlargement process? 
Concerning the Europeanisation of candidate countries, one scope condition appears to be 
particularly well-suited to explain variance in outcomes:  statehood (or stateness). As 
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underlined by Fukuyama,
248
 “before you can have a democracy or economic development, 
you have to have a state”. Differently than in previous EU enlargement rounds, in the Western 
Balkans different types of states coexists, ranging from international semi-protectorates and 
contested polities (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo) to more or less consolidated states (Croatia, 
Albania). The contestation of the polity, together with the weakness of state structures, 
vulnerable to capture by predatory elites, which Linz and Stepan had already put at the centre 
of the explanatory model of post-communist transition,
249
 have also been singled out by 
Elbasani as a relevant intervenient variable in Europeanisation processes: “deficient patterns 
of compliance tend to correlate well with the problem of stateness”.250 
The same argument is endorsed by Börzel, when she states that “limited statehood is the 
main impediment for the Western Balkans on their road to Brussels”, since it “affects both the 
capacity and the willingness of countries to conform to the EU’s expectations for domestic 
change”.251  In fact, limitations in both sovereignty (the domestically and internationally 
uncontested claim to the legitimate monopoly of force) and capacities (organisational, 
financial and cognitive resources to make and enforce collectively-binding rules) “have 
seriously curbed the transformative power of the EU in the Western Balkans – despite their 
membership perspective”.252 In contexts of contested statehood, conditionality is not able to 
produce social learning and modify behaviours, and these very states’ weaknesses lead the EU 
to behave inconsistently, reducing its own leverage and the effectiveness of conditionality.  
                                                 
248
 Fukuyama, ‘Stateness’ First, 2005, p. 84. 
249
 Linz, J.J., and Stepan, A. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1996. 
250
 Elbasani, European Integration and Transformation in the Western Balkans, 2013, p. 18. 
251
 Börzel, When Europeanization Hits Limited Statehood, 2013, p. 174. 
252
 Ibid., p. 173. 
83 
 
Consolidated statehood is crucial to make Europeanisation work. 
Uncontested sovereignty and sufficient state capacity are indispensable to 
comply with EU expectations for domestic change. For countries that lack 
one or both, membership is too remote to provide sizeable and credible 
incentives to engage in costly reforms.
253
 
This finding leads to a dilemma in the EU enlargement policy: the EU has offered future 
membership as a contribution to soften and solve statehood issues, but those very issues are 
undermining the Western Balkans’ compliance with EU norms and rules. According to 
Börzel, “the EU is unlikely to deploy much transformative power in its neighbourhood as 
long as it does not adjust its ‘accession tool box’ to countries whose statehood is seriously 
limited”.254 The EU seems ill-equipped to Börzel to deal with weak statehood cases, as it has 
no previous experience as a state-builder, and the case of Kosovo demonstrates that it has not 
developed the policies to become one. Its conditionality, capacity-building and selective 
coercive powers seem insufficient to produce anything more than formal, superficial change. 
Moreover, the EU’s post-modern emphasis on power-sharing, minority rights, and capacity-
building has sometimes clashed with state-building attempts to create strong central 
institutions and national identities. “Somewhat paradoxically, the EU can neither empower 
liberal reform coalitions where they do not exist, nor can it build states where there is no 
consensus on the national unit”.255  
Börzel’s ultimate finding is that the EU “lacks a clear strategy for state-building”,256 but 
she does not suggest the EU to equip itself with one, as “it is no use trying to develop one”,257 
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advocating instead that the EU acknowledges that it can only promote stability in its 
neighbourhood, and not substantial change. While this seems reasonable in the framework of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, it should be not necessarily so for the countries included 
in the enlargement agenda. The next section puts forward a new approach to the dilemma, by 
reframing it in terms of member state building, in order to look for new solutions.  
 
7. Member state building: building functional member states 
while integrating them 
An alternative—or better a complementary approach—to the concept of Europeanisation in 
the context of EU candidate countries is the concept of “member state building”. Initially 
employed quite denotatively, the use of this concept is growing in the literature and its 
features are becoming clearer. This section introduces the theoretical referents of member 
state building in the literature on state building and the notion of sovereignty as responsibility. 
It then defines it and trace the early discussions on the topic, concluding with the insight that 
member state building can contribute to solving the dilemma of simultaneous state building 
and European integration. 
7.1 From state building to member state building 
The issue of statehood, essential for Europeanisation but not addressed by it, has been 
usually tackled by the literature on state building, focused on “expanding over time the 
autonomy, authority, legitimacy and capacity of the state”.258 The practice of “liberal peace” 
state building derives from an understanding of sovereignty as responsibility. Under the 
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assumption that state weakness or failure is at the root of conflict, state building has 
developed since the 1990s as a strategic approach to sustainable peace.
259
 Premised on the 
incapacity of domestic state consolidation, external intervention is therefore needed to rebuild 
the state structure: either direct, or through coercion and monitoring, or by conditionality, in a 
long-distance state-building approach. The shift towards the latter is due to the 
incompatibility of long-term direct intervention with democracy and the rule of law, and to its 
legitimacy and commitment crisis.
260
  
Two different approaches to state building can be discerned in the literature: a structure-
centred approach focusing on institutions and an agency-centred approach focusing on 
legitimacy. The mainstream approach to state building, based on a Weberian conception of 
the state, keeps this latter conceptually distinct from society and equates weak statehood with 
lack of institutional capacity.
261
 State building is thus defined as the creation and 
strengthening of new governmental institutions, consistently with a liberal peace-building 
approach arguing that liberal democracy, economic interdependence, and international 
organisation are conducive to peace.
262
 It nevertheless fails in devising an adequate notion of 
legitimacy without falling in a circular definition of legitimacy as belief in legitimacy—a by-
product of successful institutions.
263
  
The state that tends to emerge from international state building, anyway, has some typical 
features: according to Zaum it is an executive-dominated state, still unable to provide most 
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public services, and often reproducing pre-war patterns of political economy.
264
 Bieber coins 
for it the term of minimalist state, i.e., “an effort to address the sources of conflict and state 
weakness by fostering state structures which fall short of the set of functions most states are 
widely expected to carry out, but by doing so might be able to endure”.265  The minimalist 
state is a sub-type of the weak state, but it holds minimal functions and has only minimal 
ambitions. Its legitimacy is still contested, both domestically and often internationally; its 
capacity to enforce decisions is weakened by power-sharing agreements and veto points; and 
its scope (the fields with which its structures engage) may be limited to few central functions: 
defence, foreign affairs, monetary policy. Nevertheless, its very limitation may allow it to 
sustain itself.
266
 
To the contrary, the critical literature on state building has pointed to the lack of 
legitimacy of models of state building designed and imposed from abroad.
267
 Institutional 
state building has been criticised as a discourse that produces states that are “failed by 
design”,268 by underplaying the role of local agency and reinforcing political dependency 
from abroad.
269
 An alternative approach to state building and legitimacy, reinstating an 
element of agency, has thus been developed by these scholars by taking into account the 
relation of mutual constitutiveness between state and society and the possibility to analyse it 
using constructivist theoretical tools. State failure and collapse is also deemed to derive from 
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the collapse of the central authority’s legitimacy and of its capacity to command loyalty, 
adding “a layer of complexity by looking at the nation-state as a constitutive whole”270 and 
drawing attention to the role of the “local” element and the agency of the beneficiaries of state 
building in hybridising the outcome.
271
  This can be seen also as a shift back in the 
understanding of sovereignty, from the concept of sovereignty as responsibility towards the 
concept of sovereignty as capacity and participation. 
7.2 The birth of member state building: building functional states while 
integrating them 
Member state building was first referred to as a strategy in the 2005 report by the 
International Commission on the Balkans (ICB), “The Balkans in Europe’s future”. Member 
state building was supposed to face the “integration challenge” and respond to the 
ghettoisation of the remainder of the Balkans, once Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia would 
have joined the Union. The ICB recognised that Western Europe and the post-Yugoslav states 
were “talking at cross-purposes” in the 1990s.272 The EU was set on the course of a post-
modern project of supranational integration, while the newly independent states were in a 
state- and nation-building moment which led only to the creation of weak states and 
protectorates. “Building functional member states while integrating them into the EU is 
Brussels’ unique challenge in the Balkans”.273 Member state building was seen as a distinct 
strategy from both international state building and the EU enlargement process. “The 
objective is not simply to build stable, legitimate states whose own citizens will seek to 
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strengthen and not destroy them - rather it is the establishment of a state that the EU can 
accept as a full member with absolute confidence”.274 
As seen by the ICB, such a strategy should have rested on three pillars. First, the Union 
should have fostered the development of functioning state administrations exploiting the 
leverage of the accession process. This includes a shift in focus from formal adoption of 
acquis norms to the development of implementation capacities, the inclusion of 
benchmarking, and the priority given to justice and home affairs issues as the most 
challenging ones.  Capacity building should thus become the “principal and explicit 
objective” of both the association (SAP) and negotiating framework.275 Although the lack of a 
single model of EU member state makes the Union a reluctant state builder, unwilling to 
endorse one or the other of the many administrative and constitutional arrangement in force in 
its member states, the Commission should have “assume[d] the responsibility for some of the 
institutional choices that the applicants are forced to make”.276 Secondly, the Union should 
have fostered the economic integration of the Western Balkan region, with a free trade area 
leading to a customs union with the EU, coupled with infrastructural investments and labour 
market and travel policies. Thirdly, “Member-state building as a Constituency Building”277 
should have focused on the gap between state and society, enhancing the quality of 
democracy, protection of minority rights, and the reconciliation between decentralisation, 
local self-governance, and multiethnicity. Finally, a “smart visa policy” should have allowed 
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the youth of the region to travel to the rest of the EU, consolidating liberal and pro-European 
attitudes in new generations which found it the most difficult to travel abroad.
278
  
The same year as the ICB’s report, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) distinguished in 
the Western Balkans three models of state building, as defined by Fukuyama as “the creation 
of new institutions and the strengthening of old ones”.279 First, traditional capacity-building 
focuses on standard non-coercive developmental tools to foster democracy and institution-
building. Second, authoritarian state-building entrusts wide-ranging competences to 
unaccountable international structures, tasked to respond to threats to peace and ensure 
minority protection; these performed “reasonably successful” in the post-war reconstruction 
of the countries at stake,
280
 but failed in supporting the consolidation of self-sustaining states. 
Finally, the ESI identified an EU-specific approach, named member state building, which had 
“accomplished revolutionary transformations over the past decade” in Central and Eastern 
Europe as well as Turkey.
281
 Member-state building, according to the ESI, consists of three 
processes: “an administrative revolution”, brought about by alignment to the EU acquis, in 
terms of institutions and legislation; “a process of social and economic convergence”, fostered 
by cohesion policies; and finally “a shift in the substance and processes of democratic 
governance”, opening up the decision-making process to consultation with civil society.282 
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7.3  The paradoxes of member state building and the role of the EU  
Later studies defined EU member states building as “a specific path to EU membership 
creating, in parallel, the preconditions for being a sustainable State as well as a future 
Member State”.283 The EU enacts a dual strategy, of state building and of European 
integration, towards the states in its enlargement agenda, through the tool of conditionality:  
The intricate process of EU integration with all its norms, procedures and 
criteria is the best crash-course in rational state management, good 
governance and administrative capacity building ever. The added value is in 
the form rather than the content of the EU integration process.
284
 
The challenge for the region is no longer about peacebuilding but about a 
process of preparation for membership in European structures... 
Democratization and state building are fundamental elements of this 
Europeanization. The EU, in other words, is building states which can 
eventually join the Union.
285
 
Nevertheless, as much as Europeanisation is weakened by the lack of statehood, member 
state building shows all the contradictions of the EU’s effort to build states while integrating 
them. As Juncos argues, the time has come for a third generation of critical Europeanisation 
studies, able to acknowledge the contradictions and limitations of the EU approach in order to 
understand it better. In fact, for Juncos, it would be wrong to assume a coherent EU strategy, 
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only to be tweaked by fine-tuning its issues with high domestic costs and normative 
inconsistencies. Rather, the inner contradictions of Europeanisation and the member state 
building effort should be exposed in order to better understand what factors weaken the 
transformative power of Europe and how they can be alleviated if they cannot be 
eliminated.
286
 
The EU has been unable to transfer conditionality to state-building; stateness has 
remained the biggest obstacle to EU integration. Europeanisation-Southeast, to paraphrase 
Héritier, has been mostly externally-driven, coercive and increasingly demanding.
287
 The 
main contradiction arises from the tensions between building minimal states (the post-conflict 
state building agenda) and building future EU member states (the member state building 
agenda). In fact, there exists a complex and non-linear relation between European integration 
and stateness. On the one hand, integration requires from states to renounce to absolute 
competence and pool some sectoral sovereignty in order to achieve common solutions. On the 
other hand, the EU requires from them high capacity requirements, in order to transpose EU 
law into domestic legislation, and to take part in common decision making. This is at odds 
with the conditions of most post-conflict states, which feel a need for strong, symbolic 
external sovereignty, while facing challenges of limited domestic capacity.
288
 
Member state building, in the context of the Western Balkans, has gone way further that 
what was the experience with institution-building during the EU eastern enlargement, 
enlarging its scope up to encroaching open issues of sovereignty. Conditionality, moreover, 
has sometimes undermined state building itself, even when geared towards a minimalist state. 
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First, pre-accession conditionality, being “sliced-out”, has offered little reward and therefore 
little leverage. Second, the EU has had to deal with cross-conditionality with other 
international organisations (Council of Europe, NATO). Third, the absence of clear rules and 
criteria, due to the lack of a single model of EU member state, has weakened democratic 
conditionality; the EU acquis is “weak on the nature of the state... The EU gives little 
guidance as to what kind of states can join the EU”.289 
In this context, “success” in member state building, according to Bieber, corresponds to 
exiting the minimalist state category, by acquiring legitimacy, strength and scope, “to be able 
to function as a future EU member state, and to provide services to citizens that allow them to 
secure popular legitimacy”.290 To achieve this, a three-pronged effort is needed. First, there 
should be commitment to one single state-building project over other alternatives. Second, a 
normative case for the state (a political, input criterion) is necessary, in order to persuade 
political elites to commit to it. Third, institutional capacities (an administrative, output 
criterion) are needed to meet the dual challenge of the high expectations of society from the 
state, and of EU membership requirements. All in all, given the two sources of high 
expectations, “the bar for state success in the Western Balkans is considerably higher than in 
other regions”.291 
Juncos highlights four contradictions of EU state building in the Balkans. First, the 
depoliticised and technocratic process of enlargement clashes with the highly salient domestic 
politics of state building. Second, the state-strengthening (capacity- and institution-building 
through pre-accession funds) and state-weakening (empowerment of civil society, resistance 
by sub-state political actors, downsizing and internationalisation of the public sector) 
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dynamics of enlargement are at odds. Third, EU compliance goals, implying the lack of 
alternatives, undermine local ownership; the EU promotion of the latter remains unable to 
foster effective civil society consultation. Finally, the executive-reinforcing, élite-driven and 
top-down features of member state building clash with the need to secure peace-building first 
by building consensus within society on the new institutions.
292
 
Woelk identifies five paradoxes of member state building. The first is the “paradox of 
sovereignty”: Western Balkans states, while they see the mirage of absolute sovereignty, are 
subject to international pressures to limit their sovereignty even before full integration. The 
second is the “no blueprint paradox”: the region, as well as the EU, shows remarkable 
diversity in the forms and functions of state structures, not providing any clear constitutional 
model. The third is the “good will paradox”: the EU lacks effective means of enforcement, 
especially in case of violation of political and constitutional duties, as a reflex of the voluntary 
nature of integration. The fourth is the “no damage paradox”: sanctions, as a way of enforcing 
decisions, might often even worsen the situation, thus suggesting a more strategic use of 
positive incentives instead. Finally, the “mirror paradox” tells us that “the EU’s capacity of 
acting as a catalyst for reforms depends very much on its own attractiveness”293. 
So, given the drawbacks above, which option is left for the EU’s role towards the 
Western Balkans? The main question concerns “how to find solutions for sustainable change 
and create incentives for overcoming these paradoxes”.294 According to Woelk, the main 
point of reference is that diversity is worth being preserved, as it is recognised by the EU as a 
value in itself (Art. 4.2 TEU). Therefore, the sovereignty paradox and the no-blueprint 
paradox seem to dispel the idea of a grand road map, a “detailed construction plan” for 
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member state building. Rather, the EU should shift its discourse and practice from “European 
standards” to “European adaptations”, in order to take into consideration the diversity among 
candidates and among member states. By taking as a reference point the shared values and 
principles of democracy, human rights, and rule of law, operationalised in particular by other 
organisation than the EU (Council of Europe, OSCE), the Union could spell out a set of 
different compatible options, from which the candidates could legitimately decide which to 
adopt according to local needs and features. This would help overcome the sovereignty 
paradox, as well as fostering “local ownership” by citizens and political elites.  
The EU, in the context of member state building, would thus assume the role of an 
“interested moderator”295, suggesting different perspectives and aiming to improve the 
political debate and decision making processes. The concept is similar to the idea of Europe 
as a “vanishing mediator”296 the EU would employ a relational power in its conflict 
management strategy, highlighting “the constitution of a community sharing a similar fate 
(and thus not necessarily a similar identity as such)”.297 By recognising conflict as a 
constitutive of the political, Balibar too points to the ability of the EU to preserve diversity, 
thus working as “neither a model, nor a hegemon”.298 This may also help lowering the 
politicisation and contestation of EU integration in candidate countries, as “the creation of a 
general consensus on EU integration is of fundamental importance in the process of EU 
Member-state building”.299 
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What are thus the necessary features for a working member state building approach? 
Woelk underlines the need for an incentive-based perspective of positive conditionality, 
consultation and assistance in constitutional matters, and citizens’ involvement to achieve 
reconciliation.
300
 The suggestions of Juncos are overlapping, focusing on the need to secure 
legitimate institutions, to acknowledge the political nature of state building, and to prioritise 
peace building as its foundation.
301
 
The ability of the EU member state building approach to soften the contradiction of 
“liberal peace” state building may be illustrated with an example from the enlargement 
process, the police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a case of “mismanaged 
conditionality”,302 in 2004 the OHR/EUSR Paddy Ashdown identified police reform as a key 
prerequisite for progress in the European integration path of the country. However, early 
apparent inter-ethnic agreement on the issue soon disappeared, leading Bosnia to the deepest 
political crisis since post-war democracy. Ashdown’s centralisation effort, cast in technocratic 
terms of judicial reforms, was undermined by the lack of common standards, either in the EU 
or by the Council of Europe, on police matters. The apparent lack of legitimacy of the EU 
conditions raised opposition by local politicians. The impasse remained until the OHR/EUSR 
backpedalled, accepting cosmetic changes as satisfactory.
303
 In this case, it is apparent how 
the lack of respect for the value of diversity, intrinsic in the “liberal peace” top-down agenda 
allowed domestic actors to oppose a veto and conquer the agenda of reform. A different 
approach, based on member state building, could have presented Bosnian politicians with 
several possible solutions for compatibility between Bosnian institutions and broad European 
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standards, drawing options from the various experiences of EU member states. In this way, 
open domestic discussion on the model to adopt would have also added legitimacy to the 
process, avoiding the democratic contradictions of imposed models. 
A change in this direction is evident in recent practice from the EU’s previous vertical 
and hierarchical positioning at the helm of international protectorates (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Kosovo) towards a more horizontal and deliberative approach based on new political 
partnership instruments (High Level Accession Dialogues, HLAD) aimed at fostering 
ownership and legitimacy in low-statehood candidate countries. The EU is thus trying to be 
less of an “Empire in denial”304 or a “substitute for Empire”,305 and work together with local 
elites in fostering state building in a way that is compatible with both the European member-
state model and the domestic democratic procedures. More could still be done; Farrell (among 
others) has gone as far as to call upon the EU to facilitate a locally-driven agreement to 
reform the Dayton Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina to make it compatible with EU 
accession and put an end to the international presence in the country.
306
 This could be the 
final challenge for EU member state building; after the several failed attempts at reforming 
Dayton, the EU would have to be extremely careful, though, in fostering a local solution from 
within, without imposing it from outside, for both legitimacy and effectiveness concerns.  
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II. Learning to interact: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the European Union 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the country object of the case study of the thesis, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. After a short introduction to the Dayton political order, the chapter discusses the 
multiple transitions (to democracy, market economy, statehood, and peace) that make it the 
country in the region with the most layers of complexity in governance. It then analyses 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a contested state. Bosnia is different from most other such cases, 
since the roots of state contestation are internal: they stem from the simultaneous presence of 
a complex federal and consociational structure, and of sub-state centrifugal tendencies 
coupled with direct intervention by international actors with executive powers. The chapter 
also takes a look at the Dayton institutional framework under the lenses of the two main 
theories of power-sharing, the consociational and integrative models. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
appears as a hybrid case in which elements from both models are present, though in an often 
contradictory way. The second part of the chapter looks at the interactions between the 
European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina over time, highlighting in particular how the 
EU struggled to adapt its approach to the specific Bosnian post-conflict context and to get to 
the helm of the international presence in the country. The EU remained twice stuck in cycles 
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of mismanaged conditionality, in the case of the police reform process (2005-2008) and of the 
Sejdić-Finci constitutional reform process (2008-2014). The shift towards a streamlined EU 
presence and the rescheduling of conditionality with the “new approach” to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in late 2014 led to a rebalanced conditionality and a different standing of the EU 
in the country, which enabled the re-opening of the EU path and the achievement of relative 
successes in the 2014-2016 period, also highlighting the consolidation of a strategy of 
member state building as stateness-aware enlargement or enlargement-specific state-building. 
 
1. Bosnia and Herzegovina as a contested state 
1.1 The Dayton order in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The Dayton peace accords (officially the General Framework Agreement for Peace), 
initialled on 21 November 1995 in Ohio and singed on 14 December in Paris, put an end to 43 
months of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
307
 The conflict had caused over 100,000 deaths, 
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the displacement of half the population of the country (of which 1 million refugees abroad) 
and the destruction of one third of the housing. The use of ethnic cleaning, concentration 
camps, mass rapes and massacres of civilians had made it the most brutal conflict in Europe 
since fifty years. The contracting parties of the Dayton peace accords are the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
The latter two took part in the peace negotiations as representatives of their secessionist 
Bosnian proxies (the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) which had established the Croatian 
Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, and the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) which aimed to defend 
the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska) which were fighting against the army of the 
internationally-recognised government seated in Sarajevo (Armija BiH).  
The peace compromise had been reached after the decisive action by NATO through air 
bombing of Serb positions, leading to a convergence between the situation in the field and on 
paper. The different sides of the agreement all had to renounce to a part of their war 
objectives: to carve out Bosnia among themselves for Serbia and Croatia; and to keep it 
together as a single polity for the Sarajevo government and the international community. The 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBiH) was thus internationally recognised in its pre-
war borders, but as a new polity – the state of “Bosnia and Herzegovina” (BiH), soon also 
with a new blue and yellow flag – composed of two “entities”, each afforded with the widest 
margin of autonomy: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), covering 51% of its 
territory and inhabited mostly by Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats; and Republika Srpska (RS), 
governing the remaining 49% and mostly inhabited by Bosnian Serbs. The Federation entity 
was to be further decentralised in 10 autonomous cantons, mostly ethnically homogenous, 
while RS was to remain as a unitary polity. The thin layer of state-level institutions meant to 
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keep them together was limited to a three-person rotating Presidency and three common 
Ministries – as detailed in Dayton’s Annex 4, which includes the English-language text of the 
new Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, this territorial power-sharing 
structure was complemented by ethnic power-sharing provisions among the three 
“Constitutive Peoples”, including the rotating Presidency and the use of Entity veto and Vital 
National Interest veto (VNI) in the legislative process.  
The first novelty of the Dayton order was thus the use of state building as a peace 
building strategy, and of “imposed federalism” as a state building strategy. Dayton went 
beyond the usual purpose of a peace treaty, and through an exercise in “political 
engineering”,308 aimed rather at building a federal state from the ruins of war.309 A federal 
form of state was introduced as part of the toolkit of international conflict resolution, peace 
building, and external state building, and without an endogenous ideology of federalism 
supporting it,
310
 Bosnia’s imposed federalism, however, limited itself to recognising the 
politico-territorial reality of 1995, and the same meaning of federalism remained domestically 
contested. Moreover, Dayton’s territorial set-up only partially overlaps with the 
communitarian system of constitutional protection of the three Constitutive Peoples.
311
 
Rather, the superposition in the RS between one territorial entity and the vast majority of one 
constitutive people risks creating a ‘segment state’, indicated in the literature as one element 
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conducive to further radicalisation of autonomy claims– as demonstrated by the secessionist 
rhetoric adopted by the RS leader Milorad Dodik since 2006.
312
  
The second novelty of the Dayton order was the strengthening of state building via the 
embeddedness of international organisations in the domestic legal order. The involvement of 
the international community in Bosnia and Hergovina’s post-war environment was massive, 
with a division of labour among international organisations to ensure the implementation of 
the peace accords (see table 1 below). On the military side, 60,000 troops under NATO 
command were included in the Implementation Force (IFOR), sine 1996 Stabilization Force 
(SFOR). On the civilian side, oversight over the implementation was entrusted to the Office 
of the High Representative (OHR), tasked to report to the international community as 
embodied by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). From the list of contents of the peace 
accords and from their order it is possible to see how the primary focus of its drafters was on 
the military aspects of peace-building. Then came issues linked with short-term stabilisation 
and state-building (elections, Constitution, institutions), which were deemed to allow for a 
quick exit-strategy of the international presence in the country. Only afterwards are issues of 
human rights and war crimes included, as well as more detailed provisions about civilian 
implementation (OHR).  
  
                                                 
312
 Roeder, Philip G., Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism, 
Princeton 2007. Perry, Valery, A ‘segment state’ vision of the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina?, 
Transconflict, 10 February 2014. 
102 
 
Table 3.1: Dayton Peace Accords annexes and tasked international institutions 
313
  
DPA Annex/Article Issue area Tasked institution 
Annex 1A Military aspects 
NATO (IFOR, SFOR) 
Annex 2 Inter-Entity Boundary Line 
Annex 1B Regional stabilisation 
OSCE Annex 3 Elections 
Annex 6B Human Rights Ombudsman 
Annex 4 Constitution 
High Representative (OHR) 
Annex 10 Civilian implementation 
Article IV Constitutional Court European Court of Human 
Rights 
Article V Central Bank International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 
Annex 6C Human Rights Chamber Council of Europe 
Annex 7 Refugees and Displaced Persons UNHCR 
Annex 8 Commission on Public Companies European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) 
Annex 11 International Police Task Force 
(IPTF) 
United Nations: UNMiBH 
The third novelty of the Dayton order was the presence of a muscled civilian 
implementation via the executive powers of international actors. The strategy of short-term 
disengagement, in fact, proved an illusion: after rushed elections in 1996 had confirmed the 
war-time nationalist elites in power, the PIC had to rethink its strategy and in 1997 settled for 
entrusting the OHR with direct executive powers to take actions against persons found in 
violation of the legal obligations stemming from the peace accords or their implementation. 
The OHR was instrumental in the coming years in order to overcome mutual vetoes and 
consolidate the implementation of the provisions of the peace agreement. When consensus 
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could not be found, the OHR imposed laws (including on media, industry, refugee returns) 
and symbols (including the flag, anthem, passport, currency and car number plates), as well as 
removed obstructionist politicians and civil servants, up to RS President Nikola Poplasen in 
1999. Its main phase of activism was in 2000-2006, during the mandate of Paddy Ashdown; 
subsequent setbacks and a changed domestic and international environment led the institution 
to take a more reserved role. After twenty years the OHR is still present, due to a lack of 
consensus on its closure, and entrusted with the same “Bonn powers”, although their use is 
deemed today only a last resort by the majority of PIC members.
314
  
Bosnia and Herzegovina has not stagnated in the last two decades, though. Rather, its 
institutions have developed from a weak confederation into the current Dayton-based federal 
form, thanks to the impulse towards centralisation of international and mixed political actors 
(the Office of the High Representative and Bosnia’s Constitutional Court). At the same time, 
the consolidation of an ethnic-based party system, with intra-group party competition only, 
helps explain how a federal system that is constitutionally centred upon territorial elements 
works in reality as an ethnic federation. The unsuccessful combination of strict power-sharing 
mechanisms with the Western tradition of civil liberties and human rights emerged in cases 
such as the Sejdić-Finci ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, which for long time 
blocked Bosnia’s progress in EU integration. According to Keil, Bosnia should be understood 
as an internationally administered federation rather than as a protectorate, as domestic 
politicians have always been offered space to find an agreement before international actors 
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stepped in to impose a solution.
315
 Yet, the embeddedness of the international community in 
the Bosnian political scene has also led to its domestication.
316
 
1.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina’s multiple transitions 
Bosnia and Herzegovina features some unique characteristics, which derive from its own 
history
317
 and have been lately entrenched in the BiH Constitution as drafted at Dayton. The 
result is a structure of asymmetric federalism, with a patchwork of overlapping decentralised 
competences, which burdens decision making and hinders implementation. Moreover, the 
territorial set-up does not overlap with the communitarian system of constitutional protection 
of the three recognised constitutive peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina– the country with the most layers of complexity in governance, 
among those of the Western Balkans – is the product of multiple overlapping transitions: to 
democracy and market economy, but also to statehood, to peace, and to power-sharing and 
international supervision. The way these various transitions have played out and interacted 
has deeply affected the current state of the institutions in the country. This feature sets Bosnia 
and Herzegovina apart from the rest of the countries of the region, and from most post-
socialist countries too. It adds further layers of complexity to its development, and presents 
the European Union with additional challenges than it was used to face.  
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Bosnia shares with the whole Central-Eastern Europe the heritage of socialism, with its 
two related transitions to liberal democracy and to market economy (two of the three 
Copenhagen criteria for EU membership). In the case of Bosnia, the two have been 
destabilised by the failure of the third and preliminary transition – to sovereignty and 
statehood – that Bosnia shares with the other post-Yugoslav and post-Soviet states of recent 
independence. The ensuing war and its resolution through external intervention and 
compromise have added further dimensions. Bosnia shares with other post-Yugoslav states 
the heritage of conflict, with its transition to peace. Due to the way peace was achieved in 
Bosnia, though, through external intervention and imposed compromise, it also faces 
additional transitions to shared rule and to international supervision. 
Table 2: Layers of transition in Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere, compared 
Transition 
from 
Transition 
to 
Lat.Am, 
Mediterr. 
Cent.East 
Europe 
Post-
Soviet 
Post-
Yugoslav 
Bosnia-
Herz. 
Socialism Democracy X X X X X 
Socialism 
Market 
economy 
 X X X X 
Yugoslav 
federation 
Sovereignty 
& statehood 
  X X X 
Conflict Peace    X X 
Ethnic 
autonomy 
Shared rule     X 
Supervision Self-rule     X 
Studies of transition have widened their scope, from their early outset in the 1970s and 
1980s. The process of political transition, centred upon the institutionalisation of democratic 
‘rules of the game’, was already the subject of 1970s and 1980s studies on the “second wave” 
of democratisation in Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Greece) and Latin America, after the 
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“first wave” of imposed post-war democracies (Germany, Japan, Italy).318 The first level of 
transition identified in ‘transitology’ studies has been the one of democratisation, i.e. “the 
whole process of regime change from authoritarian rule to the rooting of a new liberal 
democracy”.319  
The transition of post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and 
the following debate on the “third wave of democratisation”320 spurred the growth of a new 
strand of literature that focused its attention on the new challenge these states faced: the 
contemporary development of liberal democracy and market economy in countries coming 
from a long period of single party rule and planned economic systems. The simultaneity of the 
‘double transition’ to political and economic liberalisation in CEE added a layer of 
complexity, with potential “mutual effects of obstruction”.321 
 Furthermore, in the case of post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav countries, political 
liberalisation went together with newly-acquired independence through the dissolution 
(whether peaceful or not) of socialist federations, adding a vital interplay with the transition to 
statehood. The entanglement was captured by early definitions of the “triple transformation”. 
According to Claus Offe, this process involved three hierarchical levels of decision making: 
first, identity, i.e. “who ‘we’ are” (polity-building, state- and nation-building: “nationhood”); 
second, institutions, i.e. “the institutional framework of the ‘regime’” (institution-building and 
“constitution making”); and third, distribution, i.e. “who gets what”, i.e. “the ‘normal politics’ 
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of allocation”.322 Many works on the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe soon 
adopted the ‘triple transition’ label,323 to indicate democracy, market, and the state,324 or even 
lumped together the different dimensions in two broad areas, democratisation/marketisation 
and state/nation-building.
325
 Some authors, like Kuzio, set out to keep separate “stateness and 
the national question”,326 defining post-communist transformations as a quadruple transition 
(“democratisation, marketisation, state-institution and civic nation-building”), and founding 
civil society on civic nationalism and a shared national identity as means to ensure the 
cohesion of the polity. Offe remarked that the simultaneity of the three processes set aside 
Central and Eastern European countries from previous rounds of democratisation, making it 
“unsuitable and misleading” to analyse them as simply another wave. In his view, contrary to 
previous cases in which “the territorial integrity and organization of each country were largely 
preserved”, in Central and Eastern Europe “the scene is dominated by territorial disputes, 
migration, minority or nationality conflicts, and corresponding secessionist longings”.327 This 
pessimistic view likely originated from the same zeitgeist that had led Mearsheimer to spell 
disaster from ethno-national and border conflicts for the whole post-socialist half of the old 
continent.
328
 Yet, the call to integrate stateness and the challenges of state- and nation-
building in the transitology literature was long overdue. Skocpol had argued already in 1985 
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in favour of “Bringing the state back in”,329 and Linz and Stepan called attention in the 1990s 
to the fact that “stateness problems must increasingly be a central concern of political activists 
and theorists alike”.330  
The orderly unfolding of transitions in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s dispelled 
most of Mearsheimer’s forecasts, demonstrating that fifty years of socialist regimentation had 
managed to consolidate states and societies within their new borders. Yet, this third 
dimension of transition – to statehood and independence – remained relevant for one 
particular type of state, the socialist federations. None of these managed to survive the early 
phases of transition, yet they disappeared with very different modalities and consequences. 
While Czech Republic and Slovakia headed for a ‘velvet divorce’ (though Slovakia then 
underwent a period of authoritarian consolidation), and although the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union happened remarkably peacefully (with specific exceptions in the Caucasus), 
Yugoslavia proved to be the deviant case. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular, political 
liberalisation preceded economic transition. The 1990 election, the first one organised after 
the end of the political monopoly of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, was held at 
the level of the republics (Bosnia) rather and before than of the federation (Yugoslavia). 
Moreover, political liberalisation also preceded the consolidation of clear boundaries of the 
polity (transition to statehood), i.e., whether a democratised Bosnia would have remained part 
of a rump Yugoslavia, and on which terms.
331
 Scholars of democratic theory have stressed 
how the decision on the definition of the borders of the polity is pre-democratic and cannot be 
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settled by conventional democratic methods.
332Likewise, Dahl stresses that “we cannot solve 
the problem of the proper scope and domain of democratic units from within democratic 
theory”,333 warning that the lack of agreement on the boundaries of the political unit would 
not allow for consolidation of democracy. Frontloading political liberalisation in a situation of 
uncertain polity boundaries created a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ that fostered the victory of 
nationalist parties in each republic and within each ethno-national community of Bosnia, and 
led to the defeat of any non-ethnic, non-national alternative.
334
 
The wars that ravaged former Yugoslavia in the decade between 1991 and 2001 left it 
successor states with the additional challenge of coping with a fourth transition, from conflict 
to peace - the one with the widest range of consequences. Bosnia is today first and foremost a 
post-conflict country. The armed confrontation that devastated the country for three and a half 
years, causing more than 100,000 deaths and the displacement of half its population, has left 
deep scars, both visible, as in the destruction of buildings and productive infrastructures, and 
invisible ones, in the memories, identities, and preferences of the population. These war 
legacies still influence all transitions and cleavages in today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina.335 
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Two corollaries descend from this fourth transition, to peace, for the forms it assumes in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: the transition to shared rule, and the transition to self rule. Even the 
transition to peace, in fact, did not develop in the same way in all the post-Yugoslav states. 
Slovenia and Montenegro remained relatively shielded from the fighting, Croatia managed to 
regain control over all its territory through military action, and Serbia was forced to accept the 
loss of control over Kosovo through the same forceful means. In the other cases – Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia
336
 – the conflict came to an end 
through external intervention and a forced compromise among the warring parties. In 
Macedonia, the low-level conflict that opposed the Skopje government to local Albanian 
guerrilla in 2001 did not last long and a full-blown war was prevented by early international 
intervention and mediation. The ensuing Ohrid Agreement guaranteed the integration of 
Albanians within the Macedonian decision-making structures through integrative and 
consociational measures. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, the conflict had 
lasted for more than three years and had known the siege of Sarajevo and the genocide of 
Srebrenica, before the fallout from Croatia’s military advances and resolute NATO air 
support managed to push Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia (the latter ones in the name of their 
warring proxies) to sign up to the Dayton Agreement. The war in Bosnia was not solved 
through the clear military victory of one side, allowing a new political system to establish 
itself through a ‘victor’s peace’, as it had been the case in 1940s Germany, Japan, Italy or 
Austria (but also in 1930s Spain). Rather, the Bosnian conflict is a paradigmatic example of 
‘new war’, a category blurring the border between civil and international-conventional 
wars.
337
 The end of the conflict through externally-imposed power sharing – based on 
federalism and consociationalism, and replacing ethnic autonomy – engendered a fifth 
transition, to shared rule.  
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The deal struck at Dayton preserved Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single state, by 
reconstituting it as a consociational power-sharing system between the warring parties, which 
were to become its two decentralised entities, capped by a thin layer of state-level institutions. 
The newly established state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was described as an imposed 
federation without a federal ideology to support it.
338
  The political system of Bosnia, which 
combines strong territorial decentralisation with a state-wide system of power-sharing among 
national groups, has often been deemed responsible for the economic stagnation and lack of 
political reforms of the two post-war decades, since it effectively multiplies the veto points 
and, while ensuring non-domineering, it also guarantees the near-impossibility of actual 
governing. 
339
 In fact, what has been most often seen as problematic in the Bosnian case – and 
what has given rise to strategic judicial litigation cases such as Sejdic-Finci, Pilav, Zornic and 
others – is the uncanny mix of territorial (federal) and non-territorial (ethnic/communitarian) 
power-sharing, which impacts differently on different categories of citizens in different parts 
of the country.  
To ensure the necessary trust for such a system of imposed federalism to work, the 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement was delegated to a host of international 
organisations, and the ad hoc Office of the High Representative was entrusted with executive 
civilian powers, as of 1997, to effectively ensure that domestic actors do not obstruct or revert 
the implementation of the peace agreement. This element of embeddedness of international 
organisation and of direct international civilian administration engendered the last, sixth 
transition from international supervision to self-rule, and the ongoing paradox of having to 
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move a country “from Dayton to Brussels”, i.e. from international supervision to shared 
sovereignty, without passing through the usual form of full Westphalian sovereignty. 
1.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina as a contested state  
The legacies of the different layers of transition at play, detailed above, all contribute to 
the contestation of statehood in Bosnia. This is apparent in both dimensions of statehood, 
related to state legitimacy (i.e. the relation between state and society through the political 
sphere) and to state capacities (i.e. the ability to take and enforce political decisions). Yet, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is not always included among contested states. This is because the 
sources of its state contestation are of an internal nature, and hence less visible.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina differs from most other contested states that only enjoy partial 
external recognition. Bosnia and Herzegovina has in fact been universally recognised since 
1992 as an independent and sovereign state, and it enjoys membership in the main 
international organisations;
340
 Bosnia thus arguably displays high levels of external 
sovereignty The Bosnian state is also formally fully in control of its territory, as no parts of it 
have declared secession or remain de facto outside the authority of state institutions. Yet, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains severely constrained in its domestic ability to take and 
implement policy decisions. An asymmetric federal system (with most competences held by 
sub-state entities) a complex consociational structure, the executive powers of international 
organisations, and the challenges of sub-state centrifugal tendencies (secessionism in RS and 
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calls for a separate third Croat entity) all testimony to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s “problematic 
sovereignty”341 and to a level of internal sovereignty that may be considered medium at best. 
According to the definition of sovereignty put forward by Krasner,
342
 Bosnia enjoys a 
high degree of external/‘international-legal’ sovereignty (recognition), but falls short when it 
comes to internal/‘domestic’ sovereignty (effective control by state structures) and of 
Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty (independence and non-interference from outside). In the 
following table, Bosnia is placed within the context of contested states, along the two 
dimensions of sovereignty, internal (territorial control and non-interference) and external 
(international recognition). 
State contestation in Bosnia and Herzegovina may be less visible, due to its internal 
character, but not less salient. First, the domestic sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
limited by the consociational nature of its Constitution, which was adopted as the Annex Four 
to the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. Bosnia’s state-level institutions were agreed as a thin 
layer to cap the two then-warring entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), 
further decentralised into cantons, and the unitary Republika Srpska (RS). The result is a 
structure of asymmetric federalism, with a patchwork of overlapping and decentralised 
competences, which burdens decision making and hinders policy implementation. Moreover, 
the territorial set-up does not coincide with the communitarian system of country-wide 
protection of group rights providing legislative veto rights to the three constitutive peoples 
(Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats). 
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Table 1: Selected contested states and degrees of internal/external sovereignty
343
 
 
            External Sovereignty 
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This complex institutional structure is compounded by a lack of a consensus on a long-
term vision of the state among the majorities of the Constitutive Peoples. In fact Serbs, 
Croats, and Bosniaks have been remarked as having an “asimmetric commitment” to the 
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state.
344
 This is due mainly to two factors, which are hard to disentangle. First, Serbs and 
Croats have constituted themselves politically as such (rather than simply as Orthodox 
Bosnians and Catholic Bosnians) due to the nationalist influence of Bosnia’s bigger 
neighbours, working as kin-state for these populations of their same confession. To the 
contrary, Bosnian Muslims (later politically mobilised as Bosniaks) have remained without a 
kin-state. At the same time, the numerical prevalence of the latter has made it easier for them 
to claim interest in an ethnically-blind and centralised state, in which they would constitute a 
relative but substantial plurality of the population. The two main reasons have made it so that 
the three group display a different attitude and identification towards the state – with the first 
ones rather more interested in “home rule” in the sub-state territories where they are 
majorities, and displaying the national symbols of the neighbouring countries (or derivatives), 
and the latter rather more able to identify with the country as a whole and its own symbols. As 
a multinational state by design, with clauses of special protection for its three constitutive 
peoples, , the current Bosnian institutions were crafted at the end of the conflict with the first 
task to ensure non-domineering by one group over the other in the post-conflict period.
345
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina thus suffers from a the lack of consensus on a long-term vision of the 
state among its three constitutive peoples, which bear three different political projects (a 
centralised and ethnic-blind state for the Bosniaks, secession via dissolution of the state for 
the Serbs, and a three-entity confederal polity for the Croats) – mirroring what in the studies 
of the EU “democratic deficit” has been referred to as the “no demos paradox”.346 
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Finally, and despite the international recognition and UN membership of Bosnia, its 
stateness remains contested from above too. In fact, even when the territorial and 
communitarian systems of division of powers are considered, the internal sovereignty of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is further limited by the presence of international institutions with 
executive powers, embedded within the domestic legal order since 1995, though de facto less 
and less able to deploy their final powers. As agreed at Dayton, the final civilian authority in 
the country is vested in the Office of the High Representative (OHR) with his “Bonn powers” 
that since 1997 entitle him to remove elected officials and repel or impose laws, in order to 
guarantee the respect of the peace accords. While international supervision or even direct 
civilian administration has also occurred in other contexts, the Bosnian set-up is particular for 
its endurance,
347
 especially in a moment of retreat of international organisations from civilian 
administration tasks.
348
 In fact, an exit strategy for the OHR has been under discussion since 
2008,
349
 and the use of its executive power has been quietly scaled down after the controversy 
over police reform in 2008-09. Nevertheless, its closure has been repeatedly delayed, also 
following pressures for its continuation by Bosnian actors themselves. Likewise, although 
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limited in its forces in theatre (600 troops), EUFOR Althea maintains a last-resort role in 
ensuring stability and order in the country. 
1.4 Consociational and integrative elements in the Bosnian power-
sharing system 
The Dayton political order is characterised by a complex power-sharing system featuring 
a mix of ethnic and territorial federalism. In fact, as remarked by Keil, “in reality Bosnia 
works as an ethnic federation”, but this is “not due to Constitutional prerogatives, but because 
of the continued dominance of nationally exclusive parties which interpret politics in Bosnia 
as a zero-sum game between its different peoples”.350 It is the interplay of formal and 
informal elements of politics (institutions and parties) that creates challenges. As Toal and 
Dahlman argue, during and after the Bosnian conflict an ethno-territorial order of space was 
superimposed to an ethnocratic political order.
351
 This has been openly criticised by 
international bodies such as the Venice Commission,
352
 as well as it has led to widespread 
criticism of EU actions in Bosnia too. The EU in fact is deemed in turn to be either focusing 
only on formal institutions and overseeing the actual political dynamics, or conversely as 
empowering domestic informal political actors in reaching shady and opaque backroom deals, 
rather than engaging with formal institutional fora.
353
 
                                                 
350
 Keil, Multinational federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2013, p. 96. 
351
 Gerard Toal and Carl Dahlman, Bosnia Remade. Ethnic Cleansing and its Reversal. Oxford / New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011, 5. 
352
 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Constitutional 
Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative, Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe / Venice Commission, 11-12 March 2005. 
353
 See for instance the latest controversies surrounding the role of the EU delegation in fostering a deal on the 
“Coordination Mechanism” in EU matters among Bosnian political leaders in 2015/2016, or the previous 
controversies on the closed-doors negotiation sessions with the 6 or 7 main Bosnian political leaders during 
118 
 
The institutional system devised at Dayton combines elements of territorial federalism 
and ethno-communitarian power-sharing, coupled with integrative provisions too. It thus 
appears as a hybrid of often-cited blueprints such as Lijphardt’s consociationalism354 and 
Horowitz’s integrative model.355 Different analyses of the Bosnian system against these two 
theoretical ideal-types may be found, including a 2004 article by Nina Caspersen,
356
 who also 
highlights how the balance between the two poles has changed over time in Bosnia, as well as 
in the latest book by Soeren Keil.
357
 
According to Lijphardt, the composition of differences in divided societies (and 
particularly in post-conflict ones) is only possible through elite cooperation in institutions that 
explicitly recognise such cleavages and base policy-making upon them. This is meant to 
guarantee the protection of groups’ rights and to recognise the legitimacy of the demands for 
internal self-determination. Lijphardt’s model of consociational democracy is thus 
characterised by two main features, grand coations (i.e. “the participation of representatives of 
all significant communal groups in political decision-making”)358 and group autonomy (i.e. 
their “authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and 
culture”),359 with the two corollary of veto powers (on issues of minority interest) and 
proportional representation (in the electoral system and in public administration alike). The 
explicit recognition of societal cleavages in this model would accommodate and soften latent 
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grievances of communal groups through their participation in decision-making, autonomy in 
own matters, and guarantees of non-domineering by majority groups. Elite cooperation, 
following Lijphardt, would be fostered by the “self-negating prophecy” created by the mutual 
harm that ethnic leaders would be able to inflict to each other.  
In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most visible elements of the Dayton accords 
(and the strongest back in 1995) can be associated with the consociational model. These 
include the rotating Presidency and the required presence of members of the three 
Constitutive Peoples in the government; the presence of veto powers (entity veto, VNI veto); 
ethnic proportionality in the Parliament and generally in public administration (based upon 
the results of the 1991 census); and group autonomy, guaranteed by the strong 
decentralisation at entity and canton level, so that de facto most of the powers are exercised 
by majoritarian and homogeneous institutions.
360
 Yet, it should also be noted that Bosnia does 
not require the strongest forms of consociationalism. For instance, the Presidency members 
are elected on a territorial rather than ethnic basis, thus leading to controversies, such as the 
one surrounding in 2016-2014 Zeljko Komšić.361  Similarly, the formation of grand coalition 
governments does not require the winning parties in each entity or community to gather 
together in an “obligatory coalition” (as would have been the case e.g. in Macedonia); rather, 
competitive elections at entity and state-level can produce different results, giving light to 
forms of “cohabitation”. For instance, in 2014 the incumbent coalition maintained power in 
RS, but the opposition Serb parties managed to gather a majority in their community at state 
level, thus entering the state-level coalition. Finally, veto powers are entrusted to both ethnic 
communities (caucuses of constitutive peoples in each level’s House of Peoples) and to 
territorial representatives (entity veto). In addition to this, the Dayton order does specify a 
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closed list of protected groups, but nowhere does it define their features or makes group 
membership compulsory or unchangeable, differently from similar systems in e.g. Belgium, 
Cyprus, and South Tyrol.
362
  
Donald Horowitz’s integrative model is the second and opposite ideal-type of power-
sharing. On the one hand, Horowitz highlights how ethnic elites are not naturally prone to 
cooperation, since they are influenced by intra-group political competition that fosters 
maximalist rather than compromise positions. On the other hand, he remarks that ethnic 
identity is fluid and should not be crystallised but allowed to evolve over time, so that other 
non-ethnic cleavages may also be made salient in politics. Explicit recognition of group 
distinction and group rights might fuel polarisation and reinforce ethnic identities and 
loyalties, thus providing incentives for maximalist positions and consolidating a situation of 
political paralysis due to mutual vetoes.
363
 Horowitz’s integrative model instead aims to 
create incentive mechanisms for moderation and multi-ethicity. First, through electoral 
systems based on pre-electoral multiethnic coalitions, so that the need for candidates to attract 
votes from outside his own community may push them towards moderation and compromise. 
Second, through a federal system based on ethnically heterogeneous political entities, in order 
to foster integrative dynamics, moderate attitudes and fluid identities. Finally, by promoting 
public policies that are “ethnically blind” to reduce the salience of cleavages rather than 
reinforcing them. Horowitz’s model follows a minimalist approach focused on interaction 
dynamics and aimed at promoting compromise. Group protection is not guaranteed ex ante, 
since the final aim is to hollow out the differences and integrate the communities.
364
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The Dayton order also include several integrative elements, albeit less visible. First, 
group autonomy is based on the congruence of ethnicity and territory (at entity, canton, or 
municipal level), rather than on ethnicity in itself; provisions on refugee return and on the 
right to vote in pre-war residence areas work to strengthen electoral and territorial 
heterogeneity, undermining group autonomy. Likewise, there is no explicit provision 
requiring obligatory coalitions among the main ethno-national parties, thus leaving flexibility 
and allowing for electoral change. Secondly, several Dayton-mandated bodies worked as 
ethnic-blind, majoritarian institutions, without ethnic veto powers (the Constitutional Court, 
the Central Bank, the Joint Interim Commission, the Human Rights Chamber, the 
Commission for Refugees and Displaced Persons, the Commission for the Preservation of 
National Monuments and the Commission on Public Enterprises). Although not primarily 
legislative institutions, these integrative bodies still retain a substantial share of power. 
Moreover, integrative elements have been increasing in weight during the peace 
implementation process, particularly following the strengthening of the OHR powers in 1997. 
This has been the case, for instance, through the Constitution Court judgment “on the 
Constitutive Peoples” of 2000 (case U5/98), which has established the equality of rights of 
Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs throughout the country and in both entities, thus further 
diminishing the initial provisions on group autonomy and reinforcing the shift away from 
ethno-territorial rule. The same goes for the primacy of international treaties and human rights 
law in the Constitution, which has gained even more preminence after Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s accession to the Council of Europe in 2004. The ensuing jurisprudence 
(Sejdić–Finci case law) has shown the limitations of the Dayton order and the direction to 
take in order to overcome it.   
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina allows adding few variables to the debate on 
consociative and integrative elements of power-sharing. First, the international dimension: the 
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guarantee over the agreements given by external powers influences the incentives of the 
parties and favours the acceptance of integrative elements, while straining the consociative 
ones (cf. the judgements of the Constitutional Court), although the long-term sustainability of 
the whole system remains uncertain. Secondly, the temporal dimension: identities are more 
likely to become more fluid in the mid to long period, again favouring the shift towards a 
more integrative approach. Finally, the intensity of conflict matters: local experiences of war-
time violence influence post-conflict everyday life.
365
 
Scholars recognise already since the 1990s that the two ideal-types described above are 
not meant to be applied in their pure form, but rather to be customised and mixed in 
accordance with local conditions and specific features, including the historical context, the 
type of conflict, and the features of the parties involved.
366
Stefan Wolff comes to define 
“complex power-sharing” as “a practice of conflict settlement that has a form of self-
governance regime at its heart, but whose overall institutional design includes a range of 
further mechanisms for the accommodation of ethnic diversity in divided societies”, including 
among others those recommended by the literature on consociationalism and integration.
367
  
According to Caspersen, the very same mix of consociative and integrative elements 
foreseen at Dayton creates a complex system in which each model’s extreme effects are 
moderated. Consociational elements are influenced by the fluidity provided by the integrative 
ones, while integrative elements are included in a system of consociational and international 
guarantees that make their acceptance by minorities more plausible. According to Caspersen, 
in the Bosnian case the consociational elements retain the primacy in guaranteeing stability 
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Bosnia, notwithstanding the international presence. This is due to the deep cleavages left by 
the conflict in society, to the primacy of self-determination demands, and to the absence of a 
majority group. Integrative institutions have worked smoothly, but this might be due to the 
last-instance guarantee role of the international community. The two approaches can be 
deemed compatible, Caspersen argues, and a mix of the two has been able to promote 
moderation in Bosnia.  
The evaluations on the success or failure of the specific mix of elements included in 
Bosnia’s complex power-sharing system are mixed. While assessments in the first decade of 
implementation tended to be more positive, the following decade of stagnation, retrenchment 
and paralysis has cast a shadow of pessimism on contemporary commentators. Influenced by 
the experience of ten years of stagnation in Bosnia starting from 2006, more recent literature 
highlights how Dayton’s uncanny mix of ethnic and territorial elements impedes Bosnia from 
progressing further and from reforming itself. In fact, there remains a contradiction between 
Dayton’s consociational and integrative measures, deriving respectively from the tradition of 
Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Yugoslav power-sharing systems, reinforced and crystallised 
at Dayton, and from the Western liberal tradition of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms
368
 - as highlighted by the multiple ECHR judgements against Bosnia and 
Herzegovina since 2008. Moreover, the balance between the two principles have shifted over 
time and diverged further locally, without yet finding a stable equilibrium which may in 
compliance with EU standards of human rights protection. Changes to the Entity 
Constitutions in 2002 (fostered by the Constitutional Count 2000 decision on the Constitutive 
Peoples) have extended to the sub-state level the same guarantees of group rights. Yet, this 
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has been de facto gutted out in Republika Srpska,
369
 while furthering the disfunctionality of 
the Federation. Likewise, the case of Mostar, where municipal elections cannot be held since 
2008 due to lack of consensus on the electoral system and constituencies, show that Bosnian 
political elites remain impervious to a culture of compromise and more ready to sacrifice 
basic rights of their citizens (including the right to free elections) for the sake of defensive-
positionalism. A positive case, instead, is the one of the District of Brčko. Since its Final 
Arbitration Settlement in 1999, Brčko is directly administered by the state institutions, while 
its residents may freely choose to which entity citizenship to apply for the enjoyment of their 
social and political rights. In Brčko, group rights have been de-territorialised, and entities 
have become something more similar to Belgium’s overlap of “linguistic communities” in 
Brussels. Seen under the lenses of experimentalist governance,
370
 Brčko provides a successful 
example of how to make Bosnia work, despite increased complexities in understanding the 
applicable legislation in the area.
371
 Yet, the Brčko model is a case that is most likely to 
remain an exception than to become the new norm, since its universalisation would require a 
deep rethinking of Bosnia’s current institutional structure. In general terms, the few examples 
cited allow to understand how in the last decade, rather than moving towards convergence and 
functionality, Bosnia has witnessed further internal divergence and diversification of local 
experiences. 
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Overall, the Dayton order is most often assessed as a success in peace-building, having 
been able to prevent the relapse of Bosnia into conflict, while a failure in state-building and 
democratisation, having been unable to create or foster the conditions to overcome the very 
same grievances that had led to conflict, and having rather reinforced and perennialised the 
very ethnopolitical sytem created by the conflict – in the words of Florian Bieber, a “failed 
success”.372 At the same time, Dayton has put in motion a cycle of policy learning among 
international state-builders in the late 1990s, whose consequences may be noted already in the 
different policy mixes applied in the cases of Macedonia and Kosovo.
373
As noted also by 
Stojanovic, measures of recognition of group rights and group autonomy remain pivotal in 
accommodating diversity in divided societies; yet, unlike what had been the case in Bosnia, 
these should be informal, flexible and temporary, to allow the political system to evolve and 
reform.
374
  
 
2. The European Union in Bosnia Herzegovina: an uneasy 
transition 
The previous section introduced Bosnia and Herzegovina as a case study; this section 
looks at the early interactions between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina since 
the 1990s, highlighting in particular how the EU struggled to adapt its approach to the specific 
Bosnian post-conflict context and to get to the helm of the international presence in the 
country in the late 2000s. The standard tools of EU foreign policy, based on capacity-
building, conditionality and socialisation, led the EU twice to an impasse due to cycles of 
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mismanaged conditionality; first in the case of the police reform process (2005-2008), as a 
result of the lack of internal legitimacy of EU conditions, and second in the case of the Sejdic-
Finci constitutional reform process (2008-2014), due to the lack of credibility and 
proportionality of EU rewards. The shift towards a streamlined EU presence (with the fusion 
between the EU Special Representative and Head of Delegation in 2011) and the rescheduling 
of conditionality with the “new approach” to Bosnia and Herzegovina following the British-
German initiative of late 2014 led to a rebalanced conditionality and a different standing of 
the EU in the country, which enabled the re-opening of the EU path and the achievement of 
relative successes in the 2014-2016 period. This renewed approach also highlights the 
different aim of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the rise of a strategy of member state 
building as stateness-aware enlargement or “limited state-building”: aimed at building the 
functions for a future member state, not the state per se; limited in scope by the EU acquis; 
limited in method by the need to act through domestic democratic procedures; and limited in 
level by the need to engage with sub-state authorities too. 
2.1 Venus in the land of Mars? In the shadow of the High 
Representative 
As noted in the previous section, the EU did not take up specific roles in post-war Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, as opposed to the roster of other international organisations, from the OSCE 
to NATO, IMF, EBRD, UNHCR and the Council of Europe, which were tasked with 
overseeing the implementation of specific military and civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace 
Agreements (see Table 3.1 Above).  
Smaller scale engagement by the EU in the conflict and post-conflict period included, 
first, the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM, since 2005 EUMM), which 
from 1991 to 2007 deployed 75 observers throughout former Yugoslavia. Second, it included 
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the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (commonly known as the 
Badinter Committee), set up by the EEC Council of Ministers on 27 August 1991 to provide 
legal advice to the International Conference on former Yugoslavia (ICFY), which between 
1991 and 1993 issued fifteen opinions on international legal issues stemming from the process 
of the break-up of Yugoslavia, including on advising EU member states regarding the 
conditions under which to recognise post-Yugoslav independent countries. And, third, it 
included the European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM), which from July 1994 to 
January 1997 strived to ensure the post-war reconstruction and reunification of the 
Herzegovinian capital, through which ran one of the major frontlines during the Croat-
Bosniak conflict. Headed by the former mayor of Hamburg Hans Koschnick, EUAM focused 
on rebuilding physical infrastructure and setting the basis for the future joint administration of 
the city. In early 1996 Koschnick proposed a large central administrative zone, as a step 
towards a reunified multi-ethnic Mostar; his car was then attacked by a mob, and Koschnick 
resigned after the EU Council decided to appease the Croat leadership which opposed 
reunification and instigated the attack, instead of backing his plans.
375
 Mostar remains up to 
today a divided city without a unified administration, and thus has been unable to hold local 
elections since 2008. Otherwise, the EU took a backseat in the post-war reconstruction of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Diplomatically the EU remained involved in the Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC) and a non-written rule stated that the international High 
Representative had to be a European; operationally, the European Commission managed a 
growing amount of funds in reconstruction aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina and all of former 
Yugoslavia.
376
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Despite the lack of large-scale operational engagement on the ground, the EU already had 
clear ideas about the future framework of relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Already in 
December 1995, when the Dayton Peace Agreement had just been signed, the European 
Commission had set as an objective the creation of “a direct and dynamic contractual 
relationship between Bosnia and the European Union within the framework of a regional 
approach”.377 The latter came to light between 1997 and 2000 with the adoption of Council 
conclusions on conditionality,
378
 and the establishment of the Stabilisation and Association 
Process (SAP).
379
 A tailored “EU Road Map” for Bosnia and Herzegovina was annexed to the 
May 2000 Brussels PIC conclusions,
380
 including the 18 essential conditions, covering 
political, economic and democratic issues, for the Commission to start working on a 
Feasibility Study for the opening of negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA), a contractual agreement with the EU on the road towards membership, 
equivalent to Central and Eastern Europe’s Europe Agreements. Fifteen out of the 18 
conditions were complied with by September 2002, though mainly by OHR imposition, 
including the adoption of an electoral law.
381
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A reinforced engagement and the start of the road “from Dayton to Brussels” started in 
2003, when the Thessaloniki Declaration made clear that all Western Balkan countries were 
to be considered as potential candidates for EU accession.
382
 In November of the same year 
the European Commission presented its Feasibility Study on opening negotiations on an SAA, 
including sixteen areas of priority reform. Among the conditions necessary for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to negotiate an SAA and formally join the SAP, the Commission listed “further 
reform and enhance state-level enforcement capacity” to fight organised crime, as well as 
“quickly making SIPA [the state intelligence agency] fully operational”.383 Based on the 
Thessaloniki Agenda, the EU also adopted a European Partnership document for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, identifying benchmarks for progress and providing a framework for financial 
assistance.
384
 
The transformative incentive provided by the “pull of Brussels” seemed to provide some 
early results, as laws were approved in early 2004 on state-level law-enforcement capabilities, 
as well as on defence, education and tax administration, without the usual obstruction shown 
by Bosnian Serb political representatives. Likewise, the High Representative Petritsch started 
to present Bosnia and Herzegovina’s path – and his own actions – as an “entry strategy” into 
the European Union rather than an “exit strategy” for the international community. His 
successor, Paddy Ashdown, was also formally double-hatted as international High 
Representative as well as EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUSR). He 
                                                 
382
 See paragraph 40 of the Thessaloniki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 19-20 June 2003, and the 
Declaration of the Thessaloniki EU-Western Balkans Summit, 21 June 2003, C/03/163. 
383
 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council on the preparedness of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union, Brussels, 18 
November 2003, COM(2003)692 final. 
European Commission,  Bosnia and Herzegovina: Commission approves Feasibility Study, press release 
IP/03/1563, Brussels, 18 November 2003.  
384
 Council of the European Union, Council Decision on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 June 2004, 2004/515/EC. 
130 
 
also oversaw a renewed commitment of the European Union to take over responsibilities in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the deployment in January 2003 of the EU Police Mission 
(EUPM), which succeeded the UN IPTF, and in December 2004 of the EUFOR Althea 
military mission, which took over from NATO’s SFOR the executive mandate under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter to enable a “safe and secure environment” (SASE) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
385
 
Paddy Ashdown made liberal use of the OHR Bonn Powers to impose legislation, in 
order to “build Bosnia’s central government and undermine the country’s sub-sovereign 
political units: only in this way … Bosnia could become a normal European state and put its 
violent war behind it”.386 To achieve this centralisation agenda, Ashdown “became a one-man 
legislative machine, repeatedly using the Bonn Powers to enact legislation, creating new 
institutions, and implicit threats to remove officials to push the Entities to agree to transfer 
new powers to central government”.387 Ashdown soon topped the statistics on the use of the 
Bonn Powers in his “centralisation-no-matter-what policy”,388 with 447 decisions in the June 
2002 – January 2006 period. His main objectives were the reorganisation of the judicial 
system, the creation of a single army, and the reform of the tax system with the introduction 
of a state-wide VAT, and the clean-up of the public administration and government from 
corrupt and war-related officials and politicians.
 389
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Yet, Ashdown felt that the legislation necessary to move the country towards European 
integration (as well as towards NATO partnership) could not be imposed but had to be 
autonomously adopted by the BiH institutions to demonstrate the credibility of the country’s 
EU accession bid. The OHR stood behind, by supporting the legislative drafting process and 
conducting intensive lobbying efforts to ensure their adoption.
390
 Ashdown’s leadership 
proved crucial in achieving between 2003 and 2005 the reform of the defence and intelligence 
sectors, which entailed transfers of competences from the entities to the state, and saw the 
three ethnic-based militias be joined into a single, multiethnic army under the control of a 
Ministry of Defence, coupled with a reformed and professional state-level intelligence 
service. This allowed Bosnia and Herzegovina to be invited to join NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace programme in 2006 together with Serbia. At the same time, a countrywide VAT was 
introduced in January 2006, fulfilling long-standing recommendations from the European 
Commission and the IMF.
391
  
2.2 The police reform saga: a lack of legitimacy of EU conditionality 
What proved a nut too hard to crack, instead, was the reform of the police, which 
remained embroiled in a cycle of mismanaged conditionality.
392
 Its relative failure showed 
that early enthusiasm for the new “era of Brussels” was premature. As noted by Bennett, 
“police reform did not need to become the obstacle that it did, nor the focus of so much time 
and effort. That it did was the consequence of a decision by Lord Ashdown to push a specific 
model of police restructuring”.393  
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Between 2003 and 2008 the EU adopted an OHR-mandated target – the centralisation of 
the police system – as part of EU accession (SAP) conditionality, despite the lack of European 
standards and the extreme political sensitivity of the issue. When this proved impossible to 
achieve, the new HR/EUSR tried to refocus on a different topic (constitutional reform) but 
was not supported by the EU Council, thus having to resign. His successor pushed ahead on 
the issue to retain credibility, but had to content himself with some cosmetic reform in 2008, 
following which Bosnia and Herzegovina was allowed by the EU to sign the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement, which had remained on hold. The conditionality applied by the EU in 
the case of police reform defied Schimmelfennig’s and Sedelmeier’s criteria (it was not seen 
as legitimate and it did not resonate with local norms)
394
 and had to be brought forward just to 
defend overall EU credibility – but in the end the EU had to accept cosmetic changes as a 
face-saving exit strategy from the impasse.  
The need for police reform was first noted in November 2003, in the feasibility study on 
the preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with the EU, in which the Commission noted among other issues that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina also needed “a structural police reform with a view to rationalising police 
service” and included this in the preconditions for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be able to 
negotiate an SAA under the priority heading on “Tackling crime, especially organised 
crime”.395 As for other reform areas, the Commission approached the matter from a purely 
technical point of view, focusing on costs and performance ratios, while criticising the 
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fragmentation and conflicts of competence among police forces. The feasibility study noted 
that “police reform is ongoing” yet “to fight crime, further reform and enhanced State-level 
enforcement capacity are needed” and highlighted that “BiH must now consider further 
restructuring and rationalising police services in order to enhance efficiency and improve 
crime fighting capabilities”.396 An expert study requested by the Commission in June 2004 
noted also that the police was over-staffed, under-equipped, and politicised.
397
 Yet, no 
prescriptive model was put forward, and the study remarked that the presence of multiple 
police authorities did not present a problem per se – rather, their coordination needed to be 
improved.
398
  
In the first half of 2004, the Commission and the OHR pushed for the adoption of six new 
laws on security matters, including the Law on SIPA, the state intelligence agency. Despite 
their adoption, at its June  2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO rejected Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
application for the Partnership for Peace programme due to insufficient cooperation with the 
ICTY (not a single indictee had been delivered by Republika Srpska). The Summit 
communiqué noted that “systemic changes [are] necessary to develop effective security and 
law enforcement structures”.399 
It was then that HR/EUSR Ashdown decided that police reform was the missing piece of 
the puzzle. Following the example of the successful Defence Reform Commission, Ashdown 
set up a Police Restructuring Commission (PRC), chaired by former Belgian prime minister 
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Wilfred Martens, with the task to design “a single structure of policing for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina under the overall political oversight of a ministry or ministries in the Council of 
Ministers”.400 Ashdown also penned the three “European” principles which should have 
underpinned police reform: (a) state-level authority on all legislative and budgetary 
competences on police matters; (b) functional local police areas based on technical criteria 
and with local-level-only operational command; and (c) no political interference in police 
operations.
401
  
Ashdown went for a top-down approach, providing a prescriptive outcome of the police 
reform process that entailed constitutional-level changes. To enact his three principles, in fact, 
entities should have agreed to a transfer of competences to the state level on police matters. 
This raised the immediate objections of the Bosnian Serb politicians, who saw the move as an 
attempt at pushing for centralisation of the state – something that Ashdown did not hide, as he 
regarded police reform as important for the state-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Since Ashdown could not use the Bonn Powers to impose his police reform model 
against the letter of Dayton, to maximise his leverage upon domestic actors he made use of 
his “second hat” and persuaded the European Commission to include his police reform 
principles within EU conditionality.
402
 His three principles were explicitly endorsed by the 
Commission, in a letter from Commissioner Patten to the prime ministers of the state and 
entity governments in BiH, effectively including them within EU conditionality towards 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ashdown’s principles were not questioned by the new 
commissioner Olli Rehn, and they remained formally part of EU policy until late 2007, 
despite not being based upon the EU acquis (which includes no prescriptions on policing 
models)
403
 nor having ever been discussed or endorsed by the EU Council.
404
 Ashdown thus 
created a political conditionality out of thin air and managed to channel it via the EU to exert 
pressure upon domestic authorities. 
The level of ambition of such a reform was very high. The HR/EUSR expected entitities 
and cantons to renounce their law-enforcement competences and transfer them to state-level 
institutions for joint management. Moreover, the pre-designed principles raised high – 
possibly unnecessarily high – the bar for Bosnia and Herzegovina to sign the EU Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement, despite there not being any such specific request in the 
Commission’s Feasibility Study.405 
Despite early optimism that a deal on police reconfiguration would be achievable within a 
few months (Bosnian Serb representatives seemed to have even accepted the plan to draw 
new “police regions” that crossed the inter-entity boundary line),406 negotiations in the Police 
Restructuring Commission did not advance much, as the Bosnian Serb side soon understood 
the high-politics agenda of centralisation which lay beneath Ashdown’s presumed technical 
efforts at ushering in police reform. The High Representative had in fact underestimated the 
sensitivity of the issue for domestic politicians. After the defence reform, the police was the 
only public force still under direct control of RS politicians, who were determined not to lose 
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it. Moreover, Ashdown’s centralisation agenda was easy to present under an ethno-political 
light as a measure favouring the Bosniaks against the Bosnian Serbs.  
The Police Reform Commission report (the “Martens Proposal”), as submitted to the 
OHR and the BiH Council of Ministers,
407
 included two draft laws that foresaw a general 
oversight by the state-level Ministry of Security over three bodies of police: intelligence 
(SIPA), border control (SBS) and local police bodies. Of the latter, 10 police regions would 
have crossed the inter-entity boundary line. The proposal was rejected by the representatives 
of Republika Srpska, and, despite public campaigns, pressure, and political negotiations, no 
agreement that respected Ashdown’s three principles could be brokered before the 10th 
anniversary of Dayton.
408
 
The Commission kept its emphasis on efficiency and operational performance of police 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even after the publication of the Martens report. In a letter to the 
BiH Prime Minister Adnan Terzić, the EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten 
justified the EU’s involvement on police reform issues in BiH with the fact that “if BiH is not 
able to tackle crime effectively, this has a bearing on crime elsewhere in Europe, including 
within the EU”.409 As noted by Venneri, police restructuring was also kept separate from the 
ongoing judicial reform, which would later be presented as a major success story of the 
HR/EUSR. Any link between the two was absent in the 2004 mandate of the Police 
Restructuring Commission, and in the 283-page final report of the same body the issue of 
effective cooperation between police bodies and prosecutors is only briefly mentioned 
                                                 
407
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once.
410
 This was in contradiction with the earlier Commission feasibility study, which had 
clearly emphasised a technical focus on law enforcement capacities in the country, including 
the fact that “police forces in one Entity have no right of ‘hot pursuit’ into another; there is no 
central data base; different Entity forces use different information systems”.411 In fact, as 
summarised by Venneri, “in spite of the rhetoric on efficiency, institutional centralization was 
the primary objective” pursued by Ashdown’s HR/EUSR and supported by some EU member 
states, although in itself police centralisation without judicial restructuring in parallel could 
have created even more complicated and less efficient police structures.
412
  
Despite stark public messages (“choosing Belarus over Brussels” 413), the failure of the 
police reform talks did not bring any concrete consequence. The upcoming end of Ashdown’s 
mandate, and of the 10
th
 anniversary of Dayton, was putting some pressure on the EU to 
present some deliverables from its protracted efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Upon the 
initiative of the Bosnian Serb representatives (both RS President Dragan Čavić and opposition 
leader Milorad Dodik), in October 2005 the state- and entity-level Parliaments in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina adopted a resolution envisaging a state-level Directorate for Implementation of 
Police Restructuring (DIPR) which “shall be assigned to make a proposal of a plan for 
implementation of police structures reform in BiH per phases, including proposals of police 
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regions”.414 The resolution included an operational agreement with a detailed working 
schedule, but also mentioned that this had to be conducted in compliance with both EU 
principles and the Dayton Constitution (despite the two references being contradictory).
 415
 
Despite no actual reforms having been adopted and no detailed accord, the Commission 
decided this was sufficient to open the negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina, which started on 21 November, on the 10
th
 
anniversary of the Dayton agreements.  
Things changed from January 2006, with the new HR/EUSR, Christian Schwarz-
Schilling, being requested to support the transition towards local ownership of the reforms, 
and with a new mandate for the EU Police Mission (EUPM), including assistance to the 
police reform process. Negotiations continued in the framework of the Directorate, but once 
elected RS entity Prime Minister, in February 2006, Milorad Dodik reneged on the October 
2005 agreement. The EUPM tried to depoliticise the issue by working on the harmonisation 
of police procedure among entities, and on the professionalization of the police staff. Yet, the 
pre-electoral climate ahead of the October general elections (with Bosniak politician Haris 
Silajdžić  trying to exploit the reform process to question the existence of Republika Srpska) 
and regional  developments (Montenegro’s independence, the discussions on the future status 
of Kosovo, and the expectations for the ICJ’s February 2007 ruling on the Srebrenica 
genocide case) did not present conditions conducive  to the fostering of a compromise. RS 
representatives also boycotted the works of the Directorate, after asking without success for a 
reform of its decision-making procedures to secure an ethnic veto for themselves.
416
 Despite 
explanations that the Directorate was to be a technical body and not a political one, and that 
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hence no ethnic veto nor risk of “out-voting” could be foreseen, they decided to attend the 
works only as observers.
417
 
The Directorate concluded its work in December 2006 by adopting a final report that did 
not include the restructuring of the police districts. Yet, RS representatives did not endorse it 
and opposed any move that would question the status or authority of entity police forces.
 418
 
EU ambassadors in Sarajevo also expressed reserves about the good judgement behind 
Ashdown’s police reform principles, which were still being upheld by the U.S. (and formally 
by the EU).
419
  
Confronted with the risk of a collapse of the police reform, the German HR/EUSR 
Christian Schwartz-Schilling tried to shift the focus towards renewed talks on constitutional 
reforms, following the March 2005 “Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the power of the High Representative” by the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission. Schwartz-Schilling was more preoccupied with establishing the conditions for 
the upcoming closure of the OHR, and ensuring the local ownership of reforms, also by 
quietly scaling down the use of the Bonn Powers. Yet, he did not find support from the EU 
headquarters, which deemed the police reform to have to remain among the EU priorities, and 
he submitted his resignation in July 2007.
 
The new HR/EUSR, the Slovak diplomat Miroslav Lajčák, tried to push for an agreement 
in the summer of 2007, but the risk of backlash due to regional (Kosovo and Serbia) as well 
as domestic development  shaped diplomats’ attempts at finding a way out of the police 
reform conundrum.
 420
 In fact, in order to both strengthen Bosnia’s state institutions and 
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reassert the powers of the OHR, Lajčák had decided to address the issue of decision-making 
rules in the BiH Council of Ministers, imposing amendments that changed the quorum so that 
decisions could be taken by a majority of present and voting ministers – thus preventing any 
party from blocking state-institutions by simple absence – and reduced the necessary ethnic 
quota from two to one representative from each constituent people. Reaction from the 
Bosnian Serb side was unexpectedly strong, going as far as the resignation of the Chairman of 
the BiH Council of Ministers, Nikola Špirić. The crisis upended the political climate in the 
country for a month.
421
 Regional stability considerations, related to Kosovo/Serbia relations in 
the wake of the presentation of the Ahtisaari plan, also cautioned against a forceful response 
from the OHR. Lajčák, who later remarked how he felt let down,422 had to steer a narrow path 
between not backing down and not overreacting.  
At the end, an unexpected breakthrough on police reform was able to relax the tensions: 
upon the initiative of Milorad Dodik and Haris Silajdžić  on 28 September 2007 all governing 
parties drafted a joint declaration in Mostar, reiterating their commitment to the three 
principles, while leaving again the details for future negotiations in the framework of eventual 
constitutional reforms – hence once more kicking the can down the road.423 The exasperation 
of the HR/EUSR on the linkage between police reform and the SAA is also the reason why 
the “Mostar declaration” was received sceptically by the HR/EUSR as well as by some PIC 
Steering Board member countries. Despite having an initially positive impact on the drafting 
of a protocol on police reform, such outcome remained below the originally high expectations 
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on centralisation. The new HR/EUSR Miroslav Lajčák extended a relatively positive welcome 
to the protocol,
424
 only to be supplemented a few hours later by a much less explicit press 
release, highlighting the Commission’s monopoly of interpretation over the technical aspects 
of police reform, while hiding its high politics features.
425
 The importance of this document 
was anyway scaled down only two days after, when it became clear that the BiH Parliament 
could not provide a quick follow-up to it.  
An “Action plan to implement the Mostar agreement” was drafted and endorsed in 
Sarajevo on 22 November, identifying six new state-level institutions to be set up,
426
 despite 
EUPM noting that it could have led to “a useless superstructure to the existing police 
structures” and advising instead “to create a state structure able to influence the status quo and 
move the police restructuring forward”.427 At the same time, the OHR accepted a compromise 
on the state parliament’s rule of procedure, upon Dodik’s initiative, thus stepping back from 
its previous threats of direct imposition.
 428
 
EU Commissioners Rehn and Solana also endorsed the compromise solution on police 
reform, which did not dent entities’ competences on policing, and decided to postpone the 
implementation of Ashdown’s principles. On 4 December 2007, Commissioner Rehn landed 
in Sarajevo to initial the text of the negotiated SAA, leaving the signature for the moment in 
which the laws on the six new institutions would be adopted. 
                                                 
424
 OHR.  ajčák and Rehn: “No  rogress Towards EU Without  olice Reform”, 10 August 2007. 
425
 “OHR and EUSR have received the Dodik/Silajdžić Protocol which is now under review by the relevant EU 
institutions. We urge everyone to refrain from interpreting the document as only the European Commission 
can give an opinion on whether this agreement is in line with the three principles for police reform.” Office 
of the High Representative (OHR) / EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUSR), 
Statement: OHR/EUSR comment on Silajdzic-Dodik Protocol, 28 September 2007. 
426
 Agency for Forensic Examinations; Institute for Education and Professional Upgrading; Agency for Police 
Support; Independent Board; Citizens’ Complaint Board; Police Officials Complaint Board. 
427
 Quoted in Bennett, Bosnia’s  aralysed  eace, 2016, p. 190. 
428
 Ibid., p. 189. 
142 
 
The BiH Parliament adopted two police laws on 16 April 2008, and on 16 June 2008 the 
BiH government could thus sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, 
which had been on hold for one year. The implementation of police reform trailed on for a 
few more years, with political actors obstructing the development of the state-level 
coordination bodies.
 429
 
2.3. The end of police reform: Unworkable conditions and mismanaged 
conditionality 
Exactly four years after HR/EUSR Ashdown had started the police reform process, the 
EU signed its SAA with Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the meantime, ambitious conditions, 
well beyond the EU acquis, had been set and reneged on. Ashdown’s three principles were set 
aside for a phase of constitutional reforms that never came to be in the form it was envisaged. 
Moreover, the other preconditions for signing the SAA (full ICTY cooperation, PBS reform 
and public administration reform) were watered down in the process. Moreover, the final 
result of the police reform process was deemed by many as a step back in terms of effective 
policing, emphasising administrative tasks rather than active policing and not providing 
avenues for effecting cooperation between law enforcement agencies responsible for different 
layers of governance.
430
 
The most widespread interpretation of the police reform saga in the literature is that it 
showed the limits of EU political conditionality and that it weakened the EU’s leverage by 
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showing that Brussels was ready to accept fake compliance for the sake of moving on.
431
 
Several factors contributed to this first cycle of mismanaged conditionality.  
The first and foremost can be identified in the lack of legitimacy of the EU conditions. 
Ashdown’s three principles for police reform, despite being possibly an example of best 
practices on the issue, were not based on the EU acquis.
432
  They were thus devoid of the 
intrinsic power of EU norms in terms of rules that Bosnia and Herzegovina would have to 
align with, sooner or later, in its effort to accede to the European Union. Instead, they 
appeared to Bosnian political actors as the whim of some international administrators, willing 
to play power games with recalcitrant local elites.
433
  The lightly taken decision to resort to 
purely political conditionality to push for constitutional-level changes diminished the EU’s 
leverage as a technocratic actor and exposed it to criticism by domestic elites based on the 
perception of a politicised approach masking a hidden agenda.  
The second factor was the lack of clarity from the EU side. The international community 
overall, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, did not manage to speak with a single voice on the 
issue,
434
 and external factors linked to regional stability concerns interfered more than once in 
the process, leaving the HR/EUSR without the international backing he expected. Moreover, 
it also strongly highlighted the paradoxes and conflicts of interests created by double-
hatting,
435
 with one single person tasked with two mandates and responsible both for 
upholding the civilian implementation of Dayton via a logic of external imposition (OHR) 
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and for fostering the EU integration of the country via a logic of local ownership (EUSR). 
Double-hatting had allowed the OHR to instrumentalise EU processes for its own aims: 
institutional aims, in terms of upholding Dayton, forward-looking aims, in terms of 
Ashdown’s not-so-hidden centralisation agenda, and organisational aims, in terms of ensuring 
the prestige and survival of the office. This was compounded by the distracted supervision 
from the EU side (busy in that period with adapting to the eastern enlargement and its 
consequences) of the Bosnian developments and the actions of its own EUSR office, in a 
typical principal-agent dilemma. This later led to the restructuring of the EU presence in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the decoupling of the OHR from the EUSR and the new 
double-hatting of the latter with the Head of the EU Delegation as of 2011 to create a single 
voice for the European Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
One more factor was the domestication of international actors by the local elites after ten 
years of executive mandate and direct intervention in domestic politics. As noted by Bennett, 
“by becoming the driver of reforms, the international community became an actor rather than 
an observer”.436 The international factor became, over time, just one more variable in the 
cost/benefit calculations of local actors, which could reasonably predict the international 
actors’ reactions, and knew their weak spots. In particular, the episode taught domestic actors 
that they could “conquer” ownership by resisting conditionality until international actors 
would be worn out of it,
437
 domesticating it in a trench warfare strategy in which domestic 
actors would have a home advantage. Thanks to their longer time horizon (being entrenched 
enough in the political system not to fear repeated electoral cycles), local actors were able to 
exploit the temporal inconsistencies of international ones (who would typically remain in the 
country for four or five years), by obstructing processes long enough for them to get tired and 
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become hard-pressed to show some progress to their principals.
438
 In this way, local actors 
became able to effectively negotiate conditionality or even coercive imposition, in line with 
what is highlighted by the literature on “hybrid peace”. 439  Moreover, the episode also 
highlights the organisational logic of European and international institutions to defend a “no 
mistake” policy and shirk accountability for policy failures440 by shifting it on local actors via 
discourse of local ownership and lack of political will.
 
 
Finally, it could be added that the European perspective was still too far away – the 
reward was not concrete enough – for the “pull of Brussels” to have any substantial effect. 
The negotiation and signature of the SAA did not have any tangible impact on the daily life of 
the Bosnian citizens – differently from processes such as the later Schengen visa liberalisation 
– and could thus be comfortably sat out by politicians whose legitimacy was rather in the 
cycle of patronage politics, providing voters with the access to the labour market and the 
social services via party loyalty and the grey economy. 
For these reasons, the bar of conditionality in the police reform process was set too high 
and outside the perimeter of the EU acquis, establishing an objective that had probably 
always been out of reach since the beginning, and the EU had to backtrack while saving face 
within a few years.  
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3.  Sysyphus in Sarajevo: the EU and the challenge of 
constitutional reforms  
The second cycle of mismanaged conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina is related to 
the wider issue of constitutional reforms, and in particular the EU’s involvement in it 
following the ruling by the Council of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
the case of Sejdić  and Finci in 2008.441 From 2009 onwards, the EU included constitutional 
reform as a precondition for the entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement. Yet, agreement on a Sejdić–Finci-compliant reform proved elusive, and the 
degradation of socio-economic conditions and growing protest movements finally led the EU 
to postpone such a condition to a later stage in late 2014. 
3.1 The Venice Commission Opinion and the genesis of the 
constitutional reform debate 
Constitutional reforms started to be discussed following the accession of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to the Council of Europe on 24 April 2002. Bosnia and Herzegovina thus 
committed to honour the obligations of membership stemming from Art. 3 of the Statute of 
the Council of Europe,
442
 as well as specific commitments listed in the PACE Opinion 234 
(2002) on Bosnia and Herzegovina's application for membership, including the need to 
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strengthen state institutions in relation to the entities, and to align the text of the Constitution 
to the Constitutional Court’s decision on the “constituent peoples” case (U-5/98).443 
Upon a request of the same Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in March 
2005 the Venice Commission issued its advisory “Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the power of the High Representative”. The assembly had tasked 
the expert body to assess whether the use of the High Representative’s Bonn Powers 
respected the basic principles of the Council of Europe, as well as whether the Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the European Charter on Local Self-Government. It had also asked it to generally review 
the rationality and functionality of the constitutional setup of the country. The report was not 
positive, in particular for what concerns the Bonn Powers, which, although beneficial in the 
wake of the war, do “not correspond to democratic principles when exercised without due 
process and the possibility of judicial control”.444 In terms of institutional arrangements, the 
Venice Commission criticised the extraordinarily weak state level as incapable to “effectively 
ensure compliance with the commitments of the country with respect to the Council of Europe 
and the international community in general”, as well as the overlap of competences between 
the Presidency and the Council of Ministers, the lack of specific limitations for the use of the 
national interest veto, the entity veto, and the House of Peoples as a legislature. Finally, the 
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Venice Commission noted that the Constitution was unusually “drafted and adopted without 
involving the citizens of BiH and without applying procedures which could have provided 
democratic legitimacy”.445 The Venice Commission concluded that it was “unthinkable that 
Bosnia and Herzegovina can make real progress with the present constitutional 
arrangements”. It thus made a connection between the phasing out of international 
supervision and a constitutional reform process to strengthen the domestic institutions. 
3.2 The April Package and its failure 
The Venice Commission opinion set the debate for the coming months, which also 
coincided with the 10
th
 anniversary of the Dayton agreement. On this occasion, the United 
States Institute of Peace (USIP) organised an event in Washington, aptly entitled “Beyond 
Dayton: The Balkans and Euro-Atlantic Integration”, during which the U.S. Under Secretary 
of State for Political Affairs, R. Nicholas Burns (who had worked on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
between 1995 and 1997) made a clear appeal for the opening of a process of constitutional 
reform, with a view to modernising the Dayton arrangements and creating new unified, 
functional institutions for the country.
446 
In the press conference, Burns clarified that this 
process would entail moving towards a single-member presidency, a stronger prime minister, 
and a stronger parliament with a stronger speaker, and that U.S. diplomacy would work with 
BiH leaders to hammer out the details before the 2006 elections.
 447
 Likewise, in her meeting 
with BiH Presidency Chairman Ivo Miro Jovic, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
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remarked that “we must now move beyond the framework constructed one decade ago… the 
country needs a stronger energetic state capable of advancing the public good and securing 
the national interest”.448 Bosnian leaders also agreed in a joint statement to commit to a 
process that “will enhance the authorities of the state government and streamline parliament 
and the office of the presidency”.449 
Under the leadership of Amb. Douglas L. McElhaney in Sarajevo and of Amb. Donald 
Hays in Washington (a former Deputy HR in BiH in 2001-2005, then chair of the USIP 
Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations), the U.S. diplomacy embarked in the 
following months on a process of closed-doors negotiations with the main Bosnian party 
leaders, while drafting in Washington the details of a compromise proposal to be concluded 
by early Spring, before the start of the campaign for the October general elections. The choice 
of the approach, focusing on the main parties’ leaders, stemmed from the general approach of 
U.S. diplomacy to negotiations in post-conflict situations, and from the overall ideas that in 
such segmented societies the main opinion-makers need to be taken on board first, and that 
the rest of society will later follow too. Throughout the negotiation process, EU member 
states’ diplomacies took part or were briefed only sporadically; the process was completely 
U.S.-owned.
450
 
The final compromise proposal, dubbed “April Package” (aprilski paket), was less 
ambitious than originally hoped, but still included a number of changes designed to streamline 
policy-making and strengthen the state-level institutions. The revised Bosnian Constitution 
would have foreseen, first, a single-member presidency (with two deputies, one for each 
                                                 
448
 U.S. Department of State. 2005. Remarks in Honor of the Tenth Anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords. 
Speech by Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Washington DC, November 22. Emphasis added. 
449
 McMahon, P. C., Jon Western, 2009. “The Death of Dayton: How to Stop Bosnia from Falling Apart”. 
Foreign Affairs, 88(5), 69-77.  
450
  Venneri,  From International to EU-Driven Statebuilding, 2010, p. 167, 172. 
150 
 
constituent people, to rotate every 16 months instead of 8), indirectly elected by the 
Parliament and with a more ceremonial role, and a reduction of matters subject to consensus 
among presidency members to only a few, including defence; at the same time, the Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers was to be reinforced and two new ministries (for agriculture and 
for technology and the environment) were to be established. Second, the amendments foresaw 
the codification of the competences de facto acquired by the state level in the previous period 
(defence, security, intelligence, as well as joint institutions such as the state-level BiH Court, 
BiH Prosecutor’s Office, High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, and Indirect Tax 
Authority), together with a new category of shared competences (in taxation, justice and 
electoral affairs), and especially a specific provision for European integration that would have 
allowed the state level to assume the necessary competences from the entities. Third, the 
Parliament would have also been reconfigured, with a higher number of MPs (87 instead of 
42 in the House of Representatives, including at least 3 “Others”, and 21 instead of 15 in the 
House of Peoples, indirectly elected from the former rather than from the entities’ 
parliaments) and with permanent, non-rotation speakers and deputies. Moreover, the House of 
Peoples’s competences would be limited to the procedure for the Vital National Interest veto 
– thus in practice becoming an arbitration committee of the same House of Representatives. A 
form of “entity voting” would persist, with legislation approved if at least one third of MPs 
elected from each entity would support it.
451
 
To sum up, the proposal aimed at better defining and in part expanding the state-level 
competences as well as at streamlining the institutional structure, limiting (but only up to a 
point) the powers of the entities and the veto rights of the ethnic groups. In so doing, the 
package managed to gather a wide consensus by offering something to each group: 
safeguarding the autonomy of Republika Srpska for the Bosnian Serb parties; persistence of 
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political equality of the constituent peoples for the Bosnian Croats; and the strengthening of 
state institutions for the Bosniak and civic parties.  
Yet, when push came to shove, the package failed to meet the two-third majority required 
by only two votes – mainly because of squabbles within the Bosnian Croat and Bosniak 
camps. Among the former, the HDZ party split between the HDZ BiH (in favour) and the 
smaller HDZ 1990, which opposed the package on the grounds that entity voting did not 
protect the Croat group, as well as that the  authority of the House of Peoples would be 
weakened; among the latter, the SBiH party of Haris Silajdžić voted against the package, 
objecting in particular to the confirmation of entity voting, probably in the hope of achieving 
an even better deal in terms of centralisation, in view of their final aim of abolishing 
Republika Srpska.
452
  
Both parties were rewarded by voters at the following elections – an indication that their 
intransigence had struck a chord with voters, and that electoral calculations had trumped 
earlier opportunistic reasons to support the reform agreement. This also showed how, despite 
helping to broker the deal, the U.S. diplomatic strategy of closed-door negotiations under 
external pressure without a public debate had finally backfired,
453
  as a pre-electoral climate 
had easily pushed political leaders to renege on their commitments. At the same time, Milorad 
Dodik ratcheted up his rhetoric to unprecedented levels, hinting at a possible independence 
referendum for Republika Srpska following the recent example of Montenegro; he also won 
with a landslide.  
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As a final surprise, the SDP candidate Željko Komšić was elected to the BiH Presidency, 
together with the Bosniak Silajdžić (SBiH) and the Bosnian Serb Radmanović (SNSD). 
Komšić, a Croat running for the civic SDP party, was elected also thanks to Bosniak, Serb 
and other votes in the Federation constituency. He was thus not seen as a legitimate 
representative of the Croat group by the main Bosnian Croat parties, the HDZ BiH and HDZ 
1990. The trauma of the Komšić case would have long-term consequences for future reform 
efforts. 
The failure of the April Package, albeit only by a small margin, had very heavy 
consequences on the reform process. On the one hand, a precious occasion had been lost, 
whose favourable domestic conditions would not come back after the October 2006 elections. 
On the other hand, it had exposed the differences in approach between the United States and 
the European Union (and its member states), with the first showing no reluctance in replacing 
local actors to foster a compromise, in a hands-on, top-down approach. Finally, as remarked 
by Bennett, the failure also “exposed the depth of feeling and the scale of the task involved in 
amending the Dayton Peace Agreement using the mechanisms for change contained within 
it”.454 
3.3 The botched EU initiatives under Schwartz-Schilling 
A timid attempt at a new constitutional reform process was launched by the new 
HR/EUSR, Christian Schwartz-Schilling, after his appointment in 2006. Schwartz-Schilling 
saw his role as promoting the local ownership agenda and fostering the closure of the OHR 
office and the establishment of a reinforced EU presence. To this end, he considered that 
“Bosnia and Herzegovina must be fully sovereign. That means that I must step back”.455 His 
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approach to fostering reforms was very different from the closed-door U.S. approach under 
the April package talks: following the example of the European Convention leading to the 
Nice Treaty, Schwartz-Schilling envisaged a “constitutional convention” approach, open to 
civil society and the cultural establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to foster a parallel 
debate in society and to break the monopoly of the ethno-nationalist party in the topic. 
However, this soon appeared unrealistic given the tense political climate. As a subordinate, 
Schwartz-Schilling proposed a law-based constitutional commission, to be nominated by the 
BiH Parliament, with three co-chairs (a Bosnian intellectual and one each from the U.S.  and 
the EU) and a technical secretariat composed equally of Bosnians and internationals. Despite 
the readiness of Germany to foot the bill of such an endeavour, the proposal found a cold 
welcome in Brussels. While the EU Council deemed it as not showing enough local 
ownership and remaining too internationally-driven, the Commission was rather worried that 
this initiative would take away the priority still afforded to the police reform issue and spoil 
technical efforts with broader high-politics debates. The feasibility of the initiative quickly 
faded away in the summer of 2007, as HDZ BiH withdrew its support. At the same time, the 
last attempt by the U.S. to rescue the April Package through further talks between Dodik and 
Silajdžić also arrived at a fruitless conclusion.456 Moreover, because of his disappointment 
about the lack of support from Brussels, Schwartz-Schilling would soon resign from his post 
as HR/EUSR. 
3.4 Further attempts in 2008-2009: from Prud to Butmir 
Talks were relaunched in late 2008, after the closure of the police reform saga and the 
local elections. Following a retreat in the village of Prud, on 8 November 2008 the leaders of 
the three main parties (Dodik for the SNSD, Tihić for the SDA and Čović for the HDZ) 
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signed a joint agreement to place constitutional reforms at the top of the agenda, with the aim 
of harmonising the Bosnian Constitution with the European Convention on Human Rights, as 
well as to clarify state competences and establish functional institutions, and to reorganise the 
middle layers of governance, as well as settling the legal status of Brčko.457 The Prud 
declaration also explicitly called for amendments to be drafted with the expert assistance of 
international institutions.  
That same month, Solana and Rehn presented a joint report to the European Council, in 
order to establish “a comprehensive EU approach” to state-building in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, based on the European Partnership document and the SAA implementation, 
leveraging the fact that “EU integration represents a policy area that all BiH leaders agree 
on”.458 Yet the report was rather cautious on constitutional reform issues, as it mentioned that:  
Constitutional reform is neither a requirement for OHR closure nor for 
BiH’s further journey towards the EU. Nevertheless, the constitutional 
framework must evolve to ensure effective state structures capable of 
delivering on EU integration, including the requirement to speak with one 
voice. The EU can support constitutional reform with expertise and funds, 
but the process must be led by BiH itself.
459
 
The “Prud process” led to monthly tripartite meetings of party leaders. Yet, a detailed 
agreement on the foreseen reforms remained elusive, particularly for what concerned 
territorial reorganisation: Tihić and Čović saw this as a way to abolish the RS and replace the 
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entities with four non-ethnic regions, while for Dodik the modification of the borders of 
Republika Srpska was a clear red line and for him any other change would be conditional to 
entrenching the right of the RS entity to secede from the new state configuration after a three-
year probation period.
460
 The only concrete outcome of the “Prud process”, upon U.S. 
pressure, was the agreement that a formal amendment to the BiH Constitution would 
incorporate the Brčko District under the jurisdiction of the state institution and of the 
Constitutional Court, as had been settled by the Brčko arbitration process.461 
The EU and the U.S. worked together to avoid a premature failure of the process, by 
inviting the leaders to Brussels in March 2009 and by organising a joint visit of EU CFSP 
High Representative Javier Solana and U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden in May 2009. Biden 
and Solana issued a joint declaration noting that the Euro-Atlantic progress of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina “will require concerted efforts and compromise to achieve needed reforms, 
including a functional BiH Constitution. The United States and the EU will support this 
process of growth and reform”.462  
Yet, the domestic political climate verged more and more on open confrontation, 
particularly due to the stormy relations between Dodik and the OHR. Emboldened by the 
stronger support from Russia - which had started to distance itself from the Western 
consensus in the PIC and to favour the immediate closure of the OHR and the end of the Bonn 
Powers – in May 2009 the SNSD-dominated RS parliament adopted a resolution challenging 
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68 competences that had been transferred from the entities to the state-level in the course of 
the previous decade. As expressed by Dodik in an interview with Večernje Novosti,  
We are now going to ask for the competencies taken away from us to be 
returned. This will be the basis of our concept in the process of 
constitutional changes. Nobody should have any doubt about us achieving 
that. Be assured – RS will not lose one single competency more. 463 
 This would become the mantra and the standard position of the RS authorities in the 
following decade. Despite a strong rebuke by the PIC Steering Board, to which Russia did not 
align,
464
 Dodik later doubled down in his challenge to the OHR, with the RS government 
adopting a decision stating that all OHR decisions adopted based on the Bonn Powers would 
no longer apply on RS territory.
465
 Again, the stark reaction by the PIC Steering Board, 
describing the RS government as responsible for the “downward spiral in political relations 
and challenges to the GFAP”, was not supported by Russia. 466 
While the domestic political climate seemed not to be conducive to big reform attempts, 
the positions of the EU and the U.S. soon also started to diverge: in September, in the 
framework of the “Quint” meetings between the U.S., France, Germany, Italy, and the United 
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Kingdom, the EU member states proposed a brainstorming retreat for Bosnian leaders, while 
the U.S. presented a focused argumentaire on the need for constitutional reforms.
467
  
The EU document for the Quint mentioned that the “imperfect Dayton constitution… has 
clearly reached its limits”, and that “to apply for membership of the EU and NATO, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina needs to recover its full sovereignty;” “only after a decision has been taken 
to close the Office of the High Representative and relinquish the Bonn Powers can BiH 
sensibly hand in its application for EU and NATO membership”.468 Once again, the EU 
emphasised the formal aspects of sovereignty over actual capacities, and the preference for a 
gradualistic and technocratic approach to change, with the overall idea that restoration of full 
Bosnian sovereignty would be followed by its taming via assimilation in the Euro-Atlantic 
supranational structures.
469
 Overall, the EU foresaw as feasible only a couple of 
constitutional-level reforms: harmonisation with the ECHR, and a few institutional tweaks in 
line with the April package (indirect election of the BiH Presidency, increase in the number of 
MPs, reform of the cantonal structure of the Federation entity) to present the BiH political 
leaders with a package deal. 
The U.S. had a more radical position, in line with the 2005 Venice Commission Opinion, 
which considered constitutional reform as indispensable and centralisation as the main aim. 
The U.S. also objected to the EU position on three grounds: first, noting that EU enlargement 
negotiations would not be possible without constitutional reform and transfer of competences 
to the state level; second, deeming it unclear whether and how the EU enlargement process 
would identify the required changes and foster their adoption; and, finally, considering 
unrealistic the assumption that the closure of the OHR would lead to stronger local ownership 
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rather than mere institutional paralysis. The U.S. also sought to foster NATO-compliant 
reforms as a priority and a potential tool to break the deadlock and build “the institutional 
basis for EU enlargement negotiations”. 470 
The sense of urgency for a constitutional reform was also spurred by conjunctural factors. 
First, the already-looming 2010 general elections; second, the upcoming ruling of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Sejdić–Finci case, anticipated by the amicus curiae 
brief by the Venice Commission, which clearly stated how “different treatment on the basis of 
ethnicity can hardly ever be justified”.471 
A retreat was organised in the Butmir military base outside Sarajevo on 9 October 2009, 
in which the U.S. (represented by the Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg) maintained the 
lead role over the EU representatives (the EU Commissioner for enlargement Olli Rehn and 
the Swedish Foreign Minister and former HR for BiH, Carl Bildt, for the EU Council 
Presidency). The U.S. approach took prominence in the configuration of the talks, which 
gathered Bosnian leaders in the military base to discuss the reconfiguration of sovereignty in 
the country. At the same time, two aspects from the EU approach were also included: a degree 
of public diplomacy was sought, to complement closed-door talks, and the process remained 
“capitals-driven”, with only a marginal role for the OHR.472 In the final draft proposal, a 
specific paragraph (§6a) also clarifies that only the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina could 
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apply for membership in international organisations, and that it was empowered to assume 
competences from the entities for such an aim.
473
 
The Butmir draft,
 
which was taking over the main points from the April Package of three 
years before, found even less consensus among domestic parties than its predecessor, as each 
side kept raising its stakes. The SDP and SBiH opposed it because it would not have 
sufficiently reinforced the state-level institution and would have left ambiguities in the 
definition of competences; the SNSD opposed it as too centralistic, as the well-entrenched 
Dodik did not see any need to renegotiate the prerogatives that Dayton had granted his entity; 
and the HDZ, in its quest for a third entity after the Komšić trauma, also opposed the draft 
because it did not protect the Croat group enough. Only the SDA was explicitly in favour of 
the compromise proposal. After two fruitless negotiating sessions, the talks were wrapped up 
in November 2009, right before the ECtHR issued its Sejdić–Finci ruling.  
A criticism of the Butmir initiative from the U.S. side came from James C. O’Brian, who 
was among the drafters of the Dayton constitution. O’Brian criticised the tendency to go for 
“big initiatives” to strike a package deal on reform, proposing instead a bottom-up, 
gradualistic approach to “pick many, many little fights” with the local elite. He also noted that 
“constitutional reform is not necessary”, and that it would anyhow mean very little if 
negotiated by and for the same ethno-nationalist elites. According to O’Brian, the EU policy-
makers should rather “be themselves” and bring Bosnian elites to task in the implementation 
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of their contractual obligations stemming from the SAA.
474
 At the same time, a criticism of a 
different nature came from Europe too, in the form of an open letter signed by the three 
former HR/EUSR, Paddy Ashdown, Wolfgang Petritsch and Christian Schwartz-Schilling, 
who complained about the lack of involvement of the HR/EUSR, the lack of a wider public 
debate on the topic, and the need to maintain the Bonn Powers in some form even after the 
foreseen closure of the OHR, to provide a long-term international guarantee on peace and 
stability in the country.
 475
 
Overall, the reasons for the failure of all constitutional reform attempts between 2005 and 
2010 have been identified, first, through the short and fixed Bosnian electoral cycles, with 
administrative or political elections every two years, which reinforce the short-termism of 
political actors in search of gains at the ballot box.
476
 Moreover, the zero-sum character of 
Bosnian politics, with three sides having incompatible long-term goals, has been indicated as 
the other main reason for the impossibility to reach a compromise.
477
 
3.5 The ECtHR Sejdić–Finci ruling and its impact 
In 2002 Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Council of Europe and signed the European 
Convention of Human Rights (which was referred to as directly applicable by the same 
Dayton Constitution), and in April 2005 the Protocol 12 to the Convention – which 
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establishes a general prohibition of discrimination – came into force after having been ratified 
by Bosnia and Herzegovina in the group of twelve frontrunner Council of Europe member 
states.  
Soon, two prominent citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who do not identify with any of 
the three constituent peoples – Dervo Sejdić, a Bosnian Roma representative, in June 2006, 
and Ambassador Jakub Finci, a  Bosnian Jew, in January 2007 – filed a complaint of 
discrimination in Strasbourg, arguing that the Consitution and the electoral law restricted 
them from running as candidates for the country Presidency and for the House of Peoples. In 
December 2009 the Court, in its Grand Chamber, ruled in their favour.
 478
 
The ECtHR ruling meant one further narrowing down of the constitutional reform agenda 
after the failures of the 2006 April package and of the 2009 Prud-Butmir process,
479
 thought 
the EU Council kept speaking broadly about the “effective functioning of the institutions”. In 
the assessment of Valery Perry, the exercise over time even “changed from a chance to 
broadly remove discriminatory provisions in the constitution to a narrow exercise driven by 
leading party interests in maintaining the status quo”.480 
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At that point, the SAA had not yet been ratified by all EU member states and, while an 
Interim Agreement was already in force for what concerns trade-related matters, it was 
deemed important to amend the constitution in line with the Sejdić–Finci ruling in time for 
the upcoming elections of October 2010, to improve their legitimacy. Yet, finding a way to 
implement the ECtHR ruling without unsettling the delicate Dayton balance proved elusive 
one more time, particularly after four years of fruitless negotiations on constitutional reform 
and deterioration of the political climate.
481
 The aim of the political talks of the following year 
was to find a way to make the Bosnian Constitution ECtHR-compliant, and this in turn meant 
finding a way to satisfy the requests of the Bosnian Croat parties for a safe electoral 
constituency to avoid future Komšić cases. A Parliamentary committee was tasked to discuss 
the issue in 2010, at the start of the electoral campaign, but did not achieve any results, 
against the backdrop of procedural issues and the lack of a quorum.
482
  
Elections were held in October 2010 without any ECtHR-compliant changes, and with no 
consequences. Electoral results rewarded Dodik, who was elected to the RS Presidency, and 
punished Silajdžić, who lost the seat of Bosniak BiH Presidency member to Bakir 
Izetbegović, son of Alija. Komšić was re-elected. With Dodik well entrenched in power, in 
February 2010 the RS parliament adopted a Law on Referendum and Civic Initiative enabling 
entity-level referendums, which would prove very important in future relations with the OHR 
and with the EU.
483
 The election also led to a prolonged stalling, with a fifteen-month period 
needed to gather a coalition and establish a government in January 2012, also because of the 
HDZ parties’ obstruction to a government being formed without their presence, as they 
considered themselves the only legitimate representatives of the Bosnian Croats, and the 
rightful owners of all governmental posts earmarked for Croats. During the same period, 
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international actors devoted most of their energy to Dodik’s referendum challenge to the 
state-level Court and judiciary, which led to the establishment of the Structured Dialogue on 
Justice.  
Implementation of the Sejdić–Finci ruling was thus included as part of EU conditionality 
for the entry into force of the SAA in the political conclusions of the EU Council of 21 March 
2011, which speak more broadly of the “compliance of the Constitution with the European 
Convention on Human Rights”, 484 also with reference to other open issues, including 
pensions and immovable properties.
 485
 
At the same time, 2011 was also the year in which the long-discussed “reinforced 
presence” of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina was put in place. With the end of the OHR 
mandate of Miroslav Lajčák and the appointment of the Austrian diplomat Valentin Inzko to 
the same position, the double-hatting as EUSR was suspended.
486
 The decoupling between the 
OHR and EUSR was seen as the start of a new era and of a new dynamic, with the passage 
from the hard power of the High Representative to the soft power of the EU. At the same 
time, it also meant that the EU stopped supporting by default the state-building agenda of the 
international community, to think by itself about the European future of the country.
487
   
Meanwhile, following the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty that upgraded 
Commission delegations abroad to EU Delegations, the legal, political and press offices of the 
EUSR also passed under the hierarchy of the EU Delegation, which until then had dealt 
mainly with development and economic issues related to the Interim Agreement, now headed 
by a Danish diplomat, Peter Sørensen, also double-hatted as EUSR, whose new mandate also 
                                                 
484 
Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3076th Foreign Affairs 
Council meeting, Brussels, 21 March 2011. 
 
485
 Interview with an officer at the EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 2014.  
486
 Interview with a diplomatic representative of an EU member state, Sarajevo, November 2014.  
487
 Interviews with officers at the EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 2014.  
164 
 
explicitly included the monitoring of and giving advice on the process of Constitutional 
reform.
488
 With its Delegation “starting to acquire some political muscles”,489 the EU in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina could thus since rely on a single, reinforced office, with an 
unequivocal mandate to support the European integration of the country, well separate and 
distinguished from the OHR, whose mandate to uphold the civilian implementation of the 
Dayton constitution remained in force since no progress could be reported on the 5+2 agenda 
for its closure. 
Despite the political stalemate, between October 2011 and March 2012 talks towards a 
compromise to implement the ECtHR Sejdić–Finci ruling were held in the framework of a 
Parliamentary Joint Committee.
490
 The process was led by the BiH Parliament as the 
competent institution (technical assistance offered by the EU was turned down for full 
ownership) and open to civil society
491
 and EU representatives as observers.
 492
 In the course 
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of the six months, the committee held meetings twice a month; it was decided that the 
committee would focus strictly on finding an ECtHR-compliant solution, rather than on 
broader changes to the institutions. While a simple solution was within reach for the House of 
Peoples (adding two representatives of the “Others” elected from the Federation, and one 
from Republika Srpska),
493
  the bone of contention remained the Presidency, for which the 
Serbs wanted to continue with direct election of the Serb member, while the Croats asked for 
either indirect elections or a separate constituency to avoid future Komšić cases.494 A solution 
could thus not be found, as MPs lacked the political clout to diverge from established, and 
mutually incompatible, party lines. The Committee then remained dormant, pending 
institutional instructions from party leaders.
 495
 
3.6 The High Level Accession Dialogue and the Sejdić–Finci talks  
The stalemate following the 2010 elections, with a fifteen-month period needed to gather 
a coalition and establish a government in January 2012, also meant that no reforms could be 
seriously discussed. Out of the three conditions posited by the EU for the entry into force of 
the SAA, a state aid law and a census law were soon adopted; “credible efforts” towards the 
implementation of the Sejdić–Finci ruling remained outstanding. By the end of spring the EU 
saw it necessary to step in, and in June 2012 the Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle 
launched a High Level Accession Dialogue (HLAD) on the Accession Process with Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as a policy dialogue with the main Bosnian political leaders to understand 
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the various positions and assess whether any ground for compromise could be found.
 496
  The 
dialogue started with a focus on the Sejdić–Finci issue, to then broaden to other issues 
concerning the EU integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina – such as the need for a 
coordination mechanism for the country to speak with a single voice in the accession 
process
497
  – in order to include constitutional reforms in the broader framework of EU 
accession. Yet there was no breakthrough.
498
  
In the summer of 2012, the HDZ and SDP leaders, Dragan Čović and Zlatko Lagumdžija, 
reached an agreement on the broad lines of a reform, based on the indirect election of the BiH 
Presidency members by the BiH Parliament. Bosnian Croat parties continued to demand that 
any Sejdić–Finci-compliant solutions also include a reform of the election methods, to 
prevent future Komšić cases. The Čović-Lagumdžija agreement remained at the stage of a 
draft, and it did not produce detailed amendments. Yet, it managed to receive criticisms from 
Bosnian civil society representatives, who dubbed it as “medieval” since it would foster 
ethnic segregation on the local level too, by creating three electoral constituencies based on 
ethno-national majorities.
499
 Moreover, the SDA opposed it because it deemed unacceptable 
that the three members of the BiH Presidency would be elected under different methods; in 
fact, for the Bosnian Serbs it is a red line that the Serb member should remain directly elected 
from the territory of Republika Srpska. The same Komšić left the SDP party, in dissent with 
the agreement with the HDZ, which would have excluded him from acceding to power again 
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in the future. Further talks within the High Level Accession Dialogue were held in November 
and December 2012, but with no results,
500
 in particular because of the main aim of the 
Bosnian Croat party, i.e. the revision of the electoral rules for the BiH Presidency to prevent 
new Komšić cases.501 
A third phase of Sejdić–Finci talks started in February/March 2013, when the EU decided 
to step up its engagement into a direct facilitation of the negotiations under the auspices of 
Commissioner Füle. In a joint statement, Commissioner Füle and Council of Europe 
Secretary-General Thornbjörn Jagland expressed “regret that narrow party and ethnic interests 
continue to prevail over genuine engagement to end the constitutional discrimination of many 
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and bring the legislation in line with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.” They also noted that “the regrettable lack of commitment 
from some of the party leaders to the EU agenda will clearly undermine Bosnia and 
Herzegovina's European integration process.”502 Between March and April 2013, the EU 
Delegation in Sarajevo, with the support of the Director-General of DG NEAR, Stefano 
Sannino, facilitated a series of talks between the party leaders and their advisers; formal BiH 
authorities held by second-tier politicians, such as prime minister Bevanda, were not included 
in the process. The EU role as a facilitator, looking for a synthesis between the different 
positions of the political parties, was well appreciated by the political leaders, and the local 
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press reported it as such each time a solution had been found, but no fully-fledged agreement 
could be reached. On 11 April 2013, Commissioner Füle acknowledged that no final 
agreement could be found, and closed the dialogue process.
503
 
During the summer of 2013, a political initiative of the two main Bosniak and Croat 
parties, the SDA and HDZ BiH, led to a political agreement between Čović and Izetbegović 
on several files, from Mostar (where local elections could not be held since 2008) to Sejdić–
Finci and beyond. Launched and negotiated in full ownership by the two parties, the Čović-
Izetbegović understanding brought some optimism that an autonomous domestic political 
dynamic could take foot.
504
 This happened in parallel to a public campaign and political 
initiative, spearheaded by the U.S. Embassy, for a reform of the Federation entity institutions, 
which led to 181 recommendations by an expert group and a draft new constitution for the 
entity, whose adoption was nevertheless never taken into serious consideration.
 505
 On 1st 
October 2013 Commissioner Füle called for a meeting of the Bosnian political leaders in 
Brussels, at which they signed an agreement on principles on how to solve the Sejdić–Finci 
issue.
506
 Yet, the agreement dissolved even before their airplane landed back in Sarajevo. The 
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Commissioner then asked them to discuss further locally and come back on 10 October with 
the agreed details,
507
 but no final compromise was reached.
508
 
The final phase of the Sejdić–Finci talks was again led from the ground, by the EU 
Delegation in Sarajevo. Three long negotiation sessions
509
 among political leaders were held 
– the first, upon invitation by Commissioner Füle, in a castle near Prague in November, and 
the second and third in Sarajevo. The Venice Commission and the U.S. also sent their envoys 
as observers and technical assistants. Differently from earlier talks in the Parliamentary 
Committee, when only dogmatic positions were exchanged, now a final synthesis seemed 
possible.
510
 Yet, the stakes were so high that a final agreement proved impossible, as HDZ 
BiH required the absolute arithmetical certainty of being able to occupy the third seat of the 
BiH Presidency – which, given that the Sejdić–Finci ruling was actually about removing 
ethnic discrimination in the access to the same Presidency, could not be provided by any 
possible model. The process was finally declared over on 17 February 2014, during the riots 
in Sarajevo.
511
 New elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 2014, for the 
second time without implementation of the Sejdić–Finci ruling. 
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Overall, the Sejdić–Finci saga showed a second cycle of mismanaged EU conditionality. 
In the words of one EU official, the Sejdić–Finci ruling was “a failed Trojan horse; it did not 
open on time, and the EU remained stuck inside”.512 
The main reason for such mismanagement was the lack of proportionality between what 
was required from the country (constitutional reform) and what was on offer (entry into force 
of the SAA). The political leaders who took part in the talks had very little incentive to reach 
a final agreement, as their primary electoral objectives could best be achieved by resisting 
pressure and reinforcing their public position as defenders of the rights of their own 
community/constituency. Attaching conditionality to each procedural step in the EU 
accession process had made the reward invisible.
513
 Differently from other reforms with more 
evident benefits for everyday citizens – such as the process of visa liberalisation – the entry 
into force of the SAA was not concrete enough a reward for the general public to mobilise in 
support. Moreover, despite its undoubted value in terms of fundamental rights, the Sejdić–
Finci issue remained a very abstract issue for the majority of the Bosnian electorate, whose 
living conditions would not have immediately benefited from its resolution.  
As a second issue, as was the case in the previous police reform cycle, Sejdić–Finci 
conditionality also lacked legitimacy. The ECtHR ruling – at least in its part concerning the 
BiH Presidency – was based on a Protocol to the Convention, Protocol 12, that only very few 
EU member states had ratified.
514
 And, in terms of general compliance with Council of 
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Europe obligations, Bosnian authorities used to refer to the way worse track record of EU 
member states such as Italy or candidates such as Turkey.
515
 In fact, it is unclear how and why 
the Commission decided to adopt as its own a conditionality that stemmed from the Council 
of Europe legal framework and that did not have direct bearing on the EU acquis, even before 
Bosnia and Herzegovina applied formally for EU membership and started its European 
integration process.
516
  Reports have pointed to the close personal relations between 
Commissioner Füle and Council of Europe secretary-general Jagland, and this 
personal/conjunctural factor cannot be discarded. Moreover, a question of relation between 
human rights principles and peace-building is worth a note. As highlighted in the dissenting 
opinion of the Maltese judge Giovanni Bonello to the ruling ‘does it fall within this Court's 
remit to behave as the uninvited guest in peace-keeping multilateral exercises and treaties that 
have already been signed, ratified and executed?’.517 Finally, as it was remarked by EU 
officials themselves, despite being based on a ECtHR ruling, the process did not see any 
concrete involvement of the Council of Europe or of the Venice Commission, that left the 
whole process in the hands of the EU.
518
 
Finally, in terms of process, the Sejdić–Finci talks replicated previous attempts at 
constitutional reforms in focusing on closed-door meetings between political party leaders,
519
  
while leaving on the sidelines the formal political institutions (Parliament and Council of 
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Ministers).
520
 Public debate was also missing overall. The process thus failed to encourage a 
domestic constituency to push for a compromise and to support the eventual final agreement 
from the talks. It also did not take into due consideration the several bottom-up attempts at 
proposing different models and solutions for constitutional reform.
521
 Rather, coming at the 
end of several years of botched attempts at constitutional reforms, it started with very few 
chances of success.
522
 
3.7 Towards a rebalanced approach to EU conditionality in BiH  
Together with containing Bosnian Serb grievances via the Structural Dialogue on Justice, 
most of the resources of the EU and the other international actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
during the 2010-2014 legislature were used to find a solution to the Sejdić–Finci issue. At the 
same time, the global financial crisis and the crisis of the eurozone also started to take their 
toll on the country. Severe economic downturn was headed off only via IMF standby 
arrangements in 2009 and 2012, later extended in 2014. Yet, the same institution had to 
repeatedly suspend its loans due to non-compliance of Bosnian institutions with its agenda of 
reforms, which threatened to dent the patronage network connecting political parties to voters 
seeking job security and access to public services. Early protests by war veterans against 
reforms that would reduce their status-based social entitlements had already turned violent in 
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April 2010.
523
 Political agreements in 2012 between SDP and SNSD to dilute the definition of 
and sanctions for conflict of interest and to repatriate powers from independent institutions 
(only the first point was enacted) increased social perceptions of the corruption of the ruling 
political class. In the summer of 2013, a spontaneous civil rights movement organised mass-
scale demonstrations in central Sarajevo asking the political institutions to solve the dispute of 
identity numbers and documents for newborns, which were impeding them from expatriating 
and had caused the death of a child.  
This peaceful “JMBG” or “bebolucija” protest was only the prelude of the street riots of 
February 2014, which started from the strike of a bankrupt firm in Tuzla and soon extended to 
most cities in the Federation entity. Within few days, rioters had set alight the buildings of the 
cantonal governments – identified with the waste of money of the plethoric Bosnian public 
administration – and also attacked the BiH Presidency. In the following weeks, while several 
cantonal governments resigned, citizens established local assemblies, called plenums, to 
discuss political issues and come up with demands and programmes, which kept a certain 
level of organisation, with differences among different towns, up to summer 2014.
524
 In the 
same period, Bosnia and Herzegovina also had to endure the catastrophic floods that hit the 
country in May, killing 25 persons, displacing 40,000, and affecting 1,5 million people 
overall, with an economic damage estimated at 2 million euros. Civil society once again 
proved quick to react, providing solidarity across ethnic lines, and international donors soon 
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pledged to support the reconstruction, while the government seemed unable to respond 
effectively.
525
 
The EU was struck by the February 2014 riots in the middle of the latest round of 
negotiations with political leaders on the Sejdić–Finci issue, as “a rude wake up call”.526 The 
disconnect between closed-door negotiations among political leaders on electoral formulas 
and street protests for socio-economic rights could not have been more apparent.
527
 At the 
same times, the protests demonstrated to EU officials the existence of a constituency looking 
for change.
528
  The EU soon shifted its focus towards social and economic reforms by quickly 
putting together a six-point Compact for Growth and Jobs,
529
 as a blueprint of policy priorities 
that Bosnian politicians were supposed to focus on after the elections. A public campaign to 
bring more Bosnian citizens to the ballot was also launched, but the results of the election (the 
third since the Sejdić–Finci ruling) did not lead to particular changes. The main community 
parties (SDA, HDZ, SDS) came out reinforced, and could form a state-level coalition, while 
Dodik’s SNSD remained in power in the Republika Srpska entity. 
Four years of fruitless discussions with Bosnian politicians on electoral metaphysics, and 
the outburst of rage by Bosnian laymen at the lack of employment and degrading living 
conditions in the country had the effect of convincing the EU and its member states that a 
change of policy was necessary. This was first proposed by the German and British foreign 
ministers, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Philip Hammond, in a joint letter on 4 November 
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2014,
530
 which was then translated (with minor changes) into EU Council Conclusions, 
adopted in December 2014.
531
 To ensure consistency, the “renewed EU approach” towards 
Bosnia and Herzegovina stemming from the British-German initiative did not remove Sejdić–
Finci conditionality, but rather rescheduled it, delaying its expected implementation to a later 
moment in the accession  process. The BiH Presidency and Bosnian political leaders were 
expected to commit to a broad programme of reforms – the Reform Agenda – and in 
exchange the EU would put the SAA into force. Upon progress in the implantation of the 
reform agenda, Bosnia and Herzegovina could then present its EU membership application to 
the EU Council, and the Commission would then prepare its opinion (Avis) on the 
preparedness of the country in fulfilling the political criteria to obtain candidate status and 
open accession negotiations, including the implementation of the Sejdić–Finci ruling. As 
noted by Bennett, “in essence, the issue of constitutional change was shelved” and emphasis 
was shifted on socio-economic reforms.
532
   
The timing of the initiative was favourable – right after both EU and Bosnian elections – 
and its content was long overdue. The EU could thus hope to restart its relations with Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, placing emphasis on a wider range of reforms, rather than only on electoral 
formulas to overcome discrimination of minorities, which albeit necessary remained seen as 
exoteric by the wider population. At the same time, the initiative could avoid being seen as an 
ad hoc approach, but rather as treating Bosnia and Herzegovina as any other enlargement 
country.
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In January 2015 the Bosnian political leaders signed a Written Commitment to Reforms, 
which was then endorsed by the BiH Parliamentary Assembly,
533
   and on 16 March 2015 the 
EU Council decided to bring into force as of 1 June 2015 the EU-BiH Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA),
534
 which had been signed in 2008 but had remained frozen 
since.
535
   
On 15 February 2016 Dragan Čović, as Chairman of the BiH Presidency, presented the 
formal application of Bosnia and Herzegovina for EU membership to the EU institutions in 
Brussels. By the summer, the country’s institutions managed to fulfil the one condition and 
two “consensus-enablers” set by the EU Council for the application to be taken into 
consideration: demonstrating significant progress in the implementation of the Reform 
Agenda, as well as finding a final agreement on the coordination mechanism among all 
institutions concerned with EU affairs in BiH, and finally proceeding with the adaptation of 
the trade measures included in the SAA to take into account the EU accession of Croatia – 
something that Bosnia and Herzegovina had delayed for over three years, and that was finally 
resolved in the first half of 2016. Despite protests from Republika Srpska, the full results of 
the 2013 census were also published by the legal deadline of 1
st
 July, after certification by 
Eurostat. Given the (almost unexpected) progress on all fronts, on 20 September 2016 the EU 
Council decided to take into consideration Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU membership 
application, and to task the EU Commission to prepare its opinion (Avis) on whether the 
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country sufficiently fulfils the political criteria for membership in order to open accession 
negotiations.
536
  The illegal referendum held in Republika Srpska on 26 September 2016
537
 
did not manage to spoil the atmosphere of optimism, and led to targeted U.S. sanctions being 
imposed on Milorad Dodik in January 2017.
 538
  On 9 December 2016, Commissioner Hahn in 
Sarajevo presented to the Chairman of the BiH Council of Ministers, Denis Zvizdić, the 3242-
question Questionnaire – a first challenge for the newly set-up coordination mechanism to 
crunch. After a laborious consensus-building process, replies are expected in early 2018.
539
   
 
4. Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed the genesis and developments of the interactions between the EU and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The basic social and political characteristics of today’s Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were presented and explored in relation to the country’s Constitution as an 
Annex to the Dayton Peace Accords, with its mix of territorial federalism and ethnic power-
sharing provisions. State building was used as a strategy of peace building in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,  reinforced by the embedding of international organisations in the post-conflict 
order, in particular through the executive powers afforded to the Office of the High 
Representative for the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton accords, which 
allowed the post-war development from a loose confederation into a federal form, albeit 
dysfunctional. The chapter also discussed the multiple and ongoing transitions (to democracy, 
                                                 
536
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market economy, statehood, peace, shared rule and finally self rule) that make Bosnia and 
Herzegovina the country in the region with the most layers of complexity in governance. It 
then analysed Bosnia and Herzegovina through the prism of the notion of state contestation, 
which is central to the dissertation. Bosnia and Herzegovina is different from most other such 
cases, since contested statehood has internal roots: it stems from the simultaneous presence of 
a complex federal and consociational structure, and of sub-state centrifugal tendencies 
coupled with direct intervention by international actors with executive powers. The chapter 
also looked at the Dayton institutional framework under the lenses of the two main theories of 
power-sharing, the consociational and integrative models. Bosnia and Herzegovina appears as 
a hybrid case in which elements from both models are present, though in an unresolved and 
often contradictory way.  
The second part of the chapter then investigated the interactions between the EU and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina over time, highlighting in particular how the EU struggled to adapt its 
approach to the specific Bosnian post-conflict context and to reach the helm of the 
international presence in the country. Due to the interference of standard notions of state 
building, and remaining in the shadow of the international High Representative, the EU got 
twice stuck in cycles of mismanaged conditionality, in the case of the police reform process 
(2005-2008) and of the Sejdić-Finci constitutional reform process (2008-2014). The shift 
towards a streamlined EU presence and the rescheduling of conditionality with the “new 
approach” to Bosnia and Herzegovina in late 2014 led to a rebalanced conditionality and a 
different standing of the EU in the country, which enabled the re-opening of the EU path in 
the 2014-2016 period, also highlighting the consolidation of a strategy of member state 
building as stateness-aware enlargement, or enlargement-specific state-building.  
As such, member state building is interested in strengthening the administrative functions 
required for a future EU member state to take part in the EU processes of decision-making 
179 
 
and policy-implementation, rather than at strengthening state structures per se. Secondly, 
member state building is limited in scope by the perimeter of the requirements of the EU 
acquis, in order to preserve the legitimacy of its prescriptions, and open to locally-negotiated 
solutions that may be compatibile with the acquis, rather than prescribing top-down solutions 
and “best practices”. Finally, member state building is encompassing in levels, as it does not 
only address the state level, in a centralisation effort, but beign agnostic on the domestic 
distribution of competences among levels of governance it recognises and works together 
with sub-state authorities to ensure that the functions required from a future EU member state 
may be adequately performed in compliance with the local conditions.  
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III. The Structured Dialogue on Justice: Building 
Consensus to Restore Legitimacy  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter delves into the first case study of the dissertation, by looking at the proceedings 
of the EU/BiH Structured Dialogue on Justice, an exercise of political dialogue aimed at  
legitimacy-building. The Structured Dialogue on Justice is a bilateral exercise between the 
EU and Bosnian authorities that has taken place since 2011. It involves routine meetings 
between national and European civil servants, and includes two plenaries and a dozen 
thematic meetings per year. The latter are open to representatives of lawyers’ and magistrates’ 
professional organisations, and in two cases also to civil society and NGOs. It is a forum with 
both transgovernmental and deliberative characteristics,
540
 as it brings together representatives 
                                                 
540 Transgovernmental cooperation implies “direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are 
not controlled or closely guided by the policies of cabinets or chief executives of those governments.” 
Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge 1974, p. 43.  
Deliberation refers to “an approach to decision-making in which citizens consider relevant facts from multiple 
points of view, converse with one another to think critically about options before them and enlarge their 
perspectives, opinions, and understandings”. FAQ of the Deliberative Democracy Consortium, online.   
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with different legitimacy, and it seeks to foster consensus at domestic level to get Bosnia to 
“speak with one single voice” to the EU.541  
The Structured Dialogue is an example of the EU’s member state building approach, aimed at 
legitimacy-building, i.e. restoring state legitimacy from without. This is being done through a 
strategy of “governance by dialogues”, introducing in the context of EU enlargement some 
instruments mixing the tradition of political dialogues with third countries with the 
deliberative settings typical of e.g. comitology and governance networks. The Dialogue 
provided an avenue for actors from different levels of authorities in Bosnia to discuss sectoral 
policies in the presence of societal stakeholders as well as of international actors, the EU, as 
an agenda-setter. It thus reproduced some deliberative and consensus-seeking features of 
intra-EU tools, all the more since it was later expanded in terms of subjects (e.g. the fight 
against corruption) and of stakeholders included (civil society organisations also invited). 
The chapter traces the development of the Structured Dialogue on Justice in chronological 
order, starting with its launch in the context of the 2011 RS referendum threat, its 
development between 2012 and 2014, the broadening of the dialogue agenda after the 2014 
protests, and finally the impact of the entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement in 2015. The conclusions of the chapter resume some of the elements of interest of 
the Structured Dialogue on Justice as an example of governance by dialogue and deliberation 
in EU external policies, and even more as an example of consensus-building mechanisms 
aimed at restoring legitimacy of domestic institutions, within a member state building 
approach.  
 
                                                 
541
 Interviews with officers at the EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with members of NGOs 
involved in the Structured Dialogue. Sarajevo, November/December 2014. 
182 
 
1. The 2011 RS referendum threat and the launch of the 
Structured Dialogue on Justice 
The instrument of political dialogue is a typical tool of EU external relations, usually 
included in association or cooperation agreements.
542
 Political dialogue, as an exercise to 
foster domestic consensus on EU-related reforms without direct intervention in domestic 
politics, is another instance of member state building in the EU enlargement policy.
543
 
A political dialogue on issues of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) had already been 
proposed by the European commission to Bosnia’s authorities after the signature of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2008. Since the agreement could not enter 
into force, and the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related matters did not cover 
justice issues, the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina did not have a formal venue of discussion 
on the issue. An informal political dialogue on justice was thus proposed in order to start talks 
earlier and advance on the topic.
544
 The format of the meeting, that follows the technical 
subcommittees of the interim agreement, was chosen in the words of one of the EU officials 
involved as a way to “impose ownership” and move away from the custom of no 
accountability of Bosnian political actors for reforms imposed by the High Representative. 
                                                 
542
 The European Council of Essen in 1994 introduced the form of the “structured dialogue” in EU enlargement 
policy at as a way to oversee the preparation of Central and Eastern European countries to implement the 
Copenhagen criteria, particularly concerning issues of foreign policy and of justice and home affairs. 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Essen, 9-10 December 1994.  
Galičić, Drino. “EU conditionality and governance complexities in the Western Balkans: Towards mutual 
accommodation or maintaining the status quo?” PhD thesis, University of Graz, 2014, 180-181. 
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 See for instance the High Level Accession Dialogues in Macedonia, as well as the mediation efforts that have 
led to the April 2013 agreement on the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. 
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 Interview with Osman Topcagic, Director of the EU unit at the BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sarajevo, 11 
December 2014.  
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Technicalisation was chosen as a purposeful way to depoliticise what were deemed hot issues 
and foster consensus.
545
 
The idea of a forum of political dialogue between the EU and Bosnia’s authorities 
became topical in 2011, when it was re-launched as an exit strategy from the political crisis 
looming over the country. On 13 April 2011, the National Assembly of Republika Srpska 
(RS) decided to hold a referendum to ask voters whether they supported the legitimacy of the 
state courts and the powers of the High Representative. The aim was to curtail the authority of 
the state’s Constitutional Court as an interpreter of the Constitution derived from the Dayton 
agreements, as well as those of state-level judicial institutions (including the Court of BiH, 
established in 2003) within the borders of RS, as they were perceived as biased against 
Bosnian Serbs and the RS entity.  
The poll immediately appeared extremely risky,
546
 so much that the international High 
Representative, Valentin Inzko, defined it as the “most serious challenge” to the stability of 
Bosnia as envisioned by the 1995 Dayton Accords. In fact, the likely “no” outcome would 
have laid bare the illegitimacy of the OHR’s “Bonn powers” and of the highest state-level 
Court in the eyes of the population of one of the two entities. Moreover, it would have seemed 
paradoxical if the OHR had reacted simply by barring the referendum from being held 
through his Bonn powers. Such a course of action would have confirmed exactly what the 
organisers of the poll wanted to show: the democratic deficit of the international supervisory 
institutions in Bosnia. The OHR was also probably no longer able to take such a decision, 
                                                 
545
 Interview with an officer at the EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 2014. 
546
 See European Union Delegation to the United Nations – New York, Statement by EU HR Ashton on the 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 April 2011, EU11-144EN;  
European Union Delegation to the United Nations – New York, EU Statement - United Nations Security 
Council: Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9 May 2011, EUUN11-051EN. 
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after its gradual weakening as a result of the long tug-of-war on the police reform from 2005 
to 2008 that had left it drained of political legitimacy.
547
 
The EU condemned the referendum declaration as “a step in the wrong direction”, and 
expressed to the RS leadership “our strong concerns and our expectations that the referendum 
will not be held”.548 Yet it also accepted to inquire the substantial reasons of RS 
dissatisfaction, provided that they were expressed in a procedurally correct way: “while 
concerns related to the functioning of state institutions may be legitimate, they must be 
expressed through appropriate mechanisms; it is clear that only mutually agreed reforms 
would be acceptable”.549 It thus “called on BiH political leaders to engage in a constructive, 
structured political dialogue on legal issues and the judiciary”, while reiterating its support for 
the OHR and for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH.
550
 The head of the European 
External Action Service, Catherine Ashton, flew to Banja Luka on 13 May 2011 and met with 
RS President Milorad Dodik, allowing for a lifting of the referendum threat in exchange for a 
consultation process on justice and home affairs which would have involved the EU and the 
national and local authorities of Bosnia.
551
 “We consider that this dialog will establish 
solutions to these concrete problems and will re-establish this country on the EU path”, 
                                                 
547
 On the issue of the police reform see: Venneri, From International to EU-Driven Statebuilding, 2010;  
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Ashton declared.
552
 The ad interim head of the EU Delegation in Sarajevo, Renzo Daviddi, 
commented that “we’ll talk about issues surroundings appellate proceedings, war crimes and 
retroactive application of certain laws. That does not mean that we agree with all remarks [of 
Dodik]”.553 
The diplomatic solution was and remains highly controversial among Bosnian and 
international observers alike. While it effectively defused the political crisis by calling off the 
referendum,
554
 and thus reinforced the opposition parties in the RS that attacked Dodik for his 
U-turn,
555
 it also seemed to have provided Dodik with the international legitimacy he was 
looking for in his long-term secessionist project. Still in October 2014, the former HR Paddy 
Ashdown at a debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina at the House of Lords decried how:  
The noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, was even persuaded by her advisers to 
go to visit Milorad Dodik as though he was the head of a state, not the head 
of an entity, and sit down with him when, on his table, there was a map and 
flag of Republika Srpska and the flag of the European Union, but no flag for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. You could not give a clearer example that the 
European Union was not interested in the state.
556
  
Ashdown’s interventionist approach as an HR, though, had been pointed out as one of the 
factors having earlier led the EU to the showdown on the police reform in 2005-2008 and 
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having irreversibly alienated RS authorities.
557
 As expressed by a communication website 
funded by the RS,  
The main reason the Structured Dialogue is necessary is that BiH’s judicial 
system, which was imposed on BiH by a succession of High 
Representatives, entrenches OHR’s political authority over the judiciary, 
contravenes the rule of law, and otherwise fails to meet EU and other 
international standards for judicial institutions. The High Representative has 
dominated the judiciary by, among other methods, directly and indirectly 
dictating the outcome of court proceedings and displacing the lawful 
authority of courts. A High Representative’s decree even forbids any 
judicial proceeding that “takes issue in any way whatsoever” with his 
decisions.
558
 
On a more positive note, the engagement of Catherine Ashton with RS authorities also 
meant that for the first time, and after a long delay, the EU had to pay due consideration to the 
multi-level nature of the Bosnian polity, laying the ground for the subsequent debate on the 
need for a coordination mechanism among different Bosnian administrative levels charged 
with EU-related competences.
559
  
Overall, the use of a tool of political dialogue to defuse a referendum crisis may be seen 
as yet another instance of depoliticisation through technicalisation, and a transfer in the EU 
external action of what are daily strategies of domestic governance. The methodology of the 
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dialogue included a relevant role for EU actors in a domestic process of consensus building 
on the reform of the justice sector. Besides issuing recommendations at the end of each 
meeting, the EU would set the agenda of the meetings, which domestic participants would 
have to accept at least two weeks earlier and provide an agreed list of participants as well as a 
position paper on the progress made on the implementation of recommendations.
560
 Thus, the 
EU would “support the identification of necessary institutional and legislative reforms”,561 
while leaving to domestic authorities the ownership over the process. At the same time, the 
dialogue remained based on the consensus on the need to proceed to coordination with EU 
and domestic consultation before any amendment to key judicial legislation is put into 
procedure at any level, to ensure consistency in the overall judicial architecture. 
 
2. The first meeting of the Structured Dialogue: demining the 
Bosnian judiciary 
The first session of the Structured Dialogue on Justice was held in Banja Luka, the de 
facto capital of RS, on 6-7 June 2011, formally opened by Štefan F le, EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement, who defined it as “an important platform” that “the EU is offering to the 
authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, and “an opportunity that cannot be missed”.562 The 
Dialogue was included in the framework of the EU/BiH Stabilisation and Association Process 
(SAP), in parallel to the sectoral cooperation in place under the SAA’s Interim Agreement, 
                                                 
560
 European Union Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Recommendations from the European Commission, 
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and it was presented as an anticipation of future accession negotiations: a “challenging 
process, which all candidate countries had to face during their European integration process in 
the light of the political Copenhagen criteria for accession”, with the objective of “the 
consolidation of the rule of law and the establishment of an independent, effective, impartial 
and accountable judicial system across the whole country to the benefit of every citizen”, and 
“with a view to making the whole system of Bosnia and Herzegovina compatible with 
European standards and rules”.563 In his opening speech, Füle defined the consolidation of the 
rule of law and of the judicial system as “one of the most challenging fields in the future 
negotiations for EU memberships”, linking it to the EU’s ‘renewed consensus on 
enlargement’ with its frontloading of the accession negotiation chapters 23 and 24. In F le’s 
words, “the very good news is that the main principles and basic requirements are 
unambiguous and they do not leave grounds for conflicting interpretations or opting out”. The 
dialogue was thus presented as acquis-anchored, linked to “necessary and fundamental” 
principles and “non-derogable rights” that EU member states cannot afford to question and 
whose “instability or uncertainty” is not acceptable. Specifically, although stressing the 
domestic need for ownership of the reforms and that “the ultimate responsibility ... lies in the 
hands of those who have been democratically elected”, F le did not refrain from setting clear 
limits to the extent of the subject matters, by expressing that “the EU strongly supports” the 
domestic judicial institutions (the Court of BiH, the state-level Prosecutor’s Office, and the 
High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, HJPC) and that it is “crucial that their existence is no 
longer questioned and any debate on their functioning is mindful of their role”. At the same 
time, demonstrating to have learned from the failure of the one-size-fits-all approach to the 
police reform, Füle acknowledged that “there is no single EU model” and that “the optimal 
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arrangement is the responsibility of competent authorities” in BiH.564 Rather, those technical 
solutions “shall attract the necessary political consensus and be promptly translated into 
adequate reforms”.565 
The approach of the Structured Dialogue was embraced by the RS leadership, which 
considered to have found in the EU a different approach from the perceived unitarist/centralist 
vision of the OHR.
566
 The Structured Dialogue was deemed “a vitally important opportunity 
to align [BiH’s] judicial institutions with EU standards”, which “will not be quick or easy, but 
it has the potential to help dramatically reform the badly broken judicial system imposed by 
the High Representative”.567 
The first set of preliminary recommendations set by the European Commission at the end 
of the first dialogue session touched upon the Justice Sector Reform Strategy (JSRS), the 
National War Crimes Strategy (NWCS), the coordination of domestic competences, equal 
access of citizens to justice, and the justice sector budget. It envisaged further discussions on 
an appellate system for the state-level Court of BiH,  the resolution of the backlog of cases, 
and the harmonisation of domestic legislation across different levels, mindful of the 
respective competences of the territorial units. The Commission also handed in to the BiH 
Minister of Justice a request for technical information,
568
 which the Bosnian authorities 
submitted in the early autumn. 
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3. The Structured Dialogue on Justice from 2012 to 2014 
The Structured Dialogue held most of its meetings in the 2012-2014 periods, with five 
plenary sessions whose agenda touched upon the technical issues at stake in the justice sector 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, focusing in particular on two issues: the draft law on the Courts, 
and the draft law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC). Its work was 
complemented by the input of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission that in the same 
period issued three different opinions on legal matters concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The interaction and frequent reference to Council of Europe documents speaks of a growing 
architecture of inter-institutional cooperation in JHA matters, differently from the parallel 
exercise of the Sejdić–Finci talks.  
The second session of the Structured Dialogue took place in Sarajevo on 10-11 
November 2011. The range of substantial topics under discussion, as evident from the 
Commission’s recommendations, had mushroomed from five to twenty-two, touching upon 
issues as different as the backlog of unpaid utility bills, the introduction of free legal aid, and 
the infrastructures and administration of the prison system.
569
 The Commission found it 
particularly troubling that the National War Crimes strategy was stalling,
570
 and was 
concerned by the lack of progress on the reform of the appellate system at the Court of BiH, 
expecting that the 2008 proposal be put into Parliamentary procedure. It also supported the 
phasing out of international staff with executive powers from the Court of BiH and the 
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Prosecutor’s Office in line with the principle of ownership – something that was welcomed by 
RS authorities.
571
 
In June 2012 the Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through 
Law (Venice Commission) delivered its Opinion No. 648/2011 on Legal Certainty and the 
Independence of the Judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it had been requested by the 
European Commission in October 2011.
572
 The Venice Commission recognised Bosnia’s 
legal and judicial system as “the most complex and decentralised federal system among 
European countries today” (§29), due to the divergence among the four different and separate 
legal, judicial and prosecutorial systems which – although “a natural result of living in a 
federal system” (§34) – produces “discrepancies and inconsistencies in virtually all areas of 
the legal system” (§36), undermining legal certainty and the equal treatment of all citizens 
(§57). Countering “excessive decentralisation of the legal orders” (§45) was thus deemed 
“important for the country if it intends to be able to apply the acquis communautaire” (§46). 
To tackle the lack of consistency in BiH’s legal order, the Venice Commission recommended 
to couple top-down strategies of harmonisation with bottom-up elements of informal 
cooperation, for instance through a “Joint co-ordination panel” gathering the heads of all four 
high judicial institutions and continuing the existing informal inter-court cooperation, while 
waiting for a constitutional reform necessary to establish a Supreme Court of BiH in the long 
run (§66-67). The Venice Commission also recommended clarifying the scope of 
competences and jurisdiction of the state-level courts (the Constitutional Court and the Court 
of BiH), which remained a point of controversy between the RS and the state institutions, to 
prevent any doubt of arbitrariness (§55-56), as well as to establish a separate Court of Appeal 
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to increase the independence of the appeal procedure (§62). For what concerns the 
independence of the judiciary, the Venice Commission positively assesses the role and work 
of the HJPC, established in 2004 under a competence transfer agreement between the Entities, 
although it found it could be improved by creating two sub-councils, for judges and 
prosecutors respectively, and countering the fragmentation of sector financing (§82-98). 
The third meeting of the Structured Dialogue on Justice was held in Mostar on 5-6 July 
2012. The Commission’s recommendations, touching upon 17 substantial topics, 
acknowledged some positive developments, e.g. on the agreed interpretation of the criteria for 
the referral of war crime investigations from the State to the Entities and Brčko jurisdictions, 
as well as on the resolution of the backlog of cases. It also expressed concerns at delays, as in 
the signature of the Protocol on exchange of information and evidence in war crime cases 
between the state Prosecutors of Bosnia and of Serbia, and in the alignment of the RS Law on 
Courts with HJPC Law.
573
 
One issue highlighting the possible drawbacks of a transgovernmental and deliberative 
process such as the Structured Dialogue on Justice emerged in 2012 and concerned the new 
RS Law on Courts. In the recommendations following the second meeting of the Dialogue, 
the Commission stated that it “expects the RS Ministry of Justice to continue its close 
coordination with the HJPC in relation to the draft Law on Courts of Republika Srpska; 
expects that the Law shall be mindful of the independence of the judiciary and fully coherent 
with the prerogatives and recommendations of the HJPC”. The issue concerned the 
mechanism for the election of the judges from RS at the HJPC, that the RS draft Law on 
Courts intended to modify, but which in so doing would have created a conflict of 
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competences with the state-level Law on the HJPC already regulating the matter. According 
to the DPC think tank, “the [RS] law was clearly aimed at undermining the independence of 
the judiciary in the entity and undermining the authority of one of the most important central 
state level institutions and a cornerstone of EU-supported post-war judicial reform”, the 
HJPC. “The law was assessed by the HJPC as delivering a death-blow to judicial reform. In 
addition, the HJPC qualified some provisions of the  RS law ‘illegal’. The law drew resistance 
from judges and prosecutors state-wide, including from within the RS, despite heavy political 
pressure there”.574 The compromise, found in the framework of the dialogue, foresaw to 
include a more detailed article in the state-level Law on the HJPC, which was undergoing 
revision at the same time. This was assessed very negatively by the same DPC observers, who 
dubbed it “a slap in the face of brave local officials who had stood up to defend judicial 
independence”.575 At the third meeting of the Structured Dialogue in July 2012, the 
Commission positively assessed the compromise reached, yet lamented the delay in its 
legislative implementation.
576
 Subsequently, at its fourth meeting in April 2013, it welcomed 
the adoption in first reading of the amendments and put it forward as one first example of 
consensual solutions reached in the framework of the Structured Dialogue.
577
 Yet, Dodik 
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576
 (§10) “On the full alignment of the Law on Courts of Republika Srpska (RS) with relevant HJPC 
recommendations, the European Commission: acknowledges that high level agreement to align the Law on 
Courts of RS with HJPC Law was reached. Notes with concern that such agreement was not translated into 
adequate legislative amendments, and that communication between the RS Ministry of Justice and HJPC was 
not fruitful. Calls upon the HJPC and RS Ministry of Justice to jointly define, without further delays, the 
concrete legislative text that reflects their agreement on the principle and that will be drafted in the form of 
amendments to the RS Law on Courts by the RS Ministry of Justice.”  
577 “12. On full alignment of the RS Law on Courts with relevant HJPC recommendations, the European 
Commission: Welcomes the adoption of the amendments to the RS Law on Courts by the RS Government 
and the subsequent adoption by the RS National Assembly in first reading. Expects the completion of the 
process as a matter of urgency. Congratulates all relevant institutions involved in this process for their 
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backtracked from the deal, asking the RS PM Zeljka Cvijanovic to oppose it. At the following 
fifth meeting in November 2013, the Commission found the impasse “extremely 
disappointing” and asked the RS authorities to reinstate the agreed amendments in the 
legislative procedure,
578
 but to no avail. According to an EU official, the RS leadership did 
not want to provide the EU with a first success in the dialogue with the RS to showcase.
579
 
The issue then fell off the agenda of the following meetings of the Structured Dialogue and 
remained in stand-by. Although in itself quite trivial, the issue aptly highlights the risks of a 
depoliticised, deliberative and transgovernmental approach such as that of the Structured 
Dialogue. Such a setting, although useful to avoid the spillover of political issues over 
technical/juridical ones, remains obscure to the main part of the population and might give 
rise to feelings of “backroom deals” and lack of accountability. All the more in a context such 
as the Bosnian one, in which the European Union may be accused of caving in to RS 
pressures and not being able to keep the bar straight as the OHR used to.  
The fourth meeting of the Structured Dialogue on Justice was held in Brčko on 8-9 April 
2013. Among the 14 substantial points of its Recommendations, the Commission stressed the 
need to achieve concrete results by finalising the draft laws under discussion (the Laws on 
Courts and the Law on the HJPC) and putting them in parliamentary procedure, following an 
                                                                                                                                                        
constructive role, since they have once more confirmed that clear and open consultations the only possible 
was to resolve differences regarding any piece of legislation that deals with reform of the judiciary, as for all 
other sectors.” 
578 (§3) “On the draft amendments to the RS Law on Courts, the European Commission: Considers the recent 
impasse regarding the adoption of previously agreed amendments to the RS Law on Courts extremely 
disappointing. Requests the RS authorities to reinstate the Proposal for amendments into the procedure in 
view of its final adoption, taking into account the full compliance with HJPC Law defining competences of 
the latter.” 
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opinion of the Venice Commission.
580
 The Commission also agreed to the BiH requests for 
budgetary support to the justice system through IPA funds 2012-2013, while underlining its 
exceptional and temporary nature, aimed at reducing the backlog of cases on war crimes 
processing, and conditioned upon the adoption of Action Plans for the implementation of the 
National War Crimes Strategy (NWCS). Finally, the meeting saw the launch of the works to 
prepare the next Justice Sector Reform Strategy (JSRS) 2014-2018 and its Action Plan, a 
condition for the disbursement of IPA funds under sector budget support. 
In June 2013 the Venice Commission delivered its Opinion No. 723/2013 on the Draft 
Law on the Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it had been requested by the BiH 
Ministry of Justice in April 2013.
581
 The opinion analysed the draft law dealing with 
amending the Law on the Court of BiH (2000) and setting up a separate High Court of BiH in 
order to increase the independence of the appeal mechanism. The Venice Commission was 
particularly worried by the compatibility of the draft law with the law on the HJPC, and 
highlighted several issues which seemed to encroach upon the independence of the judiciary, 
starting from the selection of the judges following a criteria of ethnic proportionality, deemed 
“highly problematic” since “the judiciary is not a representative institution” (§21) and 
“organising courts along ethnic lines would be wrong, counterproductive and damaging” 
(§22). Civil liability of judges and the centralisation of evaluation procedures in the hands of 
the Court President, and the wide involvement of the Ministry of Justice, including in 
financial issues, were also deemed as potentially threatening judicial independence. On the 
issue of the criminal jurisdiction of the Court of BiH, already controversial in the past and 
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subject to appeal to the Constitutional Court in 2009 (Zivkovic, U 16/08, 28 March 2009), the 
Venice Commission recalled the “consensus on the need to revise the wording” of art. 15, 
found at the third meeting of the Structured Dialogue, and recommended further clarifications 
of art.15(2) to avoid room for discretion at risk of breaching the principle of legal certainty 
(§38-43). It also recommended that the High Court act as a single last instance, without 
further appeal mechanisms (§52), and that it decides disputes, with binding legal 
consequences, rather than giving opinions (§53).  
The following month, in July 2013, the EU and BiH held the fifth meeting of the 
Structured Dialogue on Justice in the form of a first thematic plenary dedicated to the reform 
of the state level judiciary. In its final Recommendations, the Commission positively assessed 
the redrafting of the Draft Law on the Courts following the recommendations of the Venice 
Commission’s opinion, though highlighting the persistence of some residual open issues. It 
took note of a consensus on the key principles of the reform, i.e., the clear determination of 
the circumstances for the extended criminal jurisdiction of the state level judiciary, to be 
maintained, as well as the configuration of a system with a first instance and a new appellate 
state court. Concerning the draft amendments to the HJPC Law, the Commission expressed 
preoccupation about the preservation of the prerogatives and competencies of the HJPC, 
especially concerning the access to judicial careers, the appointment of judges and 
prosecutors, and the prevention of conflicts of interest, and thus invited the Ministry of Justice 
to launch a wide consultation and ask for an opinion of the Venice Commission before going 
forward with the legislative revision.  
On 18 June, the ECtHR dealt a blow to the practices of the Court of BiH, helding it in 
violation of the Convention that the appellants, Maktouf and Damjanovic, had been tried and 
sentenced for war crimes following the 2003 BiH Criminal Code rather than the Yugoslav 
one, in breach of the principle of irretroactivity of criminal law (nulla poena sine lege). The 
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EU Delegation highlighted that “war crimes processing needs to continue …. The issue 
should not be politicised …. Consistency in the application of criminal law is a crucial feature 
of this endeavour”.582 The incident, which led also to the release of several convicted war 
criminals, bolstered the idea of strengthening the collaboration between BiH’s courts in order 
to harmonize their practices, in the absence of a state-level Supreme Court, towards the 
establishment of a joint panel of the presidents of the highest courts of the different legal 
systems of the country (state-level, entity-level, and Brčko District), as originally suggested at 
the June 2012 Mostar session of the Dialogue.
583
 The issue of equal treatment before the law 
had been on the table since the start of the Dialogue, and had been one of the original 
justifications for Dodik to call a referendum on state courts. 
The sixth plenary meeting of the Structured Dialogue on Justice was held in Banja Luka 
on 11-12 November 2013. The Commission recommendations, in six substantial points, 
highlight the main point of debate, staying clear of minor issues. On the Maktouf-Damjanovic 
issue, the Commission recommended caution in the implementation of the ECtHR ruling, 
restating the need to proceed establishing “an effective Joint Panel of highest judiciary 
instances”, under HJPC lead, to advice for the harmonisation of court practices in the 
application of criminal law to the processing of war crimes. It recommended that the 
consolidated text of the Draft Law on the Courts of BiH is submitted in parliamentary 
procedure, in order to gather a wide consensus and achieve its adoption before October 2014 
elections. The Commission was also disappointed at the withdrawal of the draft amendments 
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to the RS Law on Courts, and worried about the proposed amendments to the HJPC Law, for 
which it recommended an opinion of the Venice Commission. 
The Opinion of the Venice Commission on the Draft Law on the HJPC (No. 712/2013) 
arrived in March 2014.
584
 The Venice Commission was particularly concerned with the risks 
of politicisation and of undue interference in the independence of the judiciary that might 
have stemmed from an excessive involvement of the legislative in the appointment of HJPC 
members, from providing the Parliamentary Assembly with the power to dismiss the HJPC’s 
members and Presidents, and from the introduction of ethnic quotas, as well as from a 
downward transfer of competences to the Entities in the appointment of prosecutors (§126). 
The HJPC had been established as a single, state-level council for judges and prosecutors, 
with the task to ensure its independence, impartiality and professionality. Although not 
explicitly foreseen in the Constitution, the HJPC was set-up in 2004 by a law based on a 
Transfer Agreement with which the entities delegate such task to the state-level institutions.
585
 
Its compliance with the BiH Constitution was confirmed in 2009 (case No. U 11/08). 
Although its establishment was assessed positively by the EU, the Venice Commission, and 
the BiH judiciary, the HJPC in its first decade of work suffered from several weaknesses, 
from the vulnerability of the selection procedure for its members and for the judiciary 
(lacking a mandatory written exam and national pool of vacancies), to being shared between 
judges and prosecutors, and the limited scope of competences of the body, unable to push for 
more radical reforms, including of the financing of the justice system, or to fix the backlog of 
cases (§11). Few amendments had been proposed, some of which had already been assessed 
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by the Venice Commission in its 2012 Opinion. The final set of amendments, though, was 
presented in December 2012 and “sought to strengthen the influence of the legislative and 
executive powers” over the HJPC (§13), thus being opposed by the associations of judicial 
professionals. To reconcile the proposals of the parties and of the judicial institutions, the BiH 
Ministry of Justice put forward a new Draft Law in 2014. The Venice Commission considered 
it as “a very complex and comprehensive instrument seeking to regulate all aspects of the 
functioning of the HJPC …. carefully drafted and seek[ing] to take into account international 
standards” (§19). The solution to the shortcomings highlighted by the Venice Commission in 
2012, though, was often just a comeback to the 2004 text. The Venice Commission endorsed 
the principle of sub-division of the HJPC in two sub-council, one for the judges and one for 
the prosecutors, with the maximum amount of autonomy. Meawhile, it acknowledged the 
need for the HJPC to remain a single and uniform body in accordance with the 2004 
competence Transfer Agreement. It considered the compromise reached “a balanced solution” 
(§61), “appropriate” to BiH’s “particular context” (§64) to ensure that judges and prosecutors 
cannot outvote the other group in appointments and disciplinary proceedings. Besides 
pleading for an explicit mention of the HJPC within BiH’s Constitution in the longer term 
(§24), the Venice Commission highlighted several points of concerns. As regards the 
selection of the HJPC members, it recalled that “the judiciary should not be organised along 
ethnic lines” (§32), and that the provision calling for at least six representatives for each 
Constitutive People, as well as for gender equality, in a country the size of BiH, would make 
their selection “very difficult and inflexible” (§32), penalise their merits, and “undermine the 
effective functioning of the system” (§35). Moreover, the Venice Commission pointed out 
several avenues through which the proposed system would have risked encroaching on the 
separation of powers and put the judiciary at risk of politicisation. In fact, the Draft also 
foresaw the possibility for the Parliamentary Assembly to remove the HJPC Presidency or 
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one of its members in case of negative assessment over its annual report – a provision that the 
Venice Commission deemed “clearly problematic” and that “should be deleted” (§72). The 
same was true for the election and dismissal of the HJPC’s President and Vice-Presidents 
which, the Venice Commission reminded, should not be based on ethnic criteria and whose 
election “should not be left to the Parliamentary Assembly” (§47).  
 
4. The broadening of the dialogue agenda after the 2014 protests  
The early months of 2014 also saw the onset of popular mobilisation in Bosnia, 
particularly in the Federation entity, against the precarious socio-economic conditions of the 
main part of the population and especially high rates of youth unemployment. The civic 
protest, which in 2013 had been peacefully embodied by the JMBG/bebolucija movement, 
turned instead violent in February 2014, when several buildings of the cantonal 
administrations – taken as a symbol of the wastefulness, redundancy, and corruption of BiH’s 
political system – were torched in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica and Mostar, and several cantonal 
administrations resigned as a consequence. The protestors then organised in city-based 
plenums, which took different trajectories and overall subsided by the summer. At the same 
time, the final rounds of the process of constitutional reform negotiations finally ended 
without an agreement. The EU thus found itself in a double crisis – let down by political elites 
unable to reach a compromise, and provoked by a mass popular movement that risked 
threatening the overall stability of the country. On 7 March, the EU delegation met with civil 
society organisations, that pleaded “to make the Structured Dialogue on Justice process more 
transparent and efficient”, by having it transform into a “Structured Dialogue on the Rule of 
Law”, dealing also with gender equality and the fight against corruption, organised, crime, 
discrimination, and hate speech. CSOs also pleaded for their own involvement, claiming that 
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the dialogue had shown only limited results since it “lack[s] the third critical party – BH civil 
society”, and positing themselves as an alternative way to reach out and represent the BiH 
citizens’, beyond those political elites whose lack of will to reach compromise solutions to 
outstanding issues had become more than apparent.
586
 The European Council, on the initiative 
of Commissioner Füle, responded by adopting its April 2014 Conclusions in which it declares 
to have “heard the public protests and calls by BiH citizens”, and “urges the BiH institutions 
and elected leaders to reach out to the people … and provide responsible and immediate 
answers to their legitimate concerns” (§3). Then, among the other actions of repositioning the 
main EU priority in Bosnia on socio-economic issues, the Council also declared to “support 
broadening the Structured Dialogue on Justice to other rule of law issues, and in particular to 
anticorruption issues” (§5).587 
Two weeks later, the Structured Dialogue reconvened in Brussels for a thematic plenary 
session, its seventh, of feedback on the main issues at stake on judicial reform.
588
 Yet, the EU 
decision to broaden the agenda of the dialogue to other rule of law issues was not welcomed 
by all Bosnian actors. The thematic session was not attended by the representatives from 
Republika Srpska at the Justice Ministry and at the Directorate for European Integration,
589
 
who objected to the introduction of talks on anticorruption, and the cooperation between 
police and prosecutors, fearing that it would have meant a comeback to the debate on police 
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reform already closed in 2009. RS representatives complained of the delays in the 
reorganisation of the HJPC as well as in the debate on the removal of international judges 
from the Constitutional Court. They called for a comeback to the original mandate, focusing 
on faster resolution of the cases of alleged war crimes committed against Bosnian Serbs.
590
  
The three points of the European Commission’s Recommendations focus on the draft 
Law on the HJPC, the Justice Sector Reform Strategy (JSRS) 2014-2018, and the revised 
draft Law on Courts of BiH. The Commission recalled that the draft Law on the HJPC needed 
to undergo a thorough debate and to follow the conclusions of the December 2012 TAIEX 
expert seminar, to prevent overexposure of the judiciary to political pressures. It also 
reminded that even in the lack of a single model in Europe, cherry-picking and 
decontextualisations were to be avoided, since “when it comes to recently formed democratic 
states, the system of formal guarantees for the independence of the judiciary has to be 
possibly more rigorous” (§1). It thus advocated reviewing the draft law to include the 
recommendations of the Venice Commission, and to ensure the harmonisation of the RS Law 
on Courts with the BiH Law on the HJPC. The Commission also recalled the need to proceed 
with the adoption of the 2014-2018 JSRS as a condition for the disboursement of IPA funds, 
and recommended to start the legislative procedure for the draft Law on Courts, making sure 
to achieve “the widest and most consensual political support” (§3) while following the 
principle of maintaining the extended jurisdiction of state-level judiciary through clarifying in 
an objective way its criteria of application, as suggested by the Venice Commission in its 
Opinion No. 723/2013. 
The structured Dialogue also held a plenary meeting, its eight, on 13-14 May 2014 in 
Sarajevo, following the broadened agenda called for by the April EU Council Conclusions, 
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thus including also other rule of law issues such as “anti-corruption; anti-discrimination; 
prevention of conflict of interest; measures to strengthen integrity, accountability and 
efficiency of police forces” (§1.2), while maintaining the reform of the judiciary “as the main 
priority of the Structured Dialogue” (§1.5).591 The Commission welcomed progresses in the 
entrenchment of the professionalism of the judiciary (a mandatory written entry exam, and 
systematic structured interviews for applications and promotions). It reiterated the need to 
amend the draft Law on the HJPC to ensure the independence of the judiciary from political 
pressures, taking into account the opinion of the Venice Commission, and invited to process 
the draft law through the Council of Ministers. It also asked the HJPC to provide detailed 
information on the application of extended criminal jurisdiction by the Court of BiH, in terms 
of numbers of cases, types of offenses, overview of the main reasoning, and statistical 
overview of the final outcome, in order to finalise the drafting of the Law on the Courts of 
BiH and to proceed to clarify the criteria for the application of art. 7(2) extended jurisdiction. 
The Commission also recalled the need to reduce the backlog of cases through systemic 
solutions, particular for unpaid utility bills cases, while ensuring a proper handling of war 
crime cases to achieve reconciliation. On the implementation of the National War Crimes 
Strategy (NCSW), it underlined the need to consolidate the process of referral.  
The rule of law issues included under the broadened agenda started to be discussed with 
the need for an inclusive process of preparation of a 2015-2019 new anticorruption strategy. 
The Commission declared that it “shares the concerns expressed by representatives from civil 
society organisations” in the plenary session, as regards the need to start from “a 
comprehensive qualitative analysis of the implementation of the current strategy, a thorough 
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corruption risk assessment, as well as available sector reform” (§6.3). It also welcomed the 
adoption of a new Public Procurement Law, and of the Regulation on Whistleblowers 
Protection. On conflict of interest issues, the Commission recalled the need to monitor 
compliance with international standards and regrets that “in many instances, legislative 
authorities appear to have reversed the efforts towards achieving higher anti-corruption 
standards” (§8.3), as in the area of political parties’ financing, and in the relocation of the 
competence on conflicts of interests from the Central Electoral Commission to the 
Parliamentary Assembly; it also commended the RS for the inclusion of CSOs in the 
implementation of the new anticorruption plan, asking for them to be involved further (§9). 
On anti-discrimination, the Commission welcomed the initiative of the Ministry of Human 
Rights and Refugees to work on a revision of the 2009 Law on Prevention of Discrimination 
(LPD), and suggested that procedural amendments (needed to improve legal certainty) are 
accompanied by substantial amendments to harmonise with the EU acquis on discrimination 
on grounds of disability, age, gender identity and sexual orientation, encouraging the systemic 
and inclusive consultation of CSOs all along the process (§10). The last points of the 
recommendations are devoted to the integrity, accountability, efficiency and coordination of 
the police forces, along with their cooperation with the prosecutors. The Commission 
particularly “stresses that a fully functional security sector, irrelevant of its fragmented nature, 
is a key element for the development and entrenchment of the rule of law, which in turn is 
fundamental for the process of integration into the EU” (§13.2) 
The issue of the extended criminal jurisdiction of the state-level judiciary, as included in 
the last draft of the Law on Courts, was the subject of a TAIEX expert seminar held in July 
2014.
592
 The seminar started from the outcome of a first TAIEX seminar held in 2013, 
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according to which “there is no requirement to limit or expand the current criminal 
jurisdiction of the Court of BiH but to clarify it”.593  The HJPC presented the analytical 
opinion, as requested by the European Commission, on the case law of the Court of BiH 
based on art.7(2), highlighting 22 cases since 2003, lacking a consistent and harmonised 
jurisprudence. The situation in BiH was compared with examples from Belgium, Germany, 
Italy and Switzerland; after bilateral talks with representatives of the Court of BiH, the 
Prosecutor’s Office, Republika Srpska and the OHR, the practitioners defined specific 
recommendations for amendment of art.7(2) in order to “complement the existing draft 
reform with more stringent parameters” to “allow a clear definition of the jurisdiction” and 
“reducing excessive margins of discretionary power”.594 These included the clarification of 
the notion of interrelation between offenses, the limitation of the scope of extended 
jurisdiction only to serious offenses, and a definition of the seriousness of the crime based on 
a threshold of penalty and/or a list of specific offenses (possibly based on the list of European 
Crimes),
595
 together with “specific and objectivised criteria”  to justify state-level 
adjudication: serious and actual damage, interrelated criminal offences in various entities, 
serious criminal offences by organised criminal groups active state-wide. Overall, such set of 
parameters would have allowed to reduce discretion and visibly justify the added value in the 
state-level jurisdiction, avoiding any risk of potential misuse of the measure able to affect 
human rights in individual cases. The experts also recommended the requirement to formally 
provide motivations for art.7(2) investigations, the possibilities for entities to both challenge 
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state-level jurisdiction decisions and to voluntarily give up jurisdiction on specific cases to the 
state level, as well as the set-up of a separate state-level appellate court. 
Another TAIEX expert seminar was held in February 2015 on the issue of conflict of 
interest in the judiciary.
596
 The May 2014 Recommendations of the European Commission 
after the first Structured Dialogue session under the broadened agenda included the request to 
adopt a HJPC Book of Rules on conflict of interest, defining the situations of conflict of 
interests and the actions to be taken, which the HJPC did in the following months based on 
art. 10(2) and 16 of the Law on the HJPC. The HJPC Book of Rules was intended as a first 
step towards establishing a set of rules against conflict of interest valid for the whole state 
judiciary. Yet, soon after and at the 26-27 November session of the HJPC, its members started 
discussing possible amendments and even revocation of the Book of Rules, which “would in 
effect downgrade the Book of Rules and backslide into a vacuum of questionable practices of 
conflict between public and private interests of its members”, according to the 
Commission.
597
 The Commission thus organised the TAIEX seminar, to “assist for an 
effective enforcement of the new rules and to discuss the issue at the level of the entire 
judiciary”.598 The seminar discussed examples from Belgium, Croatia, Germany and Italy; the 
invited experts assessed positively the legal grounds of the Book of Rules as a by-law, and 
recommended it to be included in the text of the future revised Law on the HJPC. The experts 
highlighted that “there is no independent council in Europe that has as much power as the 
HJPC in BiH”, and that thus it “should be more careful to the conflict of interest issue than it 
is necessary in current EU member states. Maximum independence should lead to maximum 
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awareness”.599 Clear rules on integrity and accountability would make up the necessary 
balance to the full independence of the HJPC from the other powers of the state, and prevent 
any reform intended to introduce an overexposure of the judiciary to the legislative or the 
executive. Given the evidence on the existence of conflicts of interests in the BiH judiciary, it 
was recommended that the Book of Rules not be amended to soften it, lest the independence 
of judiciary be put in danger. Rather, such rules should be extended to the whole judiciary, 
and complemented with assets declarations and limits on extrajudicial earnings.  
 
5. The entry into force of the SAA and its impact on the 
Structured Dialogue on Justice 
Following the Anglo-German diplomatic initiative in Autumn 2014, the December 2014 
EU Council Conclusions on BiH, the signature of the Written Commitment to Reforms and its 
adoption by the BiH Parliamentary Assembly, on 16 March 2015 the EU Council decided to 
bring into force as of 1 June 2015 the EU-BiH Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA),
600
 which had been signed in 2008 but had remained frozen since.
601
 The entry into 
force of the SAA also meant the establishment of an EU-BiH SAA Sub-committee on Justice, 
Freedom and Security, meant to cover also the JHA issues dealt with by the Structured 
Dialogue up until that moment. Yet, differently from the Structured Dialogue, the SAA Sub-
committee is a formal venue of bilateral dialogue between EU institutions and candidate 
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country executive representatives, hence not foreseeing the presence of justice professionals 
and civil society organisations in the debate. Yet, since the December 2014 Council 
Conclusions expressly foresaw that “the Reform Agenda should be developed and 
implemented in consultation with civil society”, it was understood that somehow CSOs would 
remain involved in the process.
602
 
One more session of the Structured Dialogue was organised after the entry into force of 
the SAA for 13-14 July 2015. More than one year had lapsed since the last meeting of May 
2014, due to the campaign for the October 2014 political election, and the following period of 
renewal of institutions, with the new governments taking place only in April 2015. And yet, 
the Dialogue format had to be changed at the last moment for the renewed referendum threats 
coming from Republika Srpska, which brought the situation back to the status it had in 2011. 
The Commission services had performed a regular stock-taking mission on 6-7 July 2015, 
meeting with executive representatives as well as practitioners and civil society, and got the 
impression of a growing politicisation of the process from the BiH side.
603
 The following day, 
8 July, with a week of delay on the agreed timetable, the BiH Council of Ministers endorsed 
the working documents and list of participants for the dialogue, but in what was understood 
by the EU as a political game it also decided to change the co-chair for BiH, from the Security 
Ministry Secretary to the Minister of Justice, and entrusting the Ministry of Justice with the 
conduct of the process instead of the Directorate for European Integration. These 
developments only reached the Commission on the afternoon of Friday 10 July; meanwhile, 
the Commission had decided to put on hold the plenary session of the dialogue, given the 
flaws and delays in its preparation process, and to invite instead the four Justice Ministers for 
a meeting on Monday 13 July. The same day, 10 July, the RS Justice Minister Anton 
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Kasipovic announced he would not take part in the upcoming Structured Dialogue meeting, 
due to the lack of establishment of an agreed agenda within two weeks from the meeting, as in 
accordance with the Dialogue methodology. Kasipovic affirmed that the RS government 
remained committed to the Structured Dialogue, while reiterating the opposition of RS 
authorities to the participation of justice professionals and civil society organisations to the 
dialogue, stating that “the reason for the modest result of the dialogue” has to do with “the 
fact that it included a huge number of participants and topics that are not the subject of the 
main purpose of the dialogue”, and that the “enormous difficulties” experienced by the BiH 
judiciary would be better overcome by “hav[ing] the ones accountable for decisions make 
them”.604 On Sunday 12 July, the European Commission confirmed that the plenary session of 
the Structured Dialogue would be put on hold, and that a restricted meeting with the four 
Justice Ministers would instead take place. It also asked for “an urgent engagement with 
respective executive authorities in BiH” in order to “discuss all aspects related to the 
functioning of the Structured Dialogue” as well as “the future establishment of a formal Sub-
Committee on Justice, Home Affairs and Security”.605 
At the ministerial meeting, on Monday 13 July, the Commission reported of a consensus 
“on continuing and intensifying work within the Structured Dialogue on Justice and refocus it 
on the key items”, i.e., the processing of war crime cases and the reform of judiciary 
institutions, while leaving the broader agenda agreed upon in April 2014 (anticorruption, 
antidiscrimination, etc) to the works of the upcoming EU-BiH sub-committee on Justice, 
Home Affairs and Security.
606
 Interviews with EU officers confirmed that the enlarged 
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agenda of the Structured Dialogue, away from the four original priorities agreed with Dodik, 
was increasingly seen as problematic and counter-productive.
607
 According to the Joint 
Statement, “the Structured Dialogue on Justice is place for debate and consensus building to 
develop key reforms needed for the country; however, final decision making lies obviously 
with relevant executive and legislative authorities from BiH”.608 EU officers had informed 
member state representatives in Sarajevo that the process was facing a crisis and a revision 
was needed to ensure its functionality. Two things in particular were noted: that the EU was 
working within the framework of the EU acquis and European standards, including the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and not just with political conditionality; and that 
therefore the EU could assist, facilitate and even mediate among domestic actors, but it would 
not “play a game” and negotiate with them on the substance of the EU acquis.609 The question 
of the relation between decision-makers and non-state actors was discussed but not clearly 
resolved, as the Joint Statement recalls that “ministers shall continue playing a pivotal role in 
the platform, but their work shall be continuously informed by practitioners, academia, and 
international experts”.610 Likewise, participants confirmed the need for the continuous 
involvement of practitioners and civil society organisations to ensure inclusiveness and 
provide valuable input, although formally the engagement of the EU remained with the 
executive and legislative authorities, since they hold the responsibility for legislative 
initiative. A concern was expressed about too in-depth engagement with civil society 
representatives, as blurring the lines of democratic accountability of domestic institutions.
 611
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The upcoming revision of the format of the dialogue, in the context of the establishment of 
the SAA Sub-Committee on Justice, Freedom and Security would therefore need to strike a 
balance between the two.  
Although the RS Minister Kasipovic acted constructively at the Ministerial meeting, and 
supporting the Structured Dialogue process, as recognised by participants from the EU side, 
he was not able to guarantee results on the part of the RS government.
612
 In fact, that very 
day, Kasipovic was also supposed to debrief the RS Parliament on the issue. Yet, at the 
parliamentary debate, the RS President Milorad Dodik showed up and tabled a motion to call 
for mid September a referendum on confidence in the state justice system and in the authority 
of the OHR, which was approved by the majority of the deputies. The wording chosen for the 
poll question, on whether RS citizens support “the unconstitutional and unauthorised laws 
imposed by the High Representative of the international community, especially the laws 
imposed relating to the Court and the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina”,613 
gives a hint on the side taken by the RS leadership on the issue. Justifying the decision to call 
for a referendum, Dodik claimed that the state judiciary was costing “millions” to the RS 
budget while working against its interests, since its war crimes prosecutions mainly targeted 
Bosnian Serbs, and under command responsibility charges rather than for individual 
actions.
614
 Dodik said he was “ready for dialogue on the judiciary and the prosecution in BiH” 
but warned that, in the lack of an agreement, he would “stick to the decision on the 
referendum”. He explicitly mentioned that “the courts and the prosecution are under the direct 
influence of the SDA and Bakir Izetbegovic. We expect the courts to be independent and not 
influenced by Oric and Izetbegovic or British and American embassies”.615  “There can be a 
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court and a prosecutor’s office in the competences of BiH but it cannot be focused only on 
one nation – on Serbs – nor can it take over cases from the RS”.616 He also reiterated previous 
claims on the violation of international law and the Dayton Accords by the High 
Representatives between 2000 and 2005, including the abolition of fiscal competences of the 
entities and the broadening of BiH Council of Ministers from three to ten state-wide 
ministries, and guaranteed that the RS would hold the referendum even if this was to be 
annulled by the Constitutional Court, since such a decision would be “political rather than 
legal”.617   
Several factors may help explaining Dodik’s decision to come back to the referendum he 
had threatened in 2011. First, in electoral term, at the 2014 elections his SNSD party had lost 
the BiH Presidency post for the Bosnian Serbs, and he personally had retained the RS 
Presidency only for a small number of votes. His majority in the RS Parliament was deemed 
scarce, so much that several observers had warned he might lose it by July; moreover, the RS 
was deemed to be facing a severe liquidity crisis by mid September, the date for when the 
referendum was called. By going back to identity politics, Dodik could strengthen his claims 
as ultimate defender of Republika Srpska, divert public attention from socioeconomic issues, 
and embarrass the RS opposition (which in fact decided to abstain from the referendum vote),  
before it proved to be too late for him to muster parliamentary support. Second, in terms of 
relations with the state level, some disturbances in inter-institutional relations were expected 
since Dodik’s party had been expelled from both the BiH Presidency and the BiH government 
coalition by the RS opposition, while remaining in power in both the Presidency and the 
government of Republika Srpska. Resorting to the argument of direct popular legitimacy 
could have been a way for him to restore himself as the unavoidable leader of the Bosnian 
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Serbs. Moreover, allegations had surfaced about financial mismanagement in the RS banking 
sector, linked to cases of corruption and graft. The crack of Banja Luka’s Bobar Banka could 
potentially expose the RS political leadership to investigations by the BiH State Prosecutor – 
against whom, Dodik launched the referendum.
618
  
Finally, in terms of the justice system, things had started to unravel from the month of 
June, in relation of the Naser Oric issue and Srebrenica’s twentieth anniversary. Oric during 
the war had been the commander in Srebrenica of the Armija BiH, the army of the 
internationally recognised Sarajevo-based government. He had later been indicted at the 
ICTY for war crimes allegedly committed against Serb civilians in 1992, and acquitted in 
2008 as not in control of the military unit that had committed the crime, but Serbia and the 
Bosnian Serbs did not accept the verdict and kept considering Oric as a war criminal at large. 
In 2014 Serbia launched an Interpol mandate against Oric, but Bosnia appealed to have it 
suspended. Yet in June 2015 Oric was arrested in Switzerland on another Serbian Interpol 
mandate, just few weeks before the 20
th
 anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica, where he 
is considered as a hero and the ultimate defender by most Bosniaks.
619
  In the following days, 
the BiH Prosecutor’s Office launched an Interpol mandate against Oric too, to override the 
Serbian one.
620
 The Swiss authorities accepted the Bosnian mandate, Oric was extradited to 
Sarajevo and was released in the following days – though he remained under trial in the 
country.  
The use by the Serbia of Interpol mandates for political reasons was not new (in the past, 
prosecutions had been launched against Ejup Ganic and Jovan Divjak). In the heated context 
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of Srebrenica’s 20th anniversary, in which Serbia pushed Russia to issue a veto on a draft UN 
Security Council Resolution on the genocide,
621
 though, the Oric case greatly contributed to 
increase the tensions within Bosnia and with Serbia, which came to surface with the launch of 
object against Serbia’s PM Vucic at the Srebrenica remembrance ceremony in July.622 In 
terms of regional cooperation in justice matters and war crimes prosecution, the malicious use 
of international prosecution instruments by Serbia cancelled all the trust between the state 
prosecutors of the two countries, that in the previous years had demonstrating to be able to 
cooperate efficiently.
623
 As acknowledged by an EU officer, “Serbia killed the [cooperation] 
Protocol and the mechanisms of international cooperation”,624 and in so doing it cast a 
shadow over the whole process of cooperation among prosecutor’s offices of BiH and Serbia, 
providing new arguments for the main opponents of the Structured Dialogue – including the 
President of the Court of BiH. At the same time, the counter-mandate launched by the BiH 
Prosecutor’s Office to ensure the extradition of Oric to Bosnia and Herzegovina rather than to 
Serbia managed to irk the RS leadership, who saw it as the confirmation that the state 
institution, included the judicial ones, responded first and foremost to the main Bosniak 
political leadership, hence providing one more justification to resorting to the referendum 
threat.  
So, while the RS used to be the main interested actor in the Structured Dialogue on 
Justice, and while its Justice Minister assured that the entity remained committed and willing 
to continue debating the issue, in July 2015 Milorad Dodik decided to enact its referendum 
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threat. The understanding in the EU community was that the referendum would be conducted, 
but that its legal effects would have been nihil.
625
 Yet, Dodik’s move found a completely 
negative reception from international actors in BiH and from foreign diplomacies, included 
Serbia. On 13 July, the representatives of the EU, US, UK, France, Germany and Italy 
travelled to Banja Luka to express their concerns about the initiative. In a joint statements, the 
western diplomats affirmed that they “recognise and agree that there are significant problems 
with the court and prosecutorial system in BiH,” but reaffirmed the importance to discuss 
such issues in the framework of the Structured Dialogue on Justice rather than with an 
instrument of direct democracy “with no legal value, on a question which challenges the 
principles of the BiH constitution”, which would prove ineffective and “a waste of money”. 
They reaffirmed that “State level judicial institutions are critical to the sovereignty and 
stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and that the referendum would be unconstitutional and 
“a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of the state as a whole,” besides “seriously 
harm[ing] this country’s EU accession path”. It would prove an “unnecessary confrontation 
which would undermine rather than support our partnership and the reforms which we agree 
are needed”, and that therefore “cannot be tolerated”.626 
Similarly, the day after, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (with 
the telling exception of Russia) denounced the announced referendum as a “fundamental 
violation” of the Dayton Accords. It reminded that the RS parliament is not competent on 
issues falling either within the constitutional responsibilities of the state, or under the GFAP 
and international law, and that “the International Community retains the necessary 
instruments to uphold the GFAP”, in a subtle mention to the still in force Bonn Powers of the 
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OHR.
627
 The OHR himself, Valentin Inzko, the day after, defined it as a “referendum against 
Dayton”. In his statement Inzko recalled that the laws at stake (the 2002 Law on the Court of 
BiH and the 2003 Law on the Prosecutor’s Office) had been passed by the BiH Parliament, 
SNSD included, and were twice deemed Constitution-compliant by the BiH Constitutional 
Court, as well as that the OHR executive powers had been repeatedly endorsed by the UN 
Security Council.
628
 The US Embassy defined the planned referendum a “threat … to the 
security, stability, and prosperity of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, declaring to oppose it as a 
violation of Dayton.
629
  Also the European Parliament president, Martin Schulz, who was 
scheduled to visit Bosnia on 16 July, dismissed the announced referendum as 
“counterproductive” and “playing with the high risk”, since “referendums are meaningful and 
useful when it is about the fundamental questions. If they are used for tactical reasons – it is 
the wrong instrument”.630 Even Serbia did not support Dodik’s referendum move. In his visit 
to Belgrade on 17 July, the RS President was told by the Serbian PM Vucic “to reconsider the 
decision to hold a referendum”,631 offering to speak in front of the RS Assembly if so 
needed,
632
 and subtly threatening to withhold Serbia’s backing of the Bosnian Serb entity in 
the future.
633
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The only international player that openly backed Dodik’s move was the Russian 
Federation. In dissent from to the PIC Steering Board statement, Russia deemed the 
referendum “a question of internal politics” and remarked that the failure of the “so-called 
‘Structured Dialogue’” had left the “concerns of the Serbian community in BiH 
unanswered”.634 Russia also claimed that the abstention of the RS opposition meant the 
decision of the RS Assembly reflected a “consensus” among the Bosnian Serb community on 
the matter, and thus the dissatisfaction of “half of the state” could not be ignored nor called 
unconstitutional, since “Serb citizens feel that their Constitutionally- guaranteed rights and 
freedoms are limited”.635 It later called for the end of the “international protectorate” in BiH 
and the OHR’s attempts to the “forced unification” of Bosnia.636 
Domestically, the RS referendum threat arose generalised opposition from the 
Federation-based parties. In a common statement on 16 July, the leaders of the three oposition 
parties (DF, SBB, SDP) condemned the referendum as a “fundamental violation” of Dayton, 
“a direct violation of the Constitution”, and “an assault on the integrity and sovereignty of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina”, pleading to “fight” against the SNSD efforts “to provoke violence 
in order to maintain power”. Yet, they recognised that the underlining problem with the 
politicisation of the state judiciary did indeed exist: “we share the dissatisfaction with the 
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work on the part of the BiH judicial system that often behaves as an instrument in the hands 
of one political party”, i.e., the SDA, claiming to “remain open to dialogue”. 637 
After the summer recess, a follow-up ministerial meeting was organised in Brussels on 
September 10, at which the competent authorities of the state and of each territorial level 
(FBiH, RS, Brčko) met with Commissioner Hahn to “take stock of the results achieved so far” 
and “build consensus on reforms”.638  The Protocol signed by the four ministers effectively 
rescued the reforms agreed in the framework of the Structured Dialogue (the Law on Courts 
and the Law on the HJPC) and committed to finalize the draft texts and put them into 
parliamentary procedure, after an upcoming final TAIEX seminar. It also referred to the need 
to recalibrate the activities within the Structured Dialogue in order to streghten its efficiency 
and functionality – a reference to the backtracking from the May 2014 “enlarged agenda”.639 
The September 2015 meeting effectively fed into the process to reform the Structured 
Dialogue while trying to defuse the renewed RS referendum threat through a low-profile 
strategy. Yet, its set-up, as a ministerial reunion in Brussels at the presence of the highest EU 
responsible, raised some eyebrows. As Adis Merdzanovic remarked, the photo-op of the event 
reminded of the old-style internationalisation strategy, according to which “internal Bosnian 
matters are being discussed under international tutelage outside the country”.640 Indeed, while 
not a session of the Structured Dialogue per se, the restricted ministerial meetings of July and 
September 2015 demonstrated how the Structured Dialogue could possibly not survive as a 
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sustainable domestic instrument of consensus-building without high-powered EU support in 
the crisis moments – thus questioning the purely domestic character of the process and the 
EU’s capacity to restore legitimacy from without.  
Table 3.1: Contents of Agenda points of the Structured Dialogue on Justice meetings 
 1st  
Banja Luka  
2nd 
Sarajevo  
3rd  
Mostar  
4th  
Brčko  
5th 
Sarajevo  
6th  
Banja Luka 
7th 
Brussels  
8th 
Sarajevo  
 6-7/06/11 10-
11/11/11 
5-6/07/12 8-9/04/13 12/07/13 
(thematic) 
11-
12/11/13 
29/04/14 
(thematic) 
13-
14/05/14 
Justice Sector 
Reform Strategy 
(JSRS) 
1   9 New 
JSRS 
  2 New 
JSRS 
 
National War 
Crimes Strategy 
(NCWS) 
2 11 NWCS 
12 Referral 
of cases 
9 Regional 
cooperatio
n 
1 Referrals 
3 NCWS 
& regional 
coop 
1 Referrals 
3 Regional 
cooperatio
n 
 5 Referrals 
6 Regional 
cooperatio
n 
 5  
Coordination of 
competences 
3 16  
Art.7(2) 
6      
Equal access to 
justice, juvenile 
justice, prison 
system 
4 5 State 
prison and 
forensic 
psychiatric 
hospital 
8 Prison 
administrat
ion 
13 
Maktouf-
Damjanovi
c 
2 Maktouf-
Damjanovi
c 
16 
Infrastruct
ures 
17 
Vulnerable 
groups and 
juvenile 
justice 
2 Maktouf-
Damjanovi
c 
7 Capital 
investment
s 
10 Juvenile 
justice 
 
 1 Maktouf-
Damjanovi
c 
 
  
Budget  5 10 
Structural 
resources 
of judicial 
institutions 
22 
Financing 
of justice 
sector 
14  
Reduction 
of budget 
fragmentati
on 
15 IPA 
funds for 
justice 
support 
8 IPA 
funds as 
EU support 
for justice 
sector 
    
Case backlog  1 7     4 
Efficiency 
of judiciary 
FBiH 
Prosecutor Law 
 2 11      
FBiH Execution 
of Criminal 
Sanctions Law 
 3 12      
Free Legal Aid 
Law 
 4 9      
Police/prosecuto
r cooperation 
 6      11 
Pre-trial 
detention 
 7       
Witness 
protection 
 14 4  13 BiH 
Law 
    
Appellate Court  15 5      
RS Draft Law  17 10 12 Full  3    
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on Courts alignment 
HJPC 
Consolidation 
 18 8 6 HJPC 
Law 
amendmen
ts 
2 HJPC 
Law 
amendmen
ts 
4 HJPC 
Law 
amendmen
ts 
1 HJPC 
Draft Law 
3 
Independe
nce & 
reform of 
judiciary 
Constitutional 
Court 
 
 19       
Professionalism 
of judiciary 
 20 13     2 
International 
staff in judicial 
institutions 
 21       
Extradition 
agreements 
   4     
BiH Draft Law 
on Courts 
   5 1 2 3   
FBiH Draft Law 
on Corruption 
and organised 
crime 
   11     
Care of court 
users, data 
protection, 
publication of 
rulings 
   14     
Anti-corruption        6  
Public 
Procurement 
       7  
Whistleblowers 
Protection 
       8 
Conflict of 
interest, asset 
declaration, 
access to 
information, 
political party 
financing, 
money 
laundering 
       9 
Anti-
discrimination 
       10 
Integrity and 
accountability 
of police forces 
       12 
Efficiency and 
coordination of 
police forces 
       13 
Follow-up 6 23 18 15  7  14 
 
The table above shows the distribution of agenda items through the first eight sessions of the 
Structured Dialogue on Justice. Starting with a very concise agenda in its first meeting, the 
dialogue expanded both in depth and in width in the following sessions between 2012 and 
2014. The final, eighth session in May 2014 saw an “expanded agenda” to include wider 
Rule of Law issues, and an enlarged participation to include also civil society representatives.   
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Conclusions 
The vicissitudes of the EU-BiH Structured Dialogue on Justice, over a period of five 
years (2011 to 2016) aptly illustrate the potentials and the drawbacks of a member state 
building approach and of the EU’s attempt to adapt some domestic solutions to the Bosnian 
environment. Instruments of domestic consensus-building, such as the Structured Dialogue on 
Justice, may be assimilated due to their features to instances of “governance networks”, 
whose impact on domestic democracy is still under debate.
641
 The Structured Dialogue on 
Justice seems to have run into the usual criticisms for governance networks and, in particular 
in relation to the trade-off between democracy and efficiency. On the one hand, governance 
networks may provide the opportunity to open up the policy-making process and connect it 
with citizens and stakeholders. On the other hand, they risk further blurring accountability and 
allowing an opaque shield for government and private interests.
642
  
Soerensen points to four elements of potential incompatibility between governance 
networks and representative democracy.  They build a multi-level system of shared 
sovereignty, challenging the hegemony of the state and the construction of ‘the people’; they 
lead to the contestation of the notion of representation; they foster a new activism by the 
public administration; and they challenge the separation between the political system and the 
civil society.
643
 Yet, governance networks also have the potential to enhance accountability, 
exactly because they “draw more actors into a process of deliberative policy-making and 
implementation”.644 Governance networks may mediate the relations between political 
representatives and civil stakeholders, through the interaction of the public administration 
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with the civil society and interest groups within functional quasi-governmental institutions.
645
 
This may offer new opportunities for democratic anchorage: it reengages citizens by offering 
them direct participation and improving the information available to them; it fosters a 
communicative rationality and a deliberative decision-making process that leads to consensual 
outcomes, accommodating partial preferences beyond a simple zero-sum negotiation; it 
allows non-state actors to participate all along the policy process, from agenda setting to the 
implementation phases, thus building coalitions of actors interested in the success of the 
policy; and finally it increases the trust between citizens and institutions, by engaging them in 
semi-public and semi-formal arenas.
646
 
The potentials of governance networks and of consensus-building mechanisms such as 
the Structured Dialogue on Justice seem particularly promising in situations such as Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’s: where the contestation of the state and the embeddedness of international 
institutions in a post-conflict setting leads to uncertainty about the meaning and the attributes 
of “the people” as the final holder of sovereignty; and where electoral democracy is 
challenged by the sub-system dominance of ethno-cultural constituencies and the 
entrenchment of nationalist parties through vicious circles of graft and patronage. It promises 
to strengthen decision-making by adding an alternative legitimacy avenue to the discredited 
electoral-democratic one, ensuring the inclusion of all affected parties and interests in the 
process. Similarly, it foresees to go beyond mere BiH party politics (whose pettiness has led 
the word “politicisation” to acquire a negative character) by instating a deliberative and result-
oriented procedure. Finally, it promises to increase trust and transparency and to re-engage 
the population while offering European coaching to domestic authorities. 
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One of the most innovative elements of the Structured Dialogue has proven to be the 
formal involvement of civil society representatives in two areas of discussion, anticorruption 
and fundamental rights. In the words of one of the convenors of the dialogue, civil society 
members have found themselves “sitting at the same table with the authorities, discussing the 
priorities, laws, and strategies, that until now had only been discussed between EU and 
national authorities.… They are delighted to be part of that, [even] without yet knowing what 
would be their role, their task to play”.647 Civil society groups involved within the format 
confirmed this
648
 and highlighted “the opportunity to give public recommendations in front of 
domestic institutions” as the most relevant aspect of the dialogue,649 though they complained 
that other agenda points remained outside public discussion, and that speaking time for NGOs 
was limited. They pleaded for a stronger involvement of NGOs as a third party to a Dialogue 
among EU institutions, BiH institutions, and BiH civil society.
650
 Others complained that 
CSOs could only perform an “observers’ role” due to the impossibility to access or submit 
documents for consideration, and that their interventions where acknowledged but then didn’t 
make an impact on the final recommendations of the session.
651
 Unfortunately, the 
participation of CSOs at the May 2014 session of the Structured Dialogue remained a unique 
case, due to the delays and qualms that marred the process in 2014/15.  
According to observers and participants alike, the biggest achievement of the dialogue 
has been to ensure the agreement of all actors (national and local authorities, professional 
representatives, civil society groups) to discuss the perceived problems of Bosnia and 
                                                 
647
 Interview with an officer at the EU Delegation in Sarajevo, November 2014 
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 Interview with Transparency International BiH, 13 August 2015 
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Herzegovina on an equal footing and without preconditions.
652
  The Structured Dialogue has 
been hailed as an example of a non-bureaucratic, political approach to solve a politically 
complex situation.
653
 The EU created a domestic instrument for consensus-building while 
providing the services of a third-party interested mediator, as the EU Delegation assesses the 
progress in between sessions and coaches its participants.
654
 The EU set the boundaries of the 
issues under discussion (the organisation of domestic institutions, but not the role of state 
institutions in entrenching the rule of law) and through a “demining exercise” it actually 
“expanded the scope and strength of the very institutions that were contested”.655  
The Structured Dialogue thus proved to be “a dynamic mechanism of multilevel 
cooperation”, “a useful and flexible administrative framework for political discussion”, in the 
words of Bosnia’s civil servants themselves,656 aimed at creating domestic consensus while 
respecting the legitimacy of domestic political institutions. The EU is present in the 
Structured Dialogue as an “interested moderator”,657 supervising a domestic compromise-
making mechanism while not directly imposing solutions, in agreement with a model of 
member state building and a notion of sovereignty as participation. The dialogue was thus 
presented as acquis-anchored, linked to “necessary and fundamental” principles and “non-
derogable rights” that EU member states cannot afford to question and whose “instability or 
                                                 
652
 The head of the Directorate for European Integration, Nevenka Savic, noted that Bosnian authorities sit 
together to discuss only when EU officials are in the same room. Interview, Sarajevo, 11 December 2014. 
653 “The dialogue has gained such a level of leverage amongst the participants that no other alternative for 
reaching consensus on demanding issues of judicial reform now exists”. Galičić, EU conditionality and 
governance complexities in the Western Balkans, 2014, p. 184.
 
654
 Interviews with an officer of a national embassy in Sarajevo, and with an officer of the EU Delegation in 
Sarajevo, November 2014. 
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uncertainty” is not acceptable.658 The frequent reference and involvement in the process of 
other international institutions (the Council of Europe and its Venice Commission) speaks of 
a growing architecture of inter-institutional cooperation in JHA matters.  
Some small-scale concrete achievements have been reached through the Structured 
Dialogue, from the transfer of cases from the State to the Entity courts on war crimes to an 
agreement on the use of IPA funds to strengthen the state prosecutor’s office capacity to 
address the backlog of war crimes and other serious cases.
659
 Despite these positives, many of 
the actors involved consider that the Dialogue is yet to deliver the change expected, since no 
draft laws discussed within the process have yet been tabled for parliamentary procedure – the 
September 2015 Ministerial Protocol agreed on the fast-tracking of the Draft Law on Courts 
and the Draft Law on the HJPC in order to finalize the texts and bring them into 
parliamentary procedure. According to Freedom House, “several changes are under 
discussion, including a new state appellate court, but the dialogue has yielded few concrete 
results, and politicians continue to propose changes outside the talks”.660 Calls for reform of 
the dialogue have been put forward, including by Bosnia’s civil society organisations.661  
Moreover, the vicissitudes of the Structured Dialogue in 2014 and 2015 speak of the 
growing incompatibility between its aims – to increase both democracy and efficiency. The 
need to include all stakeholders and interested parties, as attempted at the May 2014 session, 
highlighted the unwieldiness of managing a political process with around 50 participants. 
Democracy, in terms of inclusivity, thus run counter to efficiency. At the same time, the 
presence of participants with different sources of legitimacy – representative democracy, 
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 EU Delegation to BiH, First set of preliminary recommendations, Banja Luka, 6-7 June 2011. 
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expertise, self-styled civil society representatives – made it more difficult to establish a clear 
ownership and accountability within the process. While it could well be said that the 
Structured Dialogue remained under “domestic ownership”, it was unclear to the Bosnian 
layman citizen who took part in it, under which prerequisites, for which purposes, and 
accountable to whom. In this case, again, inclusivity trampled accountability and 
transparency. Finally, the resurgence of the RS referendum threat in June 2015 demonstrated 
how the process’ aims of consensus-building could not be achieved in the presence of 
competing political dynamics, and how its domestic sustainability remained in danger, in the 
absence of a resoluted EU-level backing. 
The Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU and Bosnia entered into 
force on 1 June 2015 following the Anglo-German diplomatic initiative,
662
 the EU Council 
conclusions on Bosnia,
663
 and the “written commitment” to reforms by Bosnia’s 
institutions.
664
 Thus, two new sectoral sub-committees were established, including one on 
Justice, Freedom and Security, which took over from the Structural Dialogue the main part of 
its agenda. The Structured Dialogue continued to be used as a tool to provide for more in-
depth discussion on specific topics, in particular the draft laws on Courts and on the HJPC, 
which by end 2017 had not managed to gather the necessary consensus to proceed into 
parliamentary procedure. An evaluation of the final impact of the dialogue thus must remain 
on hold.  
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Overall, the participation of CSOs in BiH’s Structured Dialogue on Justice remained 
episodic and linked only to the May 2014 session. The main advantage of the Structured 
Dialogue has been to provide CSOs with a platform to directly address their recommendations 
to state authorities in the presence of the EU, thus reinforcing accountability and monitoring. 
The change with the establishment of the formal subcommittee could become problematic for 
the participation of those members of civil society that are usually excluded from the strictly 
intergovernmental setting. A solution will have to be found in order not to dissipate the social 
capital mobilised by the exercise thus far.  
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IV. The Instrument for Pre-Accession: Building 
Consensus to Restore Capacities  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I focused on the legitimacy dimension of statehood to show how the 
EU gets involved in policy dialogues in order to foster consensus among political actors and 
restore institutional legitimacy. This chapter focuses on the other dimension of statehood, 
capacity, which is directly linked with the conditions for EU accession, as one of the 
Copenhagen criteria directly concerns the “administrative and institutional capacity to 
effectively implement the acquis and ability to take on the obligations of membership”.665 
Capacity-building is also linked to the notion of international state-building as a way to 
prevent the collapse of weak states into war.   
This chapter considers the financial instruments of EU pre-accession assistance and what 
their underlying structures and rationale may tell us about the EU’s approach to capacity-
building in enlargement countries. The way in which the EU enacts capacity-building in its 
enlargement countries, and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is specific under two 
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dimensions. On the one hand, EU-driven capacity building is not merely aimed at 
strengthening state structures, but it focuses in particular on those institutions and bodies that 
are directly responsible or necessary for the implementation of the EU acquis. On the other 
hand, EU-driven capacity building is also not merely following an outside-in approach based 
on the replication of standard blueprints, but rather asks target countries to develop their own 
institutional solutions to adapt their structures to the requirements of the EU acquis. This 
latter feature is also the product of a learning process within the EU, which can be noticed in 
the evolution from IPA to IPA-II, and the shift in focus from structure to function. Finally, 
EU-driven capacity building is not separate from wider societal and political needs. The shift 
to a sector approach under IPA-II also highlights how the EU requires enlargement countries 
to develop national plans and strategies, which in a highly decentralised country like Bosnia 
and Herzegovina necessitate a wide consensus among political actors at multiple levels of 
governance. The EU thus leverages on this commitment to foster domestic policy dialogue 
and overcome state contestation. The approval of the Coordination Mechanism and its use in 
the development of countrywide strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina are cases in point.  
The first sections of the chapter inquires IPA-I and the build-up of policy implementation 
structures via the roadmap towards decentralised management. The varied results in 
introducing decentralised management also help explaining the shift towards a sector 
approach under IPA-II. In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this translated in a novel 
emphasis on the need for countrywide sector strategies. In order to foster the development of 
such strategies, the EU encouraged Bosnia and Herzegovina’s authorities at all levels to 
develop and adopt a “coordination mechanism”, which was first put to task in order to prepare 
the replies to the Commission Questionnaire following Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU 
membership application. In the chapter conclusions I take stock of the evolution of the ways 
in which the EU has intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina to achieve capacity-building: from 
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fostering institution-building (IPA DIS) to facilitating consensus and leading to the 
establishment of consensus-building engines (coordination mechanism). This evolution also 
shows a learning process of the EU on how best to support capacity-building in context of 
state contestation within its enlargement region.  
 
1. Training for membership: the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance 
Since 2007 enlargement countries receive EU funds through a single Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA). Alongside policy dialogue, financial assistance is part and parcel 
of a process aimed at fostering institutional and policy change, with the final aim of 
accelerating progress towards EU membership.
666
 
Differently from previous generations of EU financial assistance to the Western Balkans, 
which was mainly focused on post-war reconstruction, development, and stabilisation, the 
focus of IPA funds is mainly on institution building and compliance with the acquis, in a fully 
accession-driven perspective. IPA funds aims at improving the governance structures and at 
strengthening administrative capacities, in order to prepare enlargement countries to perform 
the required tasks and engage productively within the EU once they have become member 
states, particularly in terms of policy implementation and management of funds.  
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 This section includes materials previously published as: Davide Denti, ‘Did EU candidacy differentiation 
impact on the performance of pre-accession funds? A quantitative analysis of Western Balkan cases’, 
Croatian International Relations Review, XIX (68), 2013, p. 61-91. 
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The structure of IPA funds is “designed to mirror the Structural Funds” of the EU.667 IPA 
funds merge features only partially present in previous financial assistance for the Western 
Balkans, to introduce the three principles of decentralization, partnership and programming, 
simultaneously present only in the EU structural funds (see table 6.1 below). In doing so, IPA 
funds “deliberately mimic cohesion policy requirements to prepare candidate countries more 
effectively for managing cohesion policy post-accession”.668  
IPA funds have been variously described as a training ground or a gym for domestic 
institutions to develop the necessary administrative capacities and gain experience in 
administering EU monies to become able to receive and absorb the much higher volumes of 
EU structural funds available upon EU accession.
669 
Their implementation is therefore the site 
of a learning process in which enlargement countries experiment and develop domestic 
solutions in order to achieve the prescribed result in the most appropriate way given their 
differing starting conditions and features. A comparison of the various financial assistance 
instruments for the Western Balkans over time is presented in the table 6.2 below. The 
geographical focus of the EU’s action appears widening; the focus moves from reconstruction 
to development to pre-accession, and regional programmes acquire more and more 
importance over time. 
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Table 4.1 - Evolution of structural principles of pre-accession instruments over time 
period Instruments Decentralization Partnership Programming 
1985-1992 IMPs (Greece)    
1989-present Structural funds    
1994-present Cohesion funds    
1990-2006 
Pre-accession 
instruments 
   
1996-2001 MEDA (Turkey)    
2007-present IPA funds    
Structural funds: ERDF, ESF, EAGGF 
Pre-accession instruments: PHARE, OBNOVA, SAPARD, ISPA, EDIS, CARDS + PAI 
Turkey 
Source: Author’s re-elaboration from Bache, Europeanization and multi-level 
governance, 2010, p. 8. 
 
Table 4.2 –EU financial assistance instruments for the Western Balkans 
 
1
st
 generation 
instruments 
2
nd
 generation 
instruments 
3
rd
 generation instruments 
Instrument PHARE OBNOVA ECHO CARDS IPA IPA-II 
Period 1990-2000 1996-2000 1990-2000 2000-2006 2007-2013 2014-2020 
Beneficiary 
countries 
BH,AL,MK BH,AL,MK BH,AL,MK BH,AL,MK 
Candidates: 
HR,TR,MK  
All 
enlargement 
countries 
 HR,SCG,KS HR,SCG,KS HR,SCG,KS 
Others: 
SR,MN,AL,BH,K
S 
Allocations 
(only for 
WB) 
1.184 M € 1.476 M  € 2.196 M € 
5.385 M € 5.189,5 M €  
 
7.244,77 M € 
670
 
TOT 1990-2000: 4.856 M € 
Primary 
focus 
Post-conflict reconstruction 
Development 
and 
Stabilization 
Institution 
building, acquis 
compliance 
Development 
and acquis 
compliance 
Management 
methods 
Centralized Various 
Decentralized 
Implementation 
System (DIS) 
Various 
(mainly 
centralised) 
Regional 
programmes 
4% -- 6% 4% 8% 25% 
Source: Update from Denti, Did EU candidacy differentiation impact on the performance 
of pre-accession funds?,2013, p. 67. 
  
                                                 
670
 11.698,668 M € for the whole IPA-II envelope (1,8% of the whole EU MFF), minus 4.453,9 M € for Turkey 
alone (IPA II Reg 231/2014).  Multi-country actions account for 2.958,6 M €, i.e. 25,29% of the total IPA-II 
envelope. 
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The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance was introduced by the IPA Regulation 
718/2007
671
 to streamline and replace the previous external assistance instruments of the 
European Commission: PHARE,
672
 CARDS,
673
 SAPARD,
674
 ISPA
675
 and ECHO, which had 
supported the enlargement process towards Central and Eastern Europe as well as the post-
war reconstruction in the Western Balkans. IPA funds aimed at supporting enlargement 
countries in fulfilling the three Copenhagen criteria and were delivered under five 
components (see table 6.3 below).  
IPA funds provided for a single overall structure to pre-accession financial assistance for 
both official candidate countries
 676
 and potential candidates,
677
 while introducing a 
segmented approach, differentiating between the two categories in the eligibility for 
assistance components. The first two components, aimed at institution-building and regional 
cooperation, were accessible to all enlargement countries and meant particularly to support 
the transition and the implementation of SAA commitments in potential candidates. The last 
three components (regional development, agriculture, human resources), mimicking EU 
structural funds most closely, were reserved for candidates countries, with the aim of 
supporting alignment with the EU acquis and prepare them for implementation of EU 
structural funds. This did not translate in a lower financial commitment for potential 
                                                 
671
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 718/2007 of 12 June 2007 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 
1085/2006 establishing an instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA) (OJ L 170, 29.6.2007, p. 1), as 
amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 80/2010 of 28 January 2010 (OJ L 25, 29.1.2010, p.1). 
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Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Reconstructing their Economies.
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Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development.
 
675 
Instrument for Structural Policy for Pre-Accession.
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candidates, as some had feared,
678
  since Component I still included 57% of all funds, and 
could be used to fund interventions within the scope of the last three components but under 
centralised management, before the necessary conferral of management to national 
structures.
679
   
IPA funds aimed at assisting enlargement countries in developing the institutions and 
capacities that would be necessary for them to become EU member states, particularly in 
terms of policy implementation and management of structural funds. This aim is followed not 
only through the specific projects financed with IPA funds, but also through the incentive 
structure inscribed in the set-up of the funds, whose components mirror the EU structural 
funds. In order to access additional components, enlargement countries needed to achieve 
candidate status and to develop administrative structures able to sustain an accredited 
Decentralised Implementation System (DIS) of funds management.
680
 The IPA funds 
provided enlargement countries with the opportunity to build the necessary structures and 
gain experience in administering EU monies before being able to receive and absorb the much 
higher volumes of EU structural funds available upon EU accession. The IPA funds, while 
maintaining a regional approach and treating all countries equally, were designed to recognise 
the different stages of advancement of enlargement countries towards EU accession. 
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 European Stability Initiative (ESI), “Breaking out of the Balkan Ghetto: Why IPA should be changed”, Berlin  
2005, p. 1-12. 
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 See Denti, Did EU candidacy differentiation impact on the performance of pre-accession funds?, 2013. 
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 The first two IPA components (Transition assistance and institution building; Cross-border cooperation) were 
open to all potential and candidate countries, under either centralised (at EU delegation level) or 
joint/concurrent fund management; the next three IPA components (Regional development; Human resources 
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accreditation by the EU Commission of a national fund management system (Decentralised Implementation 
System, DIS). The fifth IPA component (Rural development) required the accreditation of a fully 
decentralised management system without controls ex ante from the local EU Delegation. 
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Introducing a differentiation was meant to provide incentives for both laggards and 
forerunners.  
1.1 Decentralised management and the set-up of policy implementation 
structures 
The management system of IPA funds was more structured, although still flexible. 
Decentralised management, defined as “transferring the allocated EU-funds to the Ministry of 
Finance of the beneficiary country who will be responsible for managing the effective 
contracts and payments”, 681  was the preferred method of implementation under IPA. 682 The 
Commission provided for a roadmap towards the establishment of decentralised management, 
as a final objective for all enlargement countries.  
In the first IPA budget period (2007-13), enlargement countries could begin 
programming and implementing EU pre-accession funds under a centralised management 
system, according to which the budget cycle is managed by the EU Delegation in the country. 
The centralised approach was similar to EU development cooperation (EuropAid and ECHO 
funds). However, to fully benefit from the allocated funds, enlargement countries had to 
develop national administrative capacities in order to cover tendering, contracting, and 
payments of EU-funded projects.
683
 After completing a six-stage roadmap, the national 
system could achieve “conferral of management” (accreditation) from the European 
Commission, and the local EU Delegation could delegate the management of EU funds 
directly to the beneficiary government.  
                                                 
681
 European Commission, 2012 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement (IPA, PHARE, CARDS, 
Turkey Pre-Accession Instrument, Transition Facility), SWD/2013/0326, p. 112. 
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While decentralised management was a stricter requirement for candidate countries, 
potential candidates could continue spending EU funds through centralised management by 
the EU Delegations. On the EU side, management of IPA funds in enlargement countries was 
distributed among different Directorate-Generals of the European Commission (with e.g. DG 
AGRI managing Component V on rural development). On the side of the enlargement 
countries, responsibility was to be centralised in a National IPA Coordinator (NIPAC) and in 
specific operating structures.  
Table 4.3 - Availability of IPA components by candidate status
684
 
IPA components Management 
Candidate 
countries 
Potential 
candidates 
Cf. 
1 
Transition Assistance and 
Institution Building 
centralised 
or joint 
  CARDS Funds 
2 Cross-Border Cooperation 
centralised  / 
concurrent 
  
Regional 
Programmes 
3 Regional Development decentralised   
Cohesion & Regional 
Funds 
4 
Human Resources 
Development 
decentralised   
European Social 
Funds 
5 
Rural Development decentralized   
CAP / Rural Devt 
Fund 
 
The gradient of funds management decentralisation was meant to allow candidate 
countries to gradually build their institutions and administrative capacities in an accession-
driven perspective.  Decentralised management implied that the authorities in the beneficiary 
countries were to become the contracting authorities, directly responsible for managing the 
pre-accession funds – launching tenders and paying contractors – after their administrative 
capacities had been assessed by the Commission via a series of system audits. This had the 
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explicit aim “to prepare the candidate countries and potential candidates to handle EU 
Structural and Cohesion Funds in the future”. 685 
To remain in the metaphor of EU enlargement as the reproductive moment of EU 
integration, this mechanism was meant to foster the development of the "digestive apparatus" 
of future Member States. While they were developing their own domestic structures for 
implementation of pre-accession aid, they could receive support via EU structures 
(Delegation), as if via an umbilical cord. Decentralised management after accreditation of 
domestic structures would be in this metaphor akin to breast-feeding – candidate countries 
would start absorbing EU funds (IPA) via their own implementation structures in a facilitated 
way. At the time of accession – comparable to the moment of weaning – they would then 
have to manage and implement EU structural funds on an equal footing and under the same 
regulations as any other Member State.  
The roadmap for the accreditation of the DIS included six different stages, numbered 
from 0 to 5. Such steps range from establishing the administrative structure, with the 
definition of tasks, appointment of the key actors, and provision of adequate staffing and 
equipment, until the final verification audit by the Commission, which may lead to the 
conferral of management powers and the signature of a Financing Agreement between the 
Commission and the state administration. The intermediate steps request the national 
administrations to: (a) identify the gap between the local procedures and the DIS 
requirements, through a Gap Assessment Report; (b) take actions in order to fill the gaps, 
following an Action Plan for Gap Plugging; (c) assess the effective compliance trough a 
Compliance Assessment Report; and (d) obtain the accreditation from the European 
Commission. 
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Table 4.4  - Roadmap for accreditation of Decentralised Implementation Systems 
Status Scope Actor
686
 Outcomes 
Stage 0 Establishment of Structures OS 
Appointment of key actors 
Adequate staffing and equipment 
Stage 1 Gap Assessment 
TA (FWC) 
MoF (NF) 
Gap Assessment Report 
Action Plan for Gap Plugging  
Stage 2 Gap Plugging OS / TA Compliance with requirements 
Stage 3 Compliance Assessment TA Compliance Assessment Report 
Stage 4 Accreditation NAO 
National accreditation and 
submission of application for 
conferral of management powers 
with ex ante control 
Stage 5 Verification audit EC 
Conferral of management powers 
Signature of Financing Agreement 
The implementation of the DIS roadmap proceeds separately for each country and for 
each IPA component, resulting in a highly differentiated pattern of progress. The progress of 
the different countries on the roadmap towards decentralised management of the IPA funds 
may provide a measure of mid-term performance of the IPA in its objective of fostering 
reform and strengthening administrative capacities in pre-accession countries. The presence of 
clear benchmarks, defined by the formalised stages of the DIS roadmap and reported in the 
Commission’s Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement, 687 allows drawing 
some conclusions based on quantitative data.  
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 The key actors involved in managing and implementing the IPA funds, as foreseen in the DIS, other than the 
European Commission (EC), are: the National IPA Coordinator (NIPAC); the Strategic Coordinator for 
Components III and IV (SCO); the Competent Accrediting Officer (CAO); the National Authorising Officer 
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Figure 4.1      Figure 4.2 
  
Figure 4.3 - Progress in DIS implementation, 2008-2015 
 
Table 4.5 - Progress in DIS implementation, 2008-2015 
average 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Croatia 4.8 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Bosnia-Herz. -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Serbia -0.2 -0.2 0.6 1.6 2.4 3.2 3.6 3.6 
Montenegro -0.6 -0.2 -0.2 0.8 1.4 3.0 4.0 4.4 
Kosovo -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 
Macedonia 2.0 3.8 3.8 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 
Albania -0.6 -0.4 0.4 1.4 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 
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Figure 4.4 - Progress in DIS implementation (component I only), 2008-2015 
 
Table 4.6 - Progress in DIS implementation (component I only), 2008-2015 
component I 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Croatia 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Bosnia-Herz. 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Serbia 1 1 1 2 3 4 5 5 
Montenegro 0 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 
Kosovo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Macedonia 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 
Albania 0 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 
 
Table 4.7 – Date of conferral of management powers per country and component 
IPA comp. I II III IV V 
Croatia    Aug2010 Nov2009 
Bosnia-Herz. - - - - - 
Serbia  March 2014 March 2014 March 2014 March 2014  
Montenegro   April 2014 July 2014 - 
Kosovo - - - - - 
Macedonia Dec 2010 - 2009 2009 By 2010 
Albania  March 2014 - - - - 
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When taking a look at the picture of the progress in the decentralisation of management 
of IPA funds in the 2008-2011 period, it is possible to underline some trends.
688
 Croatia 
remains the highest-scoring country in the DIS roadmap throughout the period, already 
starting from a very good level; however, it manages to receive management powers for all 
components only since August 2010. Among the other countries, Macedonia is a frontrunner 
in implementing decentralised management, for which it receives management powers for all 
component (save component II) between 2009 and December 2010.
 689
  The transition 
towards decentralised management proceeded smoothly also in Serbia and in Montenegro,
 
which received management powers for four and two components respectively in 2014.
 690
 
Finally, Albania also completes its DIS roadmap for the first component in March 2014.
 691
 
                                                 
688
 In its reports for the years 2010 and 2011, the Commission has stopped detailing explicitly the country 
progress in terms of DIS stages per component, especially in the case of Albania, Montenegro and 
Macedonia. Data for such countries are thus the author’s interpretation of the Commission’s lexicon. 
Moreover, Serbia and Albania started working on DIS for components III to V even before being formally 
granted candidate status. 
689 “For the first time the implementation of all IPA Components, except Component II - Cross-border 
cooperation, took place under decentralised management, which implies that the management of programmes 
is undertaken by the relevant national authorities, currently subject to ex ante controls by the European 
Commission.” (European Commission, 2011 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement , 
COM/2012/0678)
 
690 “Subsequently, the decision [for Serbia] was taken in March 2014.” (European Commission, 2013 Annual 
Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement, COM/2014/0610) “On management of EU funds, Serbia 
has been granted with conferral of management power in March 2014 and the financing agreement has been 
signed in June for the implementation of this part of IPA 2013 under de-centralised management”. (European 
Commission, Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement in 2014, COM/2015/0548) During 
2014, Montenegro made good progress regarding preparations for decentralised management the conferral of 
management for IPA Component III and IV was finalised in April and July 2014 respectively. (Ibid.)
 
691 “Under IPA Component I, the key structures and systems have been put in place and Albania submitted its 
application for the conferral of management in the beginning of 2012.” (European Commission, 2011 Annual 
Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement , COM/2012/0678). “Albania has finalised the preparation 
for decentralised management of IPA funds under Component I.” (European Commission, 2013 Annual 
Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement, COM/2014/0610) In March 2014 the Commission 
conferred powers to the Albanian Government to manage funds under IPA Component I. (European 
Commission, Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement in 2014, COM/2015/0548).
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While Bosnia and Herzegovina saw some timid progress under component II, it later got 
mired in domestic quarrels that prevented it from progressing further. Kosovo, finally, was 
marked “in the early stage” of the process and did not advance towards decentralised 
management throughout the period.
 692
 
Looking at the sole component I (institution-building) – the one accessible to all 
enlargement countries alike, and the one with the most relevant allocations – as in figure 6.4, 
it can be seen how Croatia is soon caught up by Macedonia, and by the end of the budgetary 
period also by Serbia and Albania, while Montenegro’s progress is less steady. As above, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains in the lower echelons, while Kosovo does not even start.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina started preparations for management decentralisation in 2006 
but never achieved it.
693
 The Commission reports note how in 2010 “State and entity 
representatives were unable to reach agreement on the structures to support decentralised 
implementation of IPA and to prepare for the IPA Components III, IV and V”. 694 A Decision 
on the Establishment of the Operating Structure was adopted by the BiH Council of Ministers 
in September 2011
695
 and by the BiH Parliament in May 2012,
 696
 but no concrete follow-up 
was provided, not even in terms of completing the appointment of key actors such as the 
Programme Authorising Officer and the Audit Authority (stage 0), thus leading the 
Commission to remark that “Politically it does not appear realistic to achieve progress 
towards DIS prior to the establishment of a functioning EU coordination mechanism”. 697 
According to EU officials, the CFCU (Central Financial and Contracting Unit) at the BiH 
                                                 
692 
European Commission, 2010 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement, COM/2011/0647
 
693 
The Deputy Head of EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina referred in particular to the lack of alignment 
in public procurement legislation as the main stumbling blocks. Interview, Sarajevo, 28 November 2014.
 
694 
Ibid.
 
695 
European Commission, 2011 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement, SWD/2012/0385.
 
696 
European Commission, 2012 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement, SWD/2013/0326.
 
697 
European Commission, 2012 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement, SWD/2013/0326.
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Ministry of Finance was well formed and staffed, but it remained inoperative, as it was not 
entrusted with funds implementation.
 698
 Bosnia and Herzegovina could show some progress 
towards decentralised management on component II (cross-border cooperation).
 699
 Yet, this 
had to be dropped in the following years, and Bosnia and Herzegovina thus lost the lead role 
on the IPA cross-border cooperation project with Montenegro, for which it had been 
preparing, due to the lack of a countrywide strategy.
700
 In 2014, the Commission came to the 
conclusion that “the country is at a standstill” in its European integration process in terms of 
both progress towards fulfilling the political criteria (resolution of the Sejdic-Finci issue) and 
towards decentralised management of financial assistance. In the absence of “an efficient and 
effective coordination mechanism in order to enable the country to speak with one voice and 
to interact properly with the EU” and due to the “increasing politicisation of IPA 
implementation” the Commission had suspended or cancelled several IPA projects in 2013, 
later reducing the whole IPA envelope for Bosnia and Herzegovina from EUR 109 million to 
EUR 64 millions. The absence of a coordination mechanism also prevented the country from 
preparing countrywide strategies, needed for future implementation of the sector approach 
under IPA II. The Commission decided in this regard “not to start the preparation [of sector 
approach] until effective coordination is ensured”. 701 
 
                                                 
698 I
nterview with the Head of Cooperation of the EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 2014
. 
699 In 2011 its “Control, Finance and Contracting Unit [CFCU] of the Ministry of Finance has assumed the role 
of the First Level Controller with the assistance of the EU framework contract for the 19 contracts under the 
IPA Adriatic CBC programme, which were implemented in the shared management mode.” European 
Commission, 2011 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement, SWD/2012/0385.
. 
700
 Interviews with officials at Bosnia’s Directorate for European Integration and at the EU Delegation. Sarajevo, 
December 2014. 
701 
European Commission, 2013 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement , COM/2014/0610.
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1.2 A premature step? Absorption problems and the return to centralised 
management 
By the end of the budget period in 2014, some countries had indeed developed 
administrative structures able to sustain a decentralised management - Croatia, Macedonia, 
and Turkey arrived at managing pre-accession funds directly under the decentralised 
implementation system. On the other hand, it soon appeared clear that heavy and costly 
administrative structures, prepared to take over the implementation of structural funds upon 
accession, should only be set up during the last phases of the EU accession process, and 
surely only after an enlargement country had achieved candidate status. This would also help 
avoid the risk of setting up administrative units that would remain inoperative due to political 
blockages in the EU accession pipeline as with Serbia’s delayed candidate status between 
2012 and 2014.
 702
 
Moreover, achievements of decentralised management varied widely, as mentioned 
above, and over time even those countries that were successful in introducing decentralised 
implementation suffered heavily in terms of efficiency in absorbing IPA funds. Commission 
reports start noting delays in contracting and tendering in Croatia
703
 and Macedonia in 2011 
and 2012 respectively.
704
 In 2012 the Commission noted that:  
                                                 
702 
Interview with the Head of Cooperation of the EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 2014.
 
703 “In 2010, Croatia experienced some delays in contracting and implementation of assistance under 
Components III and V. This was due to delays in the conferral of decentralised management, newly 
established bodies adding to pressures on the implementation system and the complexity of some large 
infrastructure contracts.” European Commission, 2010 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for 
Enlargement, COM/2011/0647.
 
704 
Ibid., European Commission, 2011 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement , 
COM/2012/0678
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The introduction of Decentralised Implementation System (DIS) for 
Component I in December 2010 triggered a remarkable slow-down in 
procurement, as it has been the case with Components III and IV where DIS 
was introduced in 2009. Under these two Components we still observed a 
considerable number of hick-ups [sic] in 2011. Weaknesses in the 
management and control system reached a new, higher level of concern at 
the end of 2011.
705
   
And the following year it remarked that “the implementation of all programmes whether 
centralised or decentralised implementation, as detailed above, was often faced with problems 
of weak political commitment and insufficient human and material resources.” 706 For the first 
time the Commission had to de-commit funds for breach of the contracting timeframe, despite 
extension of the deadline from three to four years, with prospects for further de-commitments 
the following years “due to the increasing backlog and continuing weak absorption capacity 
for IPA funds under decentralised implementation” 707 linked to “understaffing and 
insufficient managerial capacities in key institutions”. 708The contracting situation was 
reported as worsening again in 2014, with “numerous structural problems which negatively 
impact on their performance and ultimately on the timely absorption of IPA funds,” leading to 
risks of de-committment and loss of funds.
 709
 
The increasing issues with funds absorption may also help explaining the growingly colf-
feet approach of the Commission towards decentralised management. In 2012 the progress of 
Montenegro under component V was deemed not sufficient, and funds allocations for rural 
                                                 
705 
European Commission, 2011 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement , COM/2012/0678
 
706 
European Commission, 2012 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement, SWD/2013/0326.
 
707 
Ibid.
 
708 
European Commission, 2013 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement, COM/2014/0610.
 
709 
European Commission, Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement in 2014, COM/2015/0548
 
246 
 
development under IPA2013 were moved under component I, directly managed by the EU 
Delegation.
 710
 Montenegro obtained management powers on component V only in 2014. 
711
 
Likewise, Albania submitted its application for conferral of management under IPA 
Component I in early 2012, but it was only in March 2014 that it was deemed ready and 
conferral of powers followed.
712
Also for Serbia, which progressed steadily towards 
decentralised management and submitted its application for four IPA components (I, II, III 
and IV) in 2012, the Commission decided “not to proceed with opening of components III and 
IV under the current financial perspective 2007-2013”.713 Conferral of management powers 
for the four components was granted to Serbia in March 2014. Independent evaluations also 
noted “chronic performance problems” under decentralised management.714 Overall, 
decentralised management proved “a mixed blessing”, with improved ownership offset by 
efficiency losses.
 715
 Decentralised implementation was also deemed responsible of an overall 
slow-down in the implementation of IPA funds, with up to 7 years between programming and 
results.
 716
 Also because of these drawbacks, Macedonia reverted to direct management under 
IPA-II after 2014.
 717
 
As noted by the Court of Auditors,
718
 decentralised management requires a learning 
period and demanding structures. Both the IPA Regulation and the Financial Regulation
719
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European Commission, 2012 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement, SWD/2013/0326.
 
711 
European Commission, Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement in 2014, COM/2015/0548
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European Commission, 2011 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement , COM/2012/0678, 
European Commission, Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement in 2014, COM/2015/0548
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European Commission, 2012 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement, SWD/2013/0326.
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Ibid, p. ii, 18. Turkey, which has the bulk of IMBC for IPA-I and IPA-II, reports a backlog of over 600 mln € 
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Ibid, p. iii.
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Ibid, p. 17.
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Ibid, p. 16.
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European Court of Auditors, Special Report 21/2016: EU preaccession assistance for strengthening 
administrative capacity in the Western Balkans: A meta-audit. No. 21, Luxembourg, 2016.
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Council Regulation 1605/2002 (OJ L 248, 16.9.2002)
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did not require the Commission to assess the actual readiness of candidate countries to 
manage the volume and complexity of IPA funds that were being decentralised. Decisions on 
accreditation thus rested only on the compliance of domestic structures with the requirement 
for internal controls set out in the Financial Regulation – without, for instance, an assessment 
of public finance management at country level. As a consequence, national administrations 
did not prove able to cope with the administrative burden following accreditation: deadlines 
were broken and the quality of contracting documents proved inadequate, resulting in the loss 
of projects and funds.
720
 The administrative burden of managing EU funds proved challenging 
for even the most advanced public administrations in the region, especially when not as a 
short-term transition measure towards full EU membership and consequent direct 
management of EU structural and cohesion funds.
721
 To remain in the newborn metaphor, the 
passage from breastfeeding to solid food had been premature. It is thus understandable that 
decentralised management was deemed not feasible or appropriate for the weakest 
administrations of the Wester Balkans. This also helps understanding why repeated calls to 
grant access to European Structural Funds to the Western Balkans countries
722
  have not been 
taken into consideration so far by the Commission: the lack of administrative capacities 
would make it impossible for enlargement countries to absorb the higher volume of structural 
funds. Their digestive apparatus is simply not developed enough yet.  
                                                 
720
 European Court of Auditors, Meta-audit, p. 19. See also European Court of Auditors, Special Report 
11/2016: Strengthening administrative capacity in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Limited 
progress in a difficult context, No. 11, Luxembourg, 2016, paragraph 47. 
721 
Interaction with a Commission official with knowledge of implementation of IPA funds in Croatia, Brussels, 
15 March 2017.
 
722 Tobias Flessenkemper and Dušan Reljić. "EU Enlargement: A Six Percent Target for the Western Balkans", 
Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), 27 June 2017. 
Matteo Bonomi, "Economic governance in the Balkans: Towards a more sustainable path of economic 
development?", Brussels: European Policy Centre (EPC), 10 November 2016. 
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Notwithstanding more general issues concerning efficiency of decentralised management, 
for what concerns Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo, which were also lagging 
behind in the EU integration process, the incentive structure of IPA funds via the 
decentralised management roadmap proved inadequate to counter the fragmentation of 
competences and stimulate internal reform and institution building, and was thus not put in 
place by the EU itself. The strategic priorities for assistance, the decision of which is formally 
a task of the Council of Minister’s Directorate for European Integration (DEI) could not be 
implemented without a multi-level political agreement between the state and the sub-state 
entities on the list of projects. After a certain momentum from 2007 to 2009, the process 
regressed to a fully centralised management.
723
 An action programmed under IPA 2008 for 
1.5 M € (“Support to the establishment of a Decentralised Implementation System for EU 
funds management”) was cancelled due to lack of progress. The blockage is not due to the 
skills of human resources in its public administration;
724
 rather, the problem largely stems 
from posturing, linked to the defensive-positionalist political culture of Bosnia’s ruling 
elite,
725
 and the lack of attitude to compromise and consensus.
726
 In Bosnia’s legally and 
politically fragmented context, a more inclusive process is needed to ensure that selected 
priorities are supported by all political authorities at different levels, and that agreed-upon 
                                                 
723
 Interview with an official at the EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, December 2014. The 
system was similar to the one employed by the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) in Serbia, 
Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia between 2000 and 2008. 
724
 Ibid. Unlike Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina enjoys continuity from Yugoslav times in its public 
administration, which has similar competences, structures, and culture to neighbouring countries.  
725
 Defensive positionalism refers to the problem of relative gains in cooperation: an actor would refrain from 
cooperation if it fears that the gains would accrue relatively more to its partners, changing the status quo. See 
Grieco, Joseph M., Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade, Ithaca 
1990, p. 40. 
726
 The resistance of Bosnian political elites to external pressure was likened by one interviewee to the Gaul 
village of Asterix resisting to the Roman Empire. Interview with an officer of the EU Delegation to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, November 2014. 
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projects do not run into quagmires once implementation starts due to lack of cooperation by 
the competent sub-state authorities as – differently from the context of Croatia or other 
centralised countries – there is no single lever at the highest political level that may put lower 
levels into motion. 
727
 
With the IPA system challenged both by the inability of its incentive structure to spur 
Bosnian actors to compromise, and by the disappointing results of decentralised management 
for funds absorption, the post-2014 financial framework was set for a major overhaul, which 
came with the replacement of DIS by a sector approach and its new mantra of sector strategies 
to sustain budget support operations. 
 
2. The IPA-II programme and the shift from structure to function 
The 2007/2013 IPA programme was deemed a step forward in terms of linking results to 
progress in the accession process, but its implementation remained mostly based on stand-
alone projects, with a narrow scope and lacking overall coherence. Several Commission 
evaluations and discussions in various conferences
728
 led to the formalisation of the sector 
approach as a new paradigm for pre-accession assistance in order to foster its effectiveness 
and efficiency, opening the road towards IPA-II.  
The new IPA II legislative framework for the 2014/2020 period reformed the DIS system 
and replaced it with a sector approach and budget support modalities.
729
 Management on the 
                                                 
727
 Interview with an official at the EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, December 2014. 
728 
Conference on Donor Coordination in the Western Balkans and Turkey, Tirana, 2009; Conference on 
Effective Support for Enlargement, Brussels, October 2009; Sarajevo workshop, 2010.
 
729
 Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing 
an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II). (OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p.11-26). See also Directorate for 
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EU side was streamlined within DG NEAR, with the exception of the rural development 
component, still managed by DG AGRI. Programming under IPA II is based on country 
Indicative Strategy Papers (ISP) identifying the key and mature sectors for financial 
assistance, which are then implemented through Action Programmes. The five components of 
IPA where replaced by five identical policy areas, accessible to candidate countries and 
potential candidates alike, and nine priority sectors, of which the first two (Democracy and 
governance; Rule of law and fundamental rights) are allocated 40% of the funds and mirror 
the three focus sectors (rule of law, economic governance, public administration reform) of 
the renewed “fundamental firsts” approach of the EU enlargement strategy. 730    
2.1 Sector budget support as vector of state building in fragile countries 
Under the newly introduced sector approach, assistance should be targeted to strategic 
sectors relevant to EU accession objectives, and implemented through coordinated and 
coherent assistance packages at sector level. This may be supported by stand-alone projects, 
by pooled funding, or where appropriate it may lead to sector budget support or general 
budget support, i.e. the direct transfer of EU funds to the country’s budget accounts, under the 
fulfilment of specific indicators of performance included in Sector Reform Contracts – 
provided that domestic systems have sufficient capacities for public finance management and 
macroeconomic stability. Under a sector approach, 
The activities of the government, donors, the private sector and NGOs are 
considered within the sector framework. The aim is to coordinate the 
activities of all stakeholders towards objectives established by the 
                                                                                                                                                        
European Integration (DEI), Sector Approach in Pre-Accession Assistance, Ares(2013)65573, 18 January 
2013. 
730 
EU enlargement strategy, COM(2015) 611 final, Brussels, 10 November 2015.
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government within the EU integration context and a coherent public 
expenditure framework.
731
  
This change of perspective stemmed from the discussion in the development aid 
community in the late 1990s, leading to the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 
Streghtening local systems was meant to improve ownership and coherence of financial 
assistance, while minimising transaction costs. To achieve this, a series of building blocks 
were required: a sector strategy with objectives, a sector programme, a mid-term budget, and 
sectoral donor coordination. Moreover, domestic institutions would need strengthening and 
capacity-building to take the lead, coordinate and monitor performance. This seemed to fit 
well for the context of the Western Balkans, where EU accession is the main foreign policy 
aim of each country, the EU is the main donor, and domestic institutions need strengthening 
to prepare for implementation of the EU acquis, thus leveraging on coherence and 
complementarity. The development of sector approaches was included in the new 2011-2013 
IPA Multi-annual Indicative Planning Documents (MIPD).
732
  
Budget support is defined as “a means of delivering effective aid and durable results in 
support of EU partners’ reform efforts and the Sustainable Development Goals” that involves 
“the transfer of financial resources to the National Treasury of a partner country, following 
the fulfilment by the latter of the agreed conditions”.733  Budget support is envisaged as a 
bilateral contractual relation between the EU and a third country, based on specific eligibility 
criteria and conditions – including the existence of macro-economic stability and of a reliable 
domestic system of public finance management. Budget support involves: (1) policy dialogue 
                                                 
731 
Ministry of Finance and Treasury of Bosnia and Herzegovina (MoFT) and European Commission (EC), 
Implementing sector approaches in the context of Enlargement, Challenges and lessons learnt from the 
Sarajevo Workshop 22-24 March 2010, A “How to” note, October 2010, p. 2. 
732 I
bid., p.3-4.
 
733 
European Commission, Budget Support Guidelines - September 2017, p. 5.
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to agree on the results to be achieved; (2) assessment of the progress (performance 
monitoring); (3) financial transfers to the Treasury based on fulfilment of result indicators; 
and (4) capacity-building support to strengthen domestic institutions and their transparency 
and accountability.
734
 
Budget support is meant as a result-oriented modality of aid delivery; by using domestic 
country systems, it aims at “improving the accountability of the government towards its 
citizens, rather than creating parallel structures administered outside the budget by third 
parties”.735 Its domestic linkage is also meant to ensure ownership and hence alignment with 
country priorities and sustainable results. Sound macroeconomic and fiscal policies are taken 
as a prerequisite for possible public support operations, which are “specifically designed to 
support policy reforms and institutional strengthening”,736 usually enshrined in sector reform 
strategies. According to the Commission, budget support “improves accountability” via 
increased transparency and thus “helps tackling corruption” by strengthening oversight 
institutions, both formal (audit systems, Parliament) and informal (civil society 
participation).
737
 Budget support is thus foreseen as a “vector of change” for “state building in 
fragile states”.738 
In terms of implementing modalities, budget support is foreseen in three forms: 
Sustainable Development Goals Contracts, Sector Reform Contracts and State Building 
Contracts. The latter are foreseen “to support transition processes towards recovery, 
development and democratic governance, and addressing structural causes of fragility, to help 
partner countries to ensure vital state functions and to deliver basic services to the 
                                                 
734 
Ibid.
 
735 
Ibid., p.6.
 
736 
Ibid., p.7.
 
737 
Ibid.
 
738 
Ibid., p.9.
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population”.739 On the other hand, Sector Reform Contracts are foreseen for cases in which 
objectives are narrower and focused on improving public policies and service delivery in a 
specific sector, “supporting an acceleration of reforms and in improving efficiency and 
effectiveness of sector expenditures”.740 All of them are subject to four eligibility criteria: 
“national/sector policies and reforms (‘public policies’); stable macro-economic framework; 
public financial management; transparency and oversight of the budget”.741 
As an implementing modality of EU financial assistance that foresees direct transfers into 
the Treasury, budget support was initially seen favourably by beneficiaries in enlargement 
countries, as a sort of a “gift”. 742 Yet, its implementation proved not so easy for country 
authorities. Its “intrusive” character, with time, risked giving rise to a certain “fatigue”. 
Firstly, because of its prerequisites (sector policies, PFM strategy, result indicators) and its 
concrete modalities, requiring the opening to external scrutiny of “the very earth of 
government” and of the political-administrative patronage links, i.e. the treasury system. 
“Suddenly we saw more transparency in the use of donor funds, we discovered overlaps and 
hole-covering”. Secondly, because authorities soon discovered that the disbursement of the 
“gift” is actually conditioned to achieving results: “when we had to pay the first tranche, we 
could pay only one third of it, cause the result indicators had not been fulfilled yet”. The 
move towards budget support also required a change of mindset, from a project-based 
approach (sometimes simply used as constituency-building under a patronage logic) to a 
systemic approach requiring developed strategies and programmes, in which it is less easy to 
suddenly include requests for purely electoral handouts. At the same time, its prerequisites 
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Ibid., p.12.
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Ibid., p.11.
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This and following quotes: from interaction with a Commission official, formerly Head of Cooperation in a 
country with a Sector Budget Support programme, October 2017.
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(strengthening public finance management, e.g. audit authorities, procurement commissions, 
administrative procedures) made it so that a move towards budget support is seen as 
“triggering reform by design”. 743 
While decentralised management by the domestic authorities (now called “indirect 
management” under IPA II) was the default management mode under IPA I, in the new IPA II 
instrument a more flexible approach to aid modalities was introduced.
 744
 The Commission 
decided not to request new national structures to be put in place too early in the process 
towards EU membership, and identified the finalisation of the preparations for opening the 
negotiation chapters relevant for the future management of cohesion/structural funds as the 
benchmark for asking an action plan to this aim. Also those structures already set up under 
IPA I would have been subject to an assessment of positive performance before entrusting 
them with indirect management under IPA II. In the understanding of the Commission, 
indirect management should have been used primarily as a learning tool to prepare the 
national authorities for managing future structural/cohesion funds, and thus applied mainly to 
IPA actions mirroring those funded by the EU in the Member States. 
Seeing the delays and implementation issues caused by indirect management under IPA I, 
this implementation modality was swiftly scaled down under IPA II.
 
The Commission aimed 
to be very selective in the use of indirect management, while at the same time acknowledging 
the investments already undertaken by the enlargement countries and the need to make good 
use of the structures already set up, thus foreseeing a balanced mix of implementation 
modalities under IPA II. 
                                                 
743 
Ibid.
 
744While “assistance should continue to make use of structures and instruments that have proved their worth in 
the pre-accession process (…), the transition from direct to indirect management by the IPA II beneficiaries 
should be progressive and in line with the respective capacities of those IPA II beneficiaries”. IPA II 
Regulation 231/2014, Art.15.
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Countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina could thus continue with direct management 
of funds by the EU Delegation, while the progressive maturation of different sectors could 
with time lead to financial assistance under budget support modalities. For these reasons, the 
Indicative Strategy Paper for BiH was originally limited to a three-year period, 2014-2017, 
rather than up to 2020, in order to leave it to a later moment the identification of the mature 
sectors for which a budget support operation could be envisaged – in the hope that this would 
also have spurred preparations on the Bosnian side.  
IPA II thus marked a shift away from the decentralisation of management that had been 
so much in focus under IPA I, towards a more function-oriented system in which an 
obligation of result is coupled with more flexibility with regards to the means to achieve it, 
thus adding flexibility to the system and facilitating context-sensitive local solutions. Under 
IPA II, the implementation of EU funds is still entrusted to national authorities, but by making 
use of existing administrative systems rather than seeking wholesale reform in accordance 
with an external model. The EU demands a sound system of checks and balances (public 
finance management and public procurement standards), but does no longer prescribe the 
establishment of new domestic structures and their external accreditation by the 
Commission.
745
 This alternative mode of implementation attests to an ongoing shift from 
structures to functions in the conceptualisation of EU enlargement policy, accompanied by a 
more result-oriented approach to what is required from candidate countries.
746
 By becoming 
less prescriptive about the means, while retaining an obligation of results, the EU may better 
manage to accommodate state structures that depart from the usual model of centralised 
administrations, such as those of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Domestic ownership and flexibility 
may benefit from such a change. 
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The new approach to financial assistance is not without its own risks, though. The acquis 
remains a reference point for the IPA II, and management decentralisation is still among its 
aims. Yet, the financial instrument is more geared to support the general socio-economic 
objectives of development, rather than the specific objective of preparation for EU 
accession.
747
 In this, the IPA II is more consistent with other EU external funds, from 
neighbourhood policy to development cooperation, as well as with pre-2007 instruments for 
the Western Balkans, rather than designed for the specific aim of enlargement policy. Insofar 
as it focuses on local needs and ownership rather than on the preparation of candidates for the 
post-accession management of EU funds, it risks sending to the candidate countries a wrong 
message of uncertain commitment and time horizon for EU accession.  
It remains to be seen whether the changes foreseen by the IPA II will allow the political 
blockages that have mired the implementation of its predecessor to be overcome. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina may now in principle receive assistance in all sectors, including agriculture/rural 
development, employment and social policy, and not just to the ones for institution-building 
and cross-border cooperation. Moreover, the sector approach requires the previous 
identification of strategic needs and priorities and allows for a flexible allocation of funding; 
this should lead to more efficient planning of projects. The risk remains that Bosnia might 
falls behind even under these modalities of implementation.  
2.2 Countrywide strategies as the new mantra of EU financial assistance 
A mapping study conducted by the HTSPE consultancy in 2014
748
 led to the 
identification of those sectors deemed mature enough for sector approach, based on criteria 
including sectoral strategies, institutions, financial resources, coordination, and sound 
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country-wide finance management. The study found Serbia almost ready for sector approach 
in public administration reform, justice, and home affairs, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
almost ready in public administration reform and justice, with the other enlargement countries 
still lagging behind in most sectors. Observers from the Bosnian civil society deemed it “very 
likely that BiH will not be eligible for sector approach in the delivery of IPA funds for 2014 
in a large number of sectors”.749 EU officials as well considered the study as likely overly 
optimistic on Bosnia and Herzegovina,
750
 also because the country still lacked the prerequisite 
of a countrywide public finance management strategy.
 751
 Overall the implementation of 
sector approach remained in transition at mid-term.
 
 
With the introduction of sector approach, the mantra of EU financial assistance shifted 
from accreditation of decentralised management to the adoption of national sector strategies 
(in Bosnia and Herzegovina denominated “countrywide strategies”). A strategy, or plan, is a 
policy document that states the government’s objectives in a given sector in a mid-term 
perspective (3 to 5 years); strategy and ensuing activies would then be reflected in a budget. 
Achieving consensus among governmental actors, donors and stakeholders on the sector 
priorities was considered as one of the main aim of the development of sector strategies, 
whose implementation would later be co-financed by domestic and international actors.  
In case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, though, the main challenge would prove to be the 
establishment of consensus among governmental actors at different levels. In fact, EU 
officials planning financial assistance soon noticed how Bosnia’s case was “more problematic 
                                                 
749
 Foreign Policy Initiative BH (FPI BH), What does IPA II mean to us? Sarajevo, June 2014, p. 4. 
750 
Interaction with EU officials and DAI Europe consortium evaluators, 13 October 2017.
 
751 
An agreement to produce a countrywide PFM strategy was reached in July 2016 between the state, entities, 
and Brčko District authorities. With EU-funded IMF and SIGMA assistance, the BiH state and the Federation 
entity produced their own PFM strategies. The RS entity did not share the draft or adopt its own PFM 
strategy, citing concerns with the off-track IMF arrangement, despite Commission explanations regarding 
assessment of macroeconomic stability. 
 
258 
 
than a ‘normal’ state”.752  Given the distribution of competences in the country, a national or 
countrywide strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina would necessarily require multi-level 
sectoral cooperation – which, given the outstanding state contestation, would prove elusive. 
To the least, achieving consensus between authorities at all levels – often (ethno)politically 
opposed to one another – would require more time. Consensus comes at the expense of 
efficiency, but in the case of financial assistance this runs the risk of crushing against the hard 
deadlines of the annual programming cycles. Early-developed strategies in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina included those on justice and on public administration reform (PAR). For what 
concerns other sector strategies, their development remained marred by controversy, as 
Republika Srpska often did not take part in the efforts to develop them. 
For what concerns the first, the Justice Sector Reform Strategy (JSRS) would constitute a 
first backbone for a sector approach to justice and home affairs. In this regard, despite 
agreement on sector priorities and clarification of role and responsibilities of each 
stakeholder, the lack of capacities, institutional coordination, and political will, all contribute 
to explain the difficulties in the implementation of the strategy.  
On the public administration reform strategy, issues of ownership and administrative 
capacities continued to hinder its implementation.
753
  Disagreements concern the foreseen 
horizontal scope (restricted to civil services for the RS, extended to the wider public sector for 
the Federation) as well as vertical scope (limited to the state, entities and Brčko District for 
the RS, extended to involve also the cantons for the Federation). At the same time, a worrying 
trend of adoption of civil service laws in different cantons, with increased risks of 
politicisation, has emerged, while the Federation Supreme Court had to strike down the 
amendments to the Federation civil service law that allowed the entity government to appoint 
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senior- and middle-level civil servants. An approach based on complementarity of 
competences between different levels of governance, rather than competitive competences, 
remains to be developed. The PAR strategy had expired in 2014, but a revised action plan is 
still being implemented. A draft countrywide strategic framework on public administration 
reform was prepared with the support of SIGMA, UK-funded experts and GiZ, and by the end 
of 2017 it was undergoing public consultations, but concerns were raised about its quality. 
In the agriculture sector, a Strategic plan for rural development of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 2018-2021 was adopted by all governments in BiH by early 2018; its 
parliamentary adoption remain pending an d necessary for Bosnia and Herzegovina to access 
EU funds for agriculture under IPA2018 (disbursement starting in 2019).  
In the employment sector, the BiH authorities finally asked the Commission to postpone 
the preparation of the Sector reform contract to 2019. Budget support in the Employment 
sector remained marred not only by the lack of a countrywide sector strategy, but also by the 
fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina still lacks a public finance management strategy – a 
prerequisite for any budget support operation.  
In the transport sector, a BiH Transport Policy Document had been adopted by the BiH 
Council of Ministers in 2008 and later rejected by Parliament due to opposition from RS-
based parties. Multi-level consultations resumed in early 2014. The document was re-adopted 
by the Council of Ministers, but again rejected by Parliament. The European Commission 
encouraged the establishment of a sectoral working group (with ministries of transport at state 
and entity levels) to identify a way forward. With support from the UK embassy, BiH 
authorities finally agreed to a countrywide strategy one day before the 2016 Paris Summit of 
the Berlin process, at which they hoped to achieve financing grants and loans for 
infrastructural connectivity projects. This was considered too last-moment by the European 
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Commission and international financing institutions alike. At the following year’s summit in 
Trieste, Bosnia and Herzegovina announced at the very last moment that it would not have 
been able to take part in the signature of the Transport Community Treaty. The diplomatic 
fiasco led the European Commission to freeze the IPA grants which would have worked as 
co-financing for EBRD’s loans for infrastructural investments (Corridor V-c sectors and 
Brčko Port). While Bosnia and Herzegovina finally signed the Transport Community Treaty 
by late September, after heavy advocacy efforts, the law on fuel excises, considered by IMF 
and EBRD as a necessary indicator of the fiscal space available to co-finance infrastructural 
projects, could only be adopted by the BiH Parliament in mid December 2017.  
The energy sector is another one in which competence is mostly constitutionally allocated 
at sub-state levels. Despite a comprehensive study developed in 2008 through a World Bank 
loan,
754
 providing the basis for the development of a countrywide energy strategy, an entity-
level strategy for Republika Srpska alone was adopted in 2010 with a 2030 perspective. The 
Federation entity also developed and adopted in 2009 a Strategic plan and program for the 
development of the energy sector. A BiH framework energy strategy was developed in the 
course of 2017 with the support of the UK embassy under a “modular approach”– combining 
the two entity-level strategies in a single document while ensuring that entities’ respective 
interests are fulfilled and investments are made based on the agreed ratio. Yet, this raised 
concerns on the technical efficiency and financial soundness of the strategy. 
In the environment sector, the development of a countrywide strategy was initially stalled 
by Republika Srpska disagreement, as competence in the sector is mainly at entity level. 
Consultations restarted in December 2013 in the framework of the EnvIS project,
 755
  focusing 
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on the development in parallel of strategic documents at different levels of governance, in line 
with constitutional competencies. An Environmental Approximation Strategy was finally 
adopted in May 2017, complemented by a programme of approximation for each entity and 
the Brčko District, thus opening up for the possibility of IPA support to the sector under 
IPA2018 starting from 2019. It was not published in the Official Gazette by the end of 2017, 
and its “modular” framework raised concerns as to the quality of the document.  
For what concerns the strategy on public finance management (PFM) – a prerequisite for 
budget support in all other sectors – following the agreement to produce a countrywide PFM 
strategy in June 2016 separate strategies where developed by the different levels with the 
assistance of EU-funded IMF and SIGMA experts, to be later consolidated in a single 
countrywide document. The respective strategies were adopted by the Federation entity, the 
Brčko District and the state level between December 2016 and June 2017. Nevertheless, the 
Republika Srpska entity did not share their draft strategy nor did they adopt it in the course of 
2017, citing the off-track IMF programme as a pretext, despite Commission reassurances that 
the macroeconomic stability prerequisite is assessed by the EU based on its own parameters. 
Table 4.8 – Development of countrywide sector strategies  
Public financial management Modular; RS missing No draft available 
Public administration reform  Draft under consultation 
Justice sector reform  In force (2014-2018) 
Transport  Adopted July 2016 
Rural development  Modular; all levels present Pending parl. adoption 
Employment Modular; FBiH missing No draft available 
Energy Modular; all levels present Consent by RS needed 
Environment Modular; all levels present Not published in OJ yet 
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3. Mirroring consensus engines: country-wide strategies and the 
Coordination Mechanism 
Another example of the Bosnian mirroring of EU consensus engines is in the 
Coordination Mechanism. As Bosnia and Herzegovina is structured as an asymmetric 
federation, the same sector (e.g. education) may be exclusive competence of one entity and of 
the cantons in the other entity, with further devolution to municipalities in some cantons, and 
with the state administration having a narrow role of overall coordination.
756
 This has led to 
the issue of Bosnia not being able to speak with one voice to the EU, for instance not being 
able to agree on those country-wide strategies necessary for the new sector-based mode of 
implementation of IPA funds, as discussed above.  
3.1 The growth and decline of the Directorate for European Integration  
The issue of coordination of EU affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina started to become 
topical already in the early 2000s, with the introduction of financial assistance programmes 
(CARDS) that required a substantial input by the country authorities. A Ministry of European 
Integration (MEI) had been established in 2000.
 757
  It was later replaced by the Directorate 
for European Integration (DEI), an expert body attached to the BiH Council of Ministers, 
758
 
tasked with co-ordinating the process of EU integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The DEI 
presents itself as "a permanent, independent and expert body of the Council of Ministers", " 
responsible for  coordination of activities of the BiH authorities and supervision of the 
implementation of decisions passed by the relevant institutions in BiH concerning the  
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requirements for the European integration." 
759
 The DEI is in principle competent for both 
horizontal coordination – between different ministries and agencies at the state level – and 
vertical coordination – between authorities at different levels of governance: state, entities, 
cantons. The DEI Director is the National IPA Coordinator (NIPAC) and the directorate also 
conducts outreach and public information campaigns. 
760
 Its competences are listed as 
follows:  
Co-ordination of activities on harmonisation of the BiH legal system with 
the EU accession standards (acquis communautaire); Verification of the 
coherence of all draft laws and regulations submitted to the Council of 
Ministers by all ministries and administrative units with directives of the 
"White Paper – Preparation of Associated States of Central and Eastern 
Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union"; 
Harmonisation of the activities of the authorities and institutions of BiH in 
the field of the EU integration; Co-ordination of enforcement of decisions 
passed by relevant authorities and institutions of BiH, Entities and of the 
Brčko District of BiH in regard to all activities necessary in the field of the 
EU integration; Acting as the central operational partner of the institutions 
of the European Commission in the process of stabilisation and association; 
Co-ordination of the EU assistance.
 761
 
As the main counterpart of the European Commission in the process of EU integration of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the DEI (and the MEI before it) was established with the aim of 
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becoming the spokesperson for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole,  through which the 
country could have "spoken with a single voice" to the European Union. Yet, this proved not 
possible in the following years. Vertical coordination between levels of governance proved 
particularly challenging. The uneven distribution of competences between state and entities 
(and their frequent contestation – one of the features of state contestation in BiH), and the 
institutional basis of the DEI as an expert body of the state-level Council of Ministers, made 
so that any initiative of DEI got to be seen by the entities as yet another attempt of the state-
level to grab some powers at their expense. With Milorad Dodik's openly secessionist SNSD 
party coming to power in 2006, Republika Srpska started undermining DEI's standing and 
activities, up to claiming a separate track for EU accession. 
762
 
The DEI was considered as "a rare case where a central state-level institution exists with 
a full capacity to coordinate policies at lower levels".
763
 Yet, these capacities were hampered 
by the will of sub-state entities to jealously preserve their competences and not allow any 
state-level institution to have to deal with them, not even with a coordination role. Observers 
had called for "constitutional reforms that would allow the state to play a stronger 
coordination role";
764
 in fact, the 2006 "April package" of constitutional reforms would have 
included a specific clause for EU integration.
765
 Since the failure of the latter, the DEI 
remained tasked with coordinating counterparts that did not wish to be coordinated by it.  
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While in 2005 the Commission had welcomed the growing role of DEI, "now able to act 
as a real National Aid Coordinator", and the promising steps towards possible future 
decentralisation of financial assistance,
766
 in 2007 they noted that DEI's work to "promote the 
objective of European integration by continuing its efforts to improve coordination of State 
and Entity ministries" had been "hampered by the politicised climate" and that coordination 
among authorities remained "minimal" and "depend[ing] largely on personal and party 
interests".
767
 The following year, while noting the progress in horizontal coordination, for 
which "units for European  integration have been established in each ministry in the Council 
of Ministers", the Commission also remarked the significant delays in the adoption of the 
action plan for the implementation of the European Partnership priorities, "as a result of 
Republika Srpska's challenges to the competences of the State level in a number of areas". 
768
 
3.2 The debate on the need for a coordination mechanism  
The overall lack of legislative coordination between state and entities is briefly noted in 
all the Commission progress reports on BiH from 2006 onwards. The discussion on a 
coordination mechanism starts in 2011, when the Commission noted that "the EU accession 
process requires political will and functional institutions at all levels with an effective 
coordination mechanism on EU matters,"
 769
 as the DEI "remains without the necessary 
authority to drive the EU integration process forward" and its role "requires further 
strengthening".
770
 Political discord among authorities had also delayed programming for 
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IPA2011.
771
 The call was repeated in the 2012 report, 
772
 as lack of agreement on priorities 
continued to hamper the programming of financial assistance
773
. The Commission noted that 
"Establishing an effective coordination mechanism between various levels of government for 
the transposition, implementation and enforcement of EU laws so that the country can speak 
with one voice on EU matters, remains an issue to be addressed".
774
 No progress was reported 
the following year either, as "efforts led by the Council of Ministers to define an effective 
coordination mechanism between various levels of government for the transposition, 
implementation and enforcement of EU laws have not yielded results".
775
 One SA Sub-
Committee meeting was reportedly also cancelled due to lack of a common position on the 
BiH side on the topics to be discussed, "which is without precedent. This illustrates the urgent 
need for an effective coordination mechanism on EU matters."
 776
 In 2014 the Commission 
noted once more that "a well-functioning coordination mechanism on EU matters" was 
required to improve the efficiency of the interaction between levels of government, and that 
the lack of agreement on countrywide strategies (a precondition for financial assistance) had 
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caused "a substantial reduction of funding".
777
 An agreement on the matter was still out of 
reach, "despite intensive facilitation efforts by the EU".
778
 The role of DEI was also seen as 
further weakening due to disagreement within the Council of Ministers and lack of 
cooperation from the entities. 
779
 Several sub-committees had to be cancelled. The entry into 
force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2015 made the need for an effective 
coordination mechanism even more stringent.
 780 
Only two sub-committees could be held in 
2014/15.
781
 One of the main reasons was also the suspicion, from the Republika Srpska 
authorities, that the coordination mechanism could be used to “upload” competences from the 
entity to the state level under the flag of European integration, as had been foreseen in the 
2006 April package. This was one misconception that took long to address.  
3.3 Getting to an agreement on the coordination mechanism  
In early June 2015, while the Reform Agenda was being finalised the BiH Council of 
Ministers decided to re-table the 2013 proposal for a coordination mechanism, then submitted 
by Prime Minister Bevanda and proposing it for adoption by the entity governments after 
alignment with the now-in-force SAA. The main principles for the coordination mechanism, 
as agreed by all Bosnian actors, included: (a) full respect for the constitutionally-mandated 
distribution of competences between the different levels of governance; the coordination 
mechanism was not supposed to be a tool for shifting competences between different levels; 
(b) responsibility of each level to timely and efficiently implement the obligations stemming 
from EU integration, in their own sphere of competence; (c) full compliance with the SAA 
and the decisions of the joint SA bodies; and (d) consensus as the main principle of decision-
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making among the appointed members of the coordination bodies. Participation in the 
mechanism’s bodies also meant to establish permanent delegations for participation in the 
joint EU-BiH SA bodies,
782
  which had till then remained a matter of controversy between 
state and entities. 
The SAA does not explicitly regulate how the partner country should internally 
coordinate in EU-related matters nor who should participate in the SA joint bodies from their 
side. The SAA does not prejudge internal decision-making structures and procedures, as these 
are linked to the domestic distribution of competences, and the EU has no appetite to get 
involved in internal political disputes. The only prescription, in this case, is that the partner 
country may present in the joint bodies a common position that represents and binds Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as a whole as party to the SAA, irrespective of the actual composition of the 
participant delegation. This requires a prior coordination and agreement. Yet, it had been 
consistent practice in previous cases (most notably Serbia and Croatia) that these matters are 
regulated together and that EU affairs coordination is based on the institutional provisions of 
the SAA, thus creating a strong link between the joint bodies and the domestic follow-up. The 
BiH authorities thus decided (and the EU Delegation concurred with their evaluation) that the 
optimal solution would have been to align the internal coordination mechanism with the 
structure of the joint bodies under the SAA.  
A Decision on the Coordination Mechanism was adopted by the BiH Council of 
Ministers in January 2016,
 783
 but soon contested by the Republika Srpska entity. The 
agreement on the coordination mechanism was one the three consensus-enablers established 
by the EU Council in order to take into consideration Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU 
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membership application, deposited in February 2016. Consultations continued up to the 
summer, with Bosniak parties also positing a deal on the coordination mechanism as a 
condition for their go-ahead of the (much coveted by the cash-strapped RS authorities) IMF’s 
Extended Financial Facility. A deal was reached at an informal dinner between the Bosniak 
BiH Presidency member and the RS President at the Motel Barka in East Sarajevo on 31 July, 
upon facilitation by the EU Ambassador, which also allowed for immediate signing and 
dispatching of a two-weeks-delayed Letter of Intent to the IMF. Yet this raised the politically-
motivated objections of the Croat parties. 
After further negotiations, in late August 2016 all Bosnian authorities finally agreed
784
  
on the set up and procedures of the Coordination Mechanism - a series of structures to mirror, 
on the BiH side, the joint bodies of the EU-BiH Stabilisation and Association (SA) policy 
cycle (see table 6.7 below). This coordination mechanism is meant to bring together all 
Bosnian authorities competent on a specific issue, at different levels of governance, in order 
to agree on a common position for the country before EU talks. The structures of the 
mechanism, deciding by consensus, allow for the escalation of contentious issues from the 
technical to the political level, and foresees as final authorities a series of sectoral ministerial 
conferences
785
 and a collegium at prime ministers’ level, tasked to take final decisions on the 
matters of highest controversy. Dispute resolution by escalation did not in principle prevent 
controversies from being simply passed on at the higher technical/political level; to avoid 
such buck-passing, the rules of procedure foresaw that any request should include also 
background and possible models for resolution. 
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Table 5.7 – Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Coordination Mechanism 
SA bodies 
(BiH members) 
BiH 
coordination 
structure 
Members Role 
SA Council 
(CoM Chair and 
deputies) 
Collegium for 
EU integration 
BiH CoM chair and deputies; 
2 entity PMs; 10 cantonal 
PMs; Brčko Mayor (16). All 
presenting agreed positions 
for each level. 
Overall political 
coordination: strategic 
guidance and highest 
instance of dispute 
settlement 
 Ministerial 
Conferences 
Competent ministers at all 
levels in each sector 
Political sectoral 
coordination 
SA Committee 
(DEI Director) 
Commission 
for EU 
Integration 
DEI Director + coordinators 
at entity, cantons and Brčko 
level.  
Overall technical 
coordination; 
Implement. SAA 
obligations; 
Identification of 
competences 
SA 
SubCommittees 
(Assistant 
Ministers) 
Sub-
Commissions 
(8) 
Representatives of each 
competent government 
(assistant ministers; chairs 
and deputy chairs of Working 
Groups) 
Technical sectoral 
coordination; 
coordination of WGs 
per each EU-BiH 
SubCommittee 
 Working 
Groups (35) 
Sectoral representatives of 
competent institutions, as 
confirmed by the BiH 
Council of Ministers 
Operational level 
 
As a consensus-building engine, the coordination mechanism aimed for the widest 
participation and consensual decision-making. The compromise managed to ensure the 
broadest participation, including of cantons: fully at the technical level and more restrictively 
at the political level, where their representatives need to present previously-coordinated 
common positions (though this intra-entity coordination is not addressed in the mechanism 
itself) and may vote only on those issues falling under their exclusive competence. On the 
other hand, its functionality and efficiency remained in doubt. The structure seemed 
cumbersome and complex; potential issues included both logistic management (setting 
calendars and venues) and the risk of clogging the political level with technical issues being 
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escalated from the lower levels, in case of lack of political mandate. The issue of achieving 
consensus in assemblies of over 100 representatives, and the legal value (if any) of the 
“guidelines” agreed by the various coordination bodies also remained in doubt. Yet, the 
coordination mechanism was welcomed by EU actors as a first-ever compromise attempt with 
a realistic chance of finalisation and agreement, and particularly helping overcome one thorny 
political obstacle with Republika Srpska that had complicated thus far EU-BiH relations, 
allowing for a new phase of relations to start with the implementation of the Reform Agenda 
and the foreseen presentation of the EU membership application of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
However, Republika Srpska authorities did not stop challenging EU integration efforts, 
by trying to set up direct lines of reporting to the European Commission ("a practice which 
directly challenges the need for the country to ensure a single channel of communication with 
the EU"), and by not participating in the development of countrywide strategies for financial 
assistance, reportedly while waiting for the bodies under the coordination mechanism to be 
established, "with a major negative impact on programming and implementing the EU’s 
financial assistance" .
786
 
3.4 The slow establishment of the coordination mechanism 
The first testing ground for the coordination mechanism consisted in the consolidation 
into a single set of the replies of the Bosnian public administration bodies at all levels to the 
Questionnaire that the European Commission presented to the Bosnian authorities in 
December 2016.
787
 The coordination mechanism should also be made use for in order to agree 
on the country-wide strategies needed to access EU funds, as well as in any other situation 
that may require domestic multi-level agreement on EU-related matters, to avoid situations 
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such as the missed signature of the Transport Community Treaty at the July 2017 Western 
Balkans summit in Trieste, reportedly due to lack of agreement by the Republika Srpska 
entity government.  
In fact, the establishment of the coordination mechanism proceeded very slowly during 
2017, and the preparation of the replies to the Commission’s Questionnaire equally saw 
delays. A Decision of the BiH Council of Ministers identifying the members and rotating 
chairs of the 33 acquis-based working groups under the coordination mechanism was adopted 
in late March 2017, with over 1,300 members overall.
788
  The finalisation of this list was a 
long-standing requirement by Republika Srpska to contribute to the process of preparation of 
the consolidated replies to the Commission’s Questionnaire via the online software managed 
by DEI. The Decision, which implements the political agreement reached at the meeting of 14 
March 2017 of the BiH Collegium for EU Integration, rests on the principle of inclusion of all 
levels of governance in all working groups (thus also in cases for which there is no explicit 
competence of the lower levels), and 6-month rotation of the chairmanship of each working 
group. A compromise was reached on the presence of the Federation BiH Ministry of Culture 
and Sports and Federation BiH Ministry of Education and Culture (whose role and 
competence is contested by the Federation cantons), providing for their participation with 
observer status only, without voting or chairmanship power. The decision, finally, identifies 
the institutional members of each working group while leaving it to the Commission for EU 
Integration to finalise (and eventually amend) the personal identification of the members of 
each body. In such a configuration, the DEI took a backseat, providing “professional, 
technical and IT support” to the chairs and secretaries of the working group, while not 
performing such functions itself – a solution agreed in order to overcome the reservations of 
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Republika Srpska, which up until May 2017 continued to deliberately ignore any direct 
communication from DEI. As of June the working groups started working on the 
consolidation of the replies to the Commission Questionnaire. 
As with the Structured Dialogue on Justice, the Coordination Mechanism is a second 
example of the export of EU-typical consensus engines in the Bosnian context, with the aim 
to foster a less confrontational attitude between authorities at different levels and overcome 
defensive positionalism, and alleviate state contestation while preserving and strengthening 
the legitimacy of political institutions, in line with a member state building model. The bodies 
under the coordination mechanism appear as yet another instance of consensus-building 
engines, exported by the EU integration process in BiH. In this case, and differently from the 
Structured Dialogue on Justice, the coordination mechanism remains a trans-governmental 
body within a vertical hierarchy – without input from external actors such as civil society and 
EU officials (although the working groups have the faculty to extend ad hoc invitations to 
NGOs and academia). The Coordination Mechanism, while not impinging on the internal 
distribution of competences, should allow with time Bosnian authorities at all levels to 
achieve prior political consensus on EU-related issues and reforms, avoiding the all-too-often 
ex post blockages that characterize Bosnian politics. On the other hand, as it is a typical 
feature of consensus-building engines, with its emphasis on inclusivity and participation the 
coordination mechanism remains an unwieldy procedure with inevitable trade-offs in terms of 
efficiency and speed. The finalisation of a single set of coordinated and consolidated replies 
to the Commission’s Questionnaire, expected by early 2018, will show whether the approach 
will prove able to broker compromise and smoothen Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU 
integration process in the future (for instance facilitating the agreement on countrywide sector 
strategies allowing for IPA financial support), and will thus have deserved all the resources 
required to agree and setting it up, or whether it will remain a politically expedient attempt, 
274 
 
and problems of defensive positionalism and confrontational political culture will present 
themselves again in different forms and occasions.  
 
Conclusions  
This chapter has focused on the other dimension of statehood, capacity, directly linked 
with the Copenhagen criteria concerning the “administrative and institutional capacity to 
effectively implement the acquis and ability to take on the obligations of membership”, as 
well as to the standard notion of international state-building as a way to prevent the collapse 
of weak states into war.  
 
 
By analysing the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), it highlighted how EU-
led capacity building is not merely aimed at strengthening state structures, butfocuses 
specifically on those bodies that are directly responsible and necessary for the implementation 
of the EU acquis, and how it does not merely follow an outside-in, top-down approach, but 
rather requires target countries to develop local solutions to adapt their structures to the 
requirements of the EU acquis.   
EU practices of capacity building in its enlargement policy therefore show a specific 
rationale and structure, which is the product of a learning process, which can be perceived in 
the evolution from IPA to IPA-II.  EU practices of capacity building started from an 
incentive-based approach to institution building, as in the thrust towards decentralised 
management. Also due to the mixed results of such an approach, the EU later shifted its focus 
from structures to functions, away from a pre-determined blueprint and towards local 
adaptations to the domestic context.  
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EU-driven capacity building is not separate from wider societal and political needs. The 
shift to a sector approach under IPA-II translated in a novel emphasis on the need for 
countrywide sector strategies, which in a highly decentralised country like Bosnia and 
Herzegovina necessitate a wide consensus among political actors at multiple levels of 
governance. The EU thus leverages on this commitment to foster domestic policy dialogue 
and overcome state contestation.  
Financial assistance has thus been the instrument for supporting the capacity dimension 
of statehood in Bosnia and Herzegovina, first under an incentive-based model to institution-
building (IPA DIS) and then via consensus-generating mechanisms in line with the approach 
of member states building (coordination mechanism).  
Finally, consensus-generating mechanisms emerge in this area too, such as in the debate 
on a coordination mechanism (a trans-governmental body within a vertical hierarchy, with 
input from external stakeholders where needed) through which the competent authorities at all 
levels of government may agree on countrywide strategies in order to “speak with a single 
BiH voice to the EU”.  
EU practices thus evolved from incentive-based institution-building to the establishment 
of consensus-generating mechanisms. This evolution also shows a learning process of the EU 
on how best to support capacity-building in the context of state contestation within its 
enlargement region.  
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General Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation starts from the general problematique surrounding European 
enlargement policy today – how to prepare Western Balkan countries for EU accession – and 
focuses on the issue of “member state building”, i.e. the specific actions that the EU needs to 
undertake in order to help building states capable of implementing the acquis as well as of 
respecting the required standards of democracy. This involves facing issues of contestation of 
state authority and, more generally, responding to the call to “build functional states while 
integrating them”. This dissertation claims that, in order to cope with contested statehood in 
applicant countries, the EU has over time adapted its enlargement practices to include state-
building elements. These include exporting consensus-generating mechanisms, adapted from 
the EU’s own internal experience, aimed at fostering domestic consensus as a precondition for 
reinforcing both the administrative capacities and the political legitimacy of a country’s 
institutions. 
The starting point of this research was the puzzle of the missing Europeanisation in the 
Western Balkans. The EU enlargement policy aims to transform applicant countries into 
fully-fledged member states, committed to abide by the EU acquis and able to take part in the 
EU’s decision-making and policy implementation processes. Despite these long-term efforts 
and multiple attempts at refining the strategies of “external Europeanization”,789 the process 
of Europeanisation seems to encounter significant difficulties in the Western Balkans. 
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Following the intuition of Linz and Stepan on the role of the contestation of the polity in 
explaining post-communist transitions,
790
 the literature on Europeanization noted how the 
contestation of statehood impinges on the will and capacity of prospective accession countries 
to comply with EU standards and hinders the causal mechanisms of Europeanisation, 
normally seen to operate through conditionality and socialisation.
791
 This has led the EU to 
fall into cycles of mismanaged conditionality, such as in the cases of police reform and 
constitutional reform processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are described in the second 
chapter of the thesis. This dissertation sought to illustrate the cyclical trial-and-error process 
of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina and identify the outcomes of such learning process. 
This thesis rejected Fukuyama’s “stateness first” hypothesis792 as too deterministic and 
static. According to this view statehood is a crucial precondition which may help or hinder 
Europeanisation, and apparently one on which the EU has no influence, being rather 
determined by long-term structural and cultural processes. The dissertation thus started from 
an alternative theoretical lens that, following Sbragia,
793
 see how the EU and its member 
states have over time become mutually constitutive. The dissertation thus adopted a research 
design that posits statehood and its contestation as the dependent variable, and investigated 
whether and how the EU affects it through the pre-accession process. The thesis therefore 
asked which notions of statehood and sovereignty underpin EU practices of state-building, 
and to what extent these differ from those of other international agencies. Moreover, it also 
asked in what way and to what extent the EU has adapted over time to take into account the 
contestation of statehood within its enlargement policy, and which specific practices have 
been enacted by the EU to respond to the contestation of statehood. 
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By bridging the literature on European integration, state building, and Europeanisation, 
this study traced the transformations of sovereignty and of the state throughout the process of 
European integration. After reviewing in detail the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
two crucial processes of police reform and constitutional reform, this thesis comes to the 
conclusion that the EU can indeed affect statehood, provided that it is ready to adapt to the 
circumstances and that it refrains from imposing a set script. This thesis has shown that both 
processes of state building and EU accession can be pursued jointly – “building functional 
member states while integrating them” is indeed possible! – but that this must be carefully 
managed,  involving where necessary the adaptation of consolidated practices that have 
traditionally worked in previous rounds of enlargement.  
The main argument of the dissertation is that the EU has learned to adapt, by enacting 
practices of state building to cope with contested statehood in its enlargement policy. To this 
end, the EU tended to export its own internal mechanisms of consensus-building, thus 
encouraging domestic political actors to move from a defensive-positionalist attitude to a 
more cooperative one which is a precondition for reinforcing both the administrative 
capacities and the political legitimacy of a country’s institutions and overall statehood. 
In order to explore this difficult balancing act, the thesis adopted a qualitative 
methodology based on social constructivism, which allowed to consider actors’ interests and 
preferences as endogenous to the process of interaction and to show how identity is 
increasingly defined by membership in a social community. This perspective proved useful to 
highlight the transformation of sovereignty and statehood within the European integration 
process.  First of all, a notion of “sovereignty as participation” emerged as the guiding 
notion that underpins the EU practices of state-building. According to this notion, EU 
member states are sovereign in so far as they can participate in the common decision-making 
and policy implementation, rather than being excluded from them. Secondly, following the 
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literature on the transformations of the state within European integration, the thesis 
highlighted the growth of a double duty of accountability, to the domestic and to the 
international level, as well as the relativisation of the linkages between state and society, and 
the development of consensus-generating mechanisms.  
Through the study of two policy processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Structured 
Dialogue on Justice and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance), the dissertation 
examined how the EU aims at reinforcing at the same time both dimensions of statehood, 
reinforcing the capacities of domestic institutions while also enhancing their political 
legitimacy via the introduction of consensus-generating mechanisms. It is the role of the EU 
as an interested mediator and the emancipatory potential of accession that set member state 
building apart from ‘liberal peace’ international state building. “Member state building” thus 
emerges as an enlargement-specific form of EU-led state building, allowing the EU to cope 
with contested statehood in its candidate countries and potential candidates. While remaining 
anchored within the EU acquis and the EU accession perspective, member state building, 
contextualises state building practices within the EU enlargement process. 
In terms of research design, the study included two within-country policy processes, 
based on the “most different” approach, showing how in distinct policy areas (justice and 
home affairs, and the management of pre-accession assistance) it is possible to witness the 
same type of EU response to issues of state contestation. The use of two cases from the same 
country allowed to control for all other variables and make for easier comparability. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was selected, among the universe of cases, as a crucial example 
to study the approach of the EU to contested states. The contestation of state structures in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is related to the domestic challenges of sub-state actors in a highly 
decentralised and complex post-war governance system, rather than to issue of international 
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non-recognition. These features have already caused the EU to get trapped into mismanaged 
conditionality in the past. Yet, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not idiosyncratic, and 
the findings of this study are not to be seen only as a pragmatic response to failure, a mere 
adaptation of EU policies to peculiar local conditions. Rather, Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
selected as the context of the two case studies because its domestic features allow to better 
identify the processes at stake and make more evident how the EU strives to achieve an 
impact on issues of state contestation. If it is possible to see the EU adapt its strategies and 
policies to cope with the effects of state contestation in the Bosnian case, it is likely that 
similar developments may be in place also in other, less complex cases in which the EU is 
faced with state contestation. 
In terms of methods, the use of process tracing allowed to follow the development of 
policy responses and the learning process at stake. This is applied to the documentary analysis 
of written sources, coupled with semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in Brussels and 
Sarajevo.  
Time-wise, the study focuses on the 2011-2016 period, going as back as 2007 for what 
concerns financial assistance in order to include both EU financial cycles (2007-2013 and 
2014-2020). The year 2011 is taken as a turning point for its role as a marker of discontinuity: 
in 2011 the new, reinforced EU presence in the country was inaugurated, with a single Head 
of EU Delegation and EU Special Representative, separate from the OHR, and in the same 
year the Structured Dialogue on Justice was launched, propelling the EU to the helm of this 
new exercise. 
The thesis also has some clear limitations. Although the thesis identifies and theorizes the 
EU practices of member state building, it does not put forward any claims on their degree of 
effectiveness. On the one hand, this would be premature, as the Structured Dialogue on 
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Justice has not yet borne its final fruits, and equally the implementation of pre-accession 
funds is still ongoing. On the other hand, a focus on effectiveness would require a different 
methodology and a different theoretical basis, more interested in how to define what to call 
success in the Bosnian context. Rather, in this thesis I keep the analytical focus on the 
practices of EU member state-building, leaving it to future research to assess its effectiveness.  
Finally, in the last phases of the study my own position also changed as I took up a 
position as policy officer at the European Commission, DG NEAR, so that the research has 
taken up some characteristics of participant observation. This has allowed me to validate from 
within the insights previously achieved via documentary research and interviews, thus 
minimising the risks of reactivity.
794
 Yet, this also entailed a risk of loss of objectivity, which 
was mitigated by having already conducted most of the research before taking up positions 
within the EU institutions.  
These general conclusions recall the findings of each chapter of the dissertation, to then 
highlight the theoretical and policy implications of the study, and finally set the avenues for 
future research. 
 
1. Summary of the findings 
Chapter I investigated the notion of EU member state and its transformations throughout 
European integration. It introduced a thicker notion of EU member state, and identified social 
constructivism as the ontological perspective best suited to explore the mutual 
constitutiveness between the Union and its member states. The following section 
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problematized sovereignty, highlighting the notion of sovereignty as participation as a middle 
way between the opposing notions of sovereignty as control or as responsibility. Sovereignty 
as participation points to a transformation from the unitary to the disaggregated state 
underlining the functional autonomy of different state institutions in their transboundary 
relations, an understanding which is investigated in the rest of the chapter. The widely used 
framework of Europeanisation may help to explain the domestic effects of Europe and the 
transformation from nation states into member states via a double (domestic and international) 
relationship of accountability. Yet, the explanatory power of Europeanisation came to a 
standstill when facing the issue of contested statehood. The chapter put forward, as a heuristic 
alternative, the concept of member state building as the enlargement-specific form of state 
building. 
Member state building employs a wider set of tools than international state-building. 
Over time, it has grown into a project that does not only seek to strengthen the administrative 
efficiency through capacity-building projects (“capacities”), but it also takes into 
consideration the relationships between state and society (“legitimacy”), addressing both by 
the introduction of consensus-generating mechanisms, identified in political dialogue and 
coordination tools. The double emphasis on both the capacities and the legitimacy of state 
institutions provides EU member state building with a broad transformative potential, and 
highlights how the identity features of the EU emerge in its enlargement policy – the 
reproductive moment of the regional integration process. 
Chapter II introduces the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the setting of the case 
studies considered. After a short introduction to the Dayton political order, the chapter 
discussed the multiple transitions (to democracy, market economy, statehood, and peace) that 
make it the country with the most layers of complexity in governance in the region. It then 
analysed Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state whose contestation stems from the simultaneous 
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presence of a complex federal and consociational structure, and of sub-state centrifugal 
tendencies coupled with the direct intervention of international actors with executive powers. 
The chapter also took a look at the Dayton institutional framework under the lenses of the 
consociational and integrative models of power-sharing. The second part of the chapter 
looked at the interactions between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina over 
time, highlighting in particular how the EU struggled to adapt its approach to the specific 
Bosnian post-conflict context and to get to the helm of the international presence in the 
country. The EU twice remained stuck in cycles of mismanaged conditionality, in the case of 
the police reform process (2005-2008) and of the Sejdić-Finci constitutional reform process 
(2008-2014). The shift towards a streamlined EU presence and the rescheduling of 
conditionality with the “new approach” to Bosnia and Herzegovina in late 2014 led to a 
rebalanced conditionality and a different standing of the EU in the country, which enabled the 
re-opening of the EU path and the achievement of relative successes in the 2014-2016 period, 
also highlighting the consolidation of a strategy of member state building as stateness-aware 
enlargement or “limited state-building”. 
With the exception of executive and sanctioning powers, which remain vested in the 
OHR, the EU retains full instrumentality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its tools encompass 
enlargement policy, with policy dialogue and financial assistance; Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, with the EU Special Representative conducting activities of political dialogue 
and mediation, including the Structured Dialogue on Justice; and Common Security and 
Defence Policy, including the EUFOR Althea military mission. The thesis seeks to understand 
why, with such a wide range of policies available to it, the EU chose to use softer tools, such 
as financial assistance and political dialogue, to conduct state building activities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. I argue that this can be explained through the consideration of the latter as part 
of a member state building strategy that aims to overcome state contestation by strengthening 
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domestic legitimacy and supporting the consolidation of the institutions needed by a future 
EU member state, remaining strictly within the perimeter of the EU acquis. 
The thesis highlights why this makes Bosnia and Herzegovina a crucial case to study the 
approach of the European Union to atypical candidate countries, and the practices enacted by 
the EU to cope with the contestation of statehood as intervening variable of the process of 
Europeanisation. Understanding how the EU has been able to find and enact strategies to cope 
with contested statehood in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a reason to assume 
that similar adaptations may be present in other cases too. 
Chapter III then delved into the first case study, looking at the Structured Dialogue on 
Justice as an exercise in domestic legitimacy-building in JHA matters that ran from 2011 to 
2016. The EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina enacted a strategy of governance by dialogue and 
deliberation, exporting in the context of EU enlargement the transgovernmental and 
deliberative settings typical of comitology and governance networks. In the setting of the 
structured dialogue, the EU, as an interested mediator, facilitated discussion between 
domestic authorities and stakeholders with different domestic sources of legitimacy, 
contributing to fostering consensus in order to restore domestic legitimacy in the justice 
sector, resorting neither to executive powers nor to conditionality. As a consensus-generating 
mechanism, the Structured Dialogue allowed the EU to react to the contestation of statehood 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus standing out as one instance of the EU’s practices of member 
state building. 
Finally, Chapter IV focused on the other dimension of statehood, capacity. By analysing 
the instrument for pre-accession assistance, it highlighted how EU-led capacity building 
focuses specifically on those bodies that are directly responsible and necessary for the 
implementation of the EU acquis, and requires target countries to develop local solutions to 
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adapt their structures to the requirements of the EU acquis. EU practices of capacity building 
started from an incentive-based approach to institution building, as in the thrust towards 
decentralised management. The EU then shifted its focus from structures to functions, away 
from a pre-determined top-down blueprint and towards local adaptations to the domestic 
context, as in the sector approach to financial assistance. Finally, consensus-generating 
mechanisms emerge in this area too, such as in the debate on a coordination mechanism (a 
trans-governmental body within a vertical hierarchy, with input from external stakeholders 
where needed) through which all competent institutions may agree on countrywide strategies 
in order to “speak with a single BiH voice to the EU”. EU practices thus evolved from 
incentive-based institution-building to the establishment of consensus-generating 
mechanisms. This evolution also traces the learning process of the EU on how best to support 
capacity-building in the context of state contestation within its enlargement region.  
The theoretical understanding provided in Chapters I and II and the empirical insights 
developed in Chapters III and IV allow one to draw conclusions on the specific practices of 
member state building enacted by the EU to cope with state contestation in its enlargement 
policy. Based on a notion of sovereignty as participation, such practices aim to restore both 
the legitimacy and the capacity facets of statehood, via the export of consensus-building 
mechanisms which mirror the EU’s internal governance, in order to break the cycle of 
confrontation on the border and competences of the polity rather than on policies, which 
characterizes situations of contested statehood. The result is a specific form of state building, 
in line with the EU’s identity and policy aims, which may prove able to bridge the gap 
inherent in the requirement of “building functional member states while integrating them”.795 
It is still too early to draw conclusions on whether such consensus-generating mechanisms, 
with their emphasis on inclusivity and participation, may be sufficient to cope with the 
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defensive positionalist attitude of Bosnian political elites, which derives from the structural 
conditions of politics in a contested state. The use of the coordination mechanism to agree on 
a single set of coordinated and consolidated replies to the Commission’s Questionnaire, 
expected by early 2018, and the adoption of countrywide strategies allowing for IPA financial 
support will provide a first yardstick to evaluate whether the use of such unwieldy procedures, 
with inevitable trade-offs in terms of efficiency and speediness, will have been justified. 
Likewise, the final results of the Structured Dialogue on Justice remain dependent on the 
capacity of the Bosnian elites to reach a final agreement on the text of the draft laws being 
discussed within it. In the future a similar approach could be extended to more policy areas 
within the framework of EU accession negotiation. The debate between domestic actors on 
how to implement the EU acquis on the basis of the present distribution of competences may 
finally lead to a set of agreed constitutional and legislative changes in order to ensure the 
functionality of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s complex political structure in the framework of 
European integration, and make it compatible with membership in the European Union. 
 
2. Theoretical implications 
To address the first set of research questions – which notions of statehood and 
sovereignty underpin EU practices of state-building, and to what extent the EU’s practices of 
state building differ from those of other international agencies – the thesis has traced the 
transformations of sovereignty and of the state throughout European integration, and 
identified the polity ideas that underpin the state building practices of the EU in third 
countries, in particular in future member states, as in the context of its enlargement policy. 
Through a social constructivist perspective, able to show the mutual constitutiveness between 
the Union and its member states, the study has identified the notion of sovereignty-as-
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participation as the basis of the relations between the EU and its member states, as well as of 
the EU’s external action. Moreover, by investigating statehood and its contestation as the 
dependent variable of EU influence, and introducing the notion of member state building, the 
thesis proposes to reconceptualise the debate on the limits of Europeanisation, looking at the 
ways in which the EU addresses state contestation in its candidate countries and potential 
candidates. Limited or contested statehood is not a fundamental blockage for EU action, I 
argue, and the EU does have an influence on statehood itself, when this is considered under its 
dimensions of capacity and legitimacy. Member state building thus emerges as an 
enlargement-specific form of EU-led state building, set apart from ‘liberal peace’ 
international state building by its specific aim to build future EU member states, and the 
ensuing need to preserve and restore internal democratic legitimacy in parallel to building 
state capacities.  
To address the second set of research questions – whether and how the EU has adapted 
over time to take into account the contestation of statehood within its enlargement policy and 
which specific practices have been enacted by the EU to respond to the contestation of 
statehood – this study has delved into the specific context of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
investigated two case studies of EU practices of member state building. On the one hand, it 
can be seen how the approach gradually emerged from a trial-and-error process in which the 
EU slowly came out at the helm of the international community in the country – with the 
decoupling from the OHR in 2011 – and had to adjust its policy instruments to the local 
situation and to its own elements of relative advantage. The failures of the cycles of 
mismanaged conditionality in the cases of the police reform (2005-2008) and of the Sejdić–
Finci constitutional reform (2009-2014) provided clear lessons to the EU about the need to 
stick closely to the perimeter of the EU acquis to preserve credibility in conditionality; to 
maintain a technical approach to prevent the attempts at politicisation; and to keep clear red 
288 
 
lines about the process format in order to avoid being sucked into the spiral of informality and 
mediation of closed-door “leaders’ talks”.  
The EU practices of member state building are then highlighted in two different 
processes: the Structured Dialogue on Justice, a policy dialogue instrument aimed at fostering 
consensus around institutions and reforms in the justice sector, and thus at restoring 
legitimacy; and the funds for pre-accession assistance (IPA), a financial instrument aimed at 
strengthening state structures to create the necessary capacities for the management of EU 
funds, including by fostering consensus around the overall policy aims of the country (debate 
on the countrywide strategies). The finding of similar consensus-building mechanisms in 
different policy areas in which the EU is engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a 
validation of the theoretical approach chosen. In order to strengthen both capacities and 
legitimacy in the target country at the same time, the EU tends to export the same format of 
its own internal procedures – what Bickerton refers to as the EU’s “consensus-generating 
mechanisms” 796 – and to resort to instruments of network governance, rather than making use 
of more coercive measures that would undermine the legitimacy side of state-building.  
The theoretical relevance and implication of such a study is multiple. First, it adds to the 
studies on European integration by offering a social constructivist interpretation of EU 
practices towards its candidate countries. Based on the mutual constitutiveness of the Union 
and of its member states, and on sovereignty as participation as the polity notion underpinning 
EU activities in its enlargement region, the EU reproduces itself by fostering the development 
of compatible structures across its borders, and then integrating them. As Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is a state in the making, so is also the EU; their constantly unstable equilibria 
speak to each other, albeit in the diversity of structures and issues. This is a dialogue that is 
aimed at final convergence through accession. 
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Secondly, the dissertation adds to the debate on the external action of the EU by 
establishing a dialogue between the literatures on Europeanisation and on state-building, and 
reframing the debate on the limits of Europeanisation and of the transformative power of 
Europe via the concept of member state building. It shows that the domestic impact of Europe 
is not obliterated by the contestation of statehood, but rather that the EU enacts specific 
practices in order to restore consensus around statehood. Member state building emerges as an 
enlargement-specific form of state building conducted by the EU, set apart from ‘liberal 
peace’ international state building by its specific aim (building future member states), 
priorities (restore capacities and legitimacy at the same time) and instruments (export of 
consensus-generation engines). 
More broadly, the study offers a contribution to international studies by putting forward 
an analysis of the transformations of the state in relation to the EU. Member state building 
points to an unprecedented process of state transformation by interaction and integration. This 
process starts at the early stages of interaction between the EU and a third country 
(association) and accelerates during the pre-accession period, leading after accession to the 
full integration of the state structures with those of the EU. As noted above, this process can 
only be comprehended under a theoretical perspective that posits the mutual constitutiveness 
of the Union and its member states. Studying its different phases is pivotal to achieving an 
understanding of the whole process. 
 
3. Policy implications 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is characterized by a very specific form of internal contestation. 
And yet, there is no special treatment for unique cases in EU policy, since all candidate 
countries and potential candidates are meant to be treated equally and fairly. The adaptation of 
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the EU enlargement policy thus cannot move towards lowering the bar, in an ad hoc fashion; 
rather, it needs to consider the particular local conditions, and include specific mechanisms 
and procedures to adjust to the local context while keeping the consistency of the process and 
avoiding double standards that may be exploited by other actors in the future. 
In the Bosnian context, the most characteristic element – as noted by several 
interviewees
797
  – is the pervasive polarisation and politicisation of even the most technical 
policy areas. This goes hand in hand with a defensive-positionalist attitude by the members of 
the ruling elites, who continue to hold deeply divergent visions of the long-term future of the 
country, consider compromise as a failure, and believe from their own experience with 
international actors since 1995 that merely by sitting out on their commitments they can push 
the EU to give up on its requirements and reward them for the sake of ‘stability’.  
To succeed in reinforcing domestic institutions in a pre-accession perspective, the EU 
thus had to learn the hard way about the need to stick to the perimeter of the EU acquis, to 
maintain credibility of conditionality; to carefully calibrate sanctions and rewards, 
maintaining the proportionality of conditionality; and to get engaged at the technical level to 
ensure its clarity. 
At the same time, in parallel with the rebalancing of conditionality, the EU learned the 
need for a maieutic approach to state building. Member state building finds its rationale in the 
need to work in partnership between the EU and the enlargement country, in order to devise 
the specific and locally adapted solutions that may be compatible with future integration in 
the Union.  
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The final aim of the EU accession process foresees Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
functional state, able to take part in the decision-making and in the policy-implementation 
processes at European level. At the end of the process, Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be able 
to sit at the table, on an equal footing, with all other EU member states. This final aim 
highlights the emancipatory potential of EU-led state building in the enlargement region, and 
sets it apart from the state building efforts of other international organisations, which may be 
criticised for reproducing imperialist or simply unequal power relations. For the same reason, 
linked to the need to reinforce the democratic legitimacy of domestic institutions, the EU 
cannot resort to coercive tools and impose legislation.  
Member state building, which supports the objective of EU accession, aims to reinforce 
the capacities and legitimacy of institutions, and does so by exporting consensus-generating 
mechanisms, typical of the EU setting, to the Bosnian environment. The aim of these 
consensus engines is not simply to depoliticise – i.e. decreasing the political salience of a 
policy and the related political costs of an agreement – but also to redirect the discussion 
towards the supranational level, the accession to which is understood as being the objective of 
all sides at the table. 
 
4. Perspectives for future research 
An analysis of the EU practices of member state building, as proposed in this dissertation, 
may be complemented by widening the scope of the policy areas under scrutiny – for instance 
by including in the comparison the area of socio-economic policy as well, in which the EU 
has had a strong influence since 2015 following the adoption of the three-year Reform 
Agenda, in close cooperation with other financial institutions, to see whether the same 
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mechanisms of consensus-building emerge, and whether these achieve the same effects of 
legitimacy and capacity building in a policy area that is paradoxically less contested. The 
relations between the EU and different international institutions involved in the member state 
building process (the Council of Europe for what concerns justice and home affairs, the IMF, 
World Bank or EBRD in the socio-economic area) may be one further area of interest. 
 A further promising avenue of research could include a comparison with other cases of 
state contestation of a more internal nature in the Western Balkans. Leaving aside the thorny 
case of Kosovo-Serbia relations, the cases most conducive to a comparison with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are Albania and Macedonia. The recent territorial and judicial reforms in 
Albania, as well as the foreseen reforms following the change in government in Macedonia, 
could constitute good case studies to see whether the EU is also exporting consensus-building 
mechanisms to these countries, which are at a more advanced stage in the EU enlargement 
process, and where the international community is also less present, with the EU therefore 
already in a more prominent position.  
Broadening the picture even more, a further promising avenue of study could consist 
in comparing EU state building efforts in the enlargement region to those in the 
neighbourhood region, as well as comparing them to efforts even further, in Africa and Asia, 
to highlight the enlargement-specific aspects of member state building as a policy aimed at 
fostering the consolidation of future EU member states, as opposed to wider EU policy 
approaches to state building and peace building. This could also be complemented by making 
comparisons with the findings of the literature on external governance,
798
 to evaluate whether 
the EU merely exports norms and practices to its neighbourhood and further afield, as 
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opposed to getting engaged in a hands-on institutional development in the enlargement region 
to ensure future compatibility of local solutions with the EU acquis.  
Finally, one interesting avenue of research could consist in studying the recursive 
effect of the development of member state building approaches on the further integration of 
the European construction. The democratic deconsolidation and slippery slope towards 
“illiberal democracy” in Hungary and Poland (but other member states are also at risk) have 
brought to the fore the need for the EU to identify instruments to ensure and protect the rule 
of law not only in the sphere of EU law but also within the domestic legal order of its member 
states. In line with the tradition of enlargement policy as a precursor of standards that are first 
requested for candidate states to be later constitutionalised for member states too, it may be 
interesting to see whether the approach of member state building in the enlargement policy 
could constitute a blueprint for future attempts at the constitutionalisation of rule of law and 
democratic criteria within EU member states.  
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